Vol.36. December 29. 2025
What is happening in East Asian Maritime Security? The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) publishes the biweekly newsletter, the information on maritime security relevant to East Asia and Japan's territory. |
Monthly Column
Ensuring Strategic Deterrence in the First-Island-
Chain: A Japanese-ed First Island Chain Minilateral?
Renato Cruz De Castro
Distinguished Professor,
De La Salle University, Manila
The Trump Administration’s recently released November 2025 National Security Strategy of the United States revived the mid-20th-century geopolitical concept of the strategic relevance of the first island chain. The said document stated: “We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. However, the American military cannot, and should not, have to do this alone. Our allies must step up and spend—and more importantly do—
much more for collective defense.” The first-island chain is the geopolitical linear arrangement of three major island groups: Japan’s Southwest Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippine archipelago. The concept of a first-island chain is based on a traditional geopolitical assumption that occupying and controlling this collection of islands provides locational advantages, triggering undeniable attractions from great naval powers, drawing them in through a small island's "suction effect" (SISE).
In recent times, driven by its vast economy and expanding navy, Beijing has pursued a policy of maritime expansionism that challenges Washington’s pivotal position in the first-island chain, extending from Japan to Taiwan and the Philippines. Projecting its growing comprehensive power eastward, China seeks to break past the first island chain, namely Japan’s Southwest Island chain, Taiwan, and the Philippines, into the open waters of the Western and Central Pacific. This, consequently, is leading to a 21st-century version of the mid-20th-century Cold War First Island Chain Strategy.
Reviving a 21st Century Island-Chain Strategy
Washington conceived the first island chain strategy during the Cold War to contain the Soviet Union and China. It provided for establishing American naval and air bases in the Western Pacific, from which to project American air and naval power and deny access to Soviet and Chinese expansion into the Central Pacific. In the context of the 21st century, the strategy involves linking the defense postures of the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan through security partnerships among the three. Three significant developments are creating the necessary conditions for the formation of a first island chain strategy that can constrain Chinese maritime expansion. They are: the Philippines’ adoption of a Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC), the enhancement of the Philippine-Japan security partnership, and the growing realization by Manila and Tokyo that they need to link their security relations with Taipei, despite their respective One-China policies.
The Philippines’ Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC)
In January 2024, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro announced a new defense concept known as the “Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept” (CADC). The CADC requires the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to create a credible defensive posture to build the country’s deterrent capabilities in the Philippines' archipelagic waters and EEZ. The CADC aims to rectify the Philippines’ strategic vulnerabilities and enhance the AFP’s capability to protect national interests through long-term plans. The CADC is designed to enable the AFP to project its capabilities into maritime areas of the country that require protection and preservation. The Philippine military must boost its maritime situational awareness, connectivity, intelligence capabilities (C41STAR), and area-denial and deterrence capabilities in marine and aerial domains. The AFP must also adopt a new strategic paradigm, driven by the urgency to develop its anti-access and area denial capabilities. This also requires the AFP to develop strategic bases around the fringes of the Philippine archipelago. These measures are designed to prevent other militaries from operating or crossing the vast stretches of its archipelagic territory, with the stated goal of making its EEZ in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea a no-go zone of the Chinese maritime militia, China Coast Guard (CCG), and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
By implication, this means the AFP is moving away from its old concept of defending the country’s long and rugged coastal areas. This required the Philippine military to anticipate an invading force moving toward the country’s shoreline before mounting any combat operation against this amphibious enemy. Instead, the AFP is formulating a new strategic paradigm based on the need to bolster its anti-access and area denial capabilities within the Philippines’ archipelagic territories, including the country’s EEZ. This also required the AFP to develop defense capabilities and utilize resources to establish a credible deterrent posture or forward defense that covers the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These capabilities are intended to prevent other militaries from operating or crossing the vast stretches of its archipelagic territory, with the stated goal of making its EEZ in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea a no-go zone for the Chinese maritime militia, CCG, and PLAN. More significantly, implementing CADC would effectively enable the Philippines to fill the strategic vacuum in the southern flank of the First Island Chain.
