RIPS’ Eye, December 19, 2025
Japan-China Tensions over Taiwan and the Strategic Trajectory of the Takaichi Administration
Masatoshi MURAKAMI, Ph. D
Associate Professor, Department of Contemporary Society, Kogakkan University
RIPS Senior Research Fellow
In November 2025, tensions between Japan and China have intensified sharply. Why are the two countries confronting each other over Taiwan? It is worth examining the fundamental causes.
China reacted vehemently to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks in the Diet on 7 November 2025, claiming that her comments are the root cause of the deterioration in Japan–China relations. Japan, however, sees the situation differently. In recent years, it is China that has expanded its military capabilities in an opaque manner and become a destabilising factor for regional security. Beijing has attempted unilateral changes to the status quo through coercive means in the Senkaku Islands, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Around Taiwan, it has repeatedly carried out military exercises and increased military intimidation.
International concern over China’s behaviour has also been rising. At the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Canada on 12 November 2025, the joint communiqué included a reference to the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Following Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks, expressions of solidarity have also come from like-minded partners. Admiral Daryl Caudle, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, told reporters that he “can’t say [he is] surprised” by Prime Minister Takaichi’s recent statements. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te stated that China’s “hybrid attacks” on Japan pose a serious threat to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, and urged Beijing to “exercise restraint, demonstrate the demeanor of a responsible major power, and refrain from being a troublemaker in the region.”
To respond to China’s military ambitions, Japan has been strengthening its defence posture, enhancing the credibility of the Japan–US alliance, deepening cooperation with like-minded partners, reinforcing its capabilities in key areas such as maritime security, cyber and space, and working diplomatically to uphold a rules-based international order. What is important is that all of these are reactive measures taken in response to China’s rapid military build-up. Japan aims to secure peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific by enhancing deterrence vis-à-vis China.
In this sense, the deterioration of Japan-China relations in recent years—driven largely by tensions over Taiwan—forms the strategic backdrop against which the Takaichi administration has defined its foreign and security policy priorities.
Japan and China fundamentally differ in their positions on Taiwan. To understand the Taiwan issue within Japan–China relations, it is necessary to refer to the Japan–China Joint Communiqué. In September 1972, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira visited China and held negotiations with Premier Zhou Enlai on the normalisation of diplomatic relations. During the negotiations, the Chinese side presented the “Three Principles for the Restoration of Relations.”
The final sticking point was the Taiwan issue, which was ultimately incorporated into Paragraph 3 of the Joint Communiqué as follows:
“The Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.”
Japan merely agreed to understand and respect China’s position; it did not endorse it. Likewise, in the Shanghai Communiqué issued in February 1972 during President Nixon’s visit to China, the United States only acknowledged China’s position. Because neither Japan nor the United States fully accepted Beijing’s “One China” principle, both countries preserved some room to maintain and develop their respective relationships with Taiwan. This unresolved divergence has remained a fundamental source of Sino-Japanese tensions over Taiwan to this day.
Consequently, the Takaichi administration must formulate its diplomatic and security strategy under conditions in which the Taiwan issue remains the core structural challenge in Japan–China relations.
From here, I would like to consider the future trajectory of the Takaichi administration. In her policy speech upon taking office on 24 October, Prime Minister Takaichi asserted that “without political stability, it is impossible to advance robust economic policies or a strong foreign and security policy.” Her slogan, “Japan’s diplomacy in full bloom at the centre of the world,” reflects the diplomatic philosophy of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and clearly signals continuity with the Abe line.
The administration’s emphasis on foreign and security policy—particularly vis-à-vis China—thus cannot be separated from the ongoing tensions surrounding Taiwan.
Particularly noteworthy is her pledge to accelerate the increase of defence spending to 2% of GDP and achieve this target within fiscal year 2025. The Takaichi administration characterises this not as the result of U.S. pressure but as part of Japan’s sovereign decision to strengthen its own defence capabilities.
This decision aligns closely with the heightened threat environment Japan faces in dealing with China’s military assertiveness.
Specific policy measures are laid out in the coalition agreement signed between the Liberal Democratic Party and Nippon Ishin. Key items include:
• Accelerated revision of the three strategic documents (National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy, and Defence Buildup Programme)
• Establishment of a peace mediation unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Development of stand-off defence capabilities, including submarines equipped with vertical launch systems (VLS)
• Strengthening unified command and control within the Self-Defence Forces
• Abolition of the five categories restricting defence equipment transfers
• Promotion of private-sector operation of state-owned defence factories and facilities
• Creation of a pension/benefits system for SDF personnel
• Upgrading the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office into a National Intelligence Bureau and creation of a National Intelligence Council
• Establishment of an independent foreign intelligence agency
• Cross-ministerial training of intelligence officers
• Development of legal frameworks related to intelligence and counter-espionage
The central question in political management for the administration is the timing of the dissolution of the House of Representatives. Although the House has a four-year term, the prime minister may dissolve it at any time. With the Takaichi administration enjoying high approval ratings, discussions of an early dissolution have already emerged. Should the ruling parties win a landslide victory, some predict the possibility of a reconfiguration of the coalition.
In foreign and security policy, the departure of Komeito—the traditional “brake” within coalition governments—has given the administration greater freedom of action, raising expectations that long-stalled defence and security reforms will accelerate rapidly. In addition to front-loading defence spending increases, future policy debates are likely to focus on the potential introduction of nuclear-powered submarines, the removal of remaining restrictions on defence equipment transfers, and even reconsideration of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
These discussions illustrate how China’s behaviour—particularly regarding Taiwan—continues to shape the strategic direction and policy ambitions of the Takaichi administration.
If the government strengthens its political base through a snap election, it is highly likely that the Takaichi administration will evolve into a long-term government, launching a series of new initiatives in the field of foreign and security policy.