The Enhancement of Philippine-Japan Security Partnership through JAPHUS
In recent times, Tokyo and Washington have expanded their alliance relationship, especially in the maritime security domain, by including a third party. The U.S. and Japan have enhanced their collective defense capabilities through consultations and involvement with other Indo-Pacific countries, including Australia, India, and South Korea. From 2023 to 2024, Tokyo and Washington decided to engage Manila strategically. This led the Kishida Administration to focus on enhancing Japan’s strategic partnership with the Philippines. On April 11, 2024, Presidents Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and Joe Biden of the United States, along with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, convened in Washington, D.C. to meet for the first summit of the Japan-Philippine-U.S. (JAPHUS) Trilateral Security Partnership.
With Japan and the U.S. strengthening their respective security relations with the Philippines, the three countries have worked to bring each other closer to deep and comprehensive trilateral security cooperation, building up what can be considered a collective capacity to address common regional security concerns. Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S. are intensifying their security partnership through the JAPHUS defense network. This security network is formed by a strengthened alliance between Tokyo and Washington, with both allies strengthening the foundations of their strategic partnerships with Manila. Consequently, JAPHIS’s informal and de facto trilateral security network is intact and active, generating appreciable results after its formation in April 2024. These benefits include:
1) Through JAPHUS, the U.S. and Japanese security assistance and guarantee to the Philippines have strengthened its resolve to confront Chinese gray zone operations in the South China Sea.
2) Through Japan’s participation in the trilateral security partnership, Tokyo has extended security assistance to the AFP modernization program by providing radar and other non-lethal military hardware.
3) Through this trilateral security arrangement, Japan and the U.S. have synchronized their security assistance to the Philippines by aligning their efforts to support the Philippines’ defense priorities in implementing the CADC. For example, the installation of Japanese-made air-surveillance systems at Wallace Air Station, and the U.S. continued development and integration of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) air domain sensors at the Basa Air Base Command and Control Fusion Center, have collectively helped develop the AFP’s air and sea domain-awareness capabilities in its archipelagic waters.
4) Through JAPHUS, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), the AFP, and the U.S. Armed Forces have enhanced operational coordination and interoperability by periodically conducting multilateral maritime cooperative activities in the South and East China Seas. Through these activities, the AFP, the JSDF, and the U.S. Armed Forces have agreed to explore joint planning for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities to enhance interoperability and coordination in effective maritime and air domain awareness in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and surrounding waters.
The Recognition of the Need to Establish Security Relations with Taiwan
In the recent past, Manila and Tokyo have been less vocal about their security concerns about China’s plan for an armed unification against Taiwan because of their respective One-China Policy. However, there is a growing realization in the two capitals that if China controls and dominates the South China Sea and Taiwan, Beijing can tilt the balance of power in its favor. China will then exercise effective sea control over the region’s sea lanes of communications (SLOCS) and effectively prevent the U.S. 7th Fleet from operating within the waters of the first-island-chain. Hence, aside from ensuring that no single power controls and dominates the South China Sea, it is also in Manila's and Tokyo’s interest to ensure that Taipei remains a strategic buffer against Beijing’s goal to dominate the first island chain. This led to both Manila and Tokyo expressing their mutual concerns about China’s irredentist agenda regarding Taiwan, despite their adherence to the One-China policy.
Recently, the Marcos Administration has become more articulate about the need for the Philippines to prepare for a Taiwan contingency. In August 2025, during President Marcos Jr.’s first official visit to India, he publicly mentioned what many defense officials, analysts, and military officers are discussing in several closed-door defense and security conferences in the Philippines: “If there is an all-out war, we will be drawn into it. We will have to go into Taiwan and bring our people home.” Firstpost Managing Editor Palki Sharma hosted this question during an interview about how the Philippines will respond in a Taiwan contingency. President Marcos added that his country “cannot stay out if a conflict breaks out between China and Taiwan,” as the Philippines would be “drawn into it to protect its citizens working in Taiwan.” A few days later, after his return to Manila, he reiterated what he stated in Delhi: “To be practical about it, if there is confrontation over Taiwan between China and the United States, there is no way that the Philippines can stay out of it because of our geographical location.” President Marcos reiterated this statement in response to the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s harsh and critical condemnation of his remarks regarding the Philippines' potential response in the event of a contingency involving Taiwan.
Tokyo has also been vocal about its need to prepare and respond to a Taiwan Contingency. In the past, Japanese prime ministers have refrained from answering hypothetical questions on a Taiwan emergency and contingency. However, this changed in November 2025 when Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s recent statement hinting that a Chinese naval blockade in the vicinity of Taiwan could constitute a ‘survival-threatening situation—potentially triggering the mobilization of the Self-Defense Forces—that has recently triggered a major Sino-Japanese diplomatic row.
A Japanese-led First Island Chain Mini-lateral?
The first step in forming this island defense system is for the three to establish a security partnership among themselves. Japan and the Philippines have already linked their respective defense policies through the 2015 Philippine-Japan Strategic Partnership, known as JAPHUS, and more recently, the Philippine-Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) of 2025. Both the Philippines and Japan, despite their One-China policy, must pursue an informal security partnership with Taiwan. As the most powerful among the first island chain countries, Japan must take the lead in forming a First Island Chain mini lateral. To form this fist-island chain mini-lateral, Manila, Taipei, and Tokyo should consider the following measures:
1) Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines should view their respective long-term strategic interests as closely linked and inviolable.
2) Manila, Taipei, and Tokyo should hold several informal and track 2 dialogues regarding the inviolability of their security interests and the need to link their defense policies despite the Philippines and Japan’s One-China Policies.
3) The Philippines and Japan should enhance their comprehensive security partnerships through joint military exercises and maritime cooperative activities, Subject Matter Exchanges (SME) exchanges, transfer of Japanese Excess Defense Articles to the Philippines, and mutual logistic arrangements.
4) Despite the Philippines’ strict and highly legalistic One-China Policy, Manila and Taiwan should explore an informal defense cooperation through intelligence exchanges, security and defense dialogues between ranking AFP and Taiwan Armed Forces, SME exchange, joint military exercises in third countries, and maritime cooperative activities at the Luzon Straits and the Philippine Sea.
5) Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines should strengthen their respective security relations with their common security ally and partner, the United States.
6) The AFP, the JSDF, and the Taiwan armed forces should encourage the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) to host military exercises and command conferences at Guam and Hawaii, where units from the AFP, the Taiwan armed forces, and the JSDF can join and participate.
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Statistical Data and Analysis (as of December 29)
In the latter half of this month, diplomatic activities related to events that had occurred by the nd of the previous period continued.
In response to Prime Minister Takaichi's remarks last month regarding a Taiwan contingency, China has demanded the retraction of those remarks, while continuing to assert its own position and criticize Japan. Japan has countered that China's claims lack any basis and is seeking understanding from other countries.
Japan briefed the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia on two incidents this month: a radar incident in which a Chinese military aircraft illuminated a Japan Air Self–Defense Force (JASDF) aircraft with radar, and the Chinese–Russian bombers’ joint flight from the East China Sea to the Pacific, and conveyed its grave concerns over these incidents.
Japan agreed with each country to advance cooperation.
Additionally, China Coast Guard actions that endangered Filipino fishermen this month drew condemnation not only from the Philippines but also from the United States and the European Union.
[Statistical Data as of December 29]
Japan Coast Guard (JCG) daily updates the statistical data on the number of China Coast Guard vessels entering in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands and intruding into Japanese territorial waters. The below is from the website of JCG.
https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/
mission/senkaku/senkaku.html
Dec. |
Contiguous zone |
Territorial
Waters |
Dec. |
Contiguous zone |
Territorial
Waters |
15 |
2 |
|
22 |
1 |
|
16 |
4 |
|
23 |
4 |
|
17 |
4 |
|
24 |
4 |
|
18 |
4 |
|
25 |
4 |
|
19 |
4 |
|
26 |
|
|
20 |
4 |
|
27 |
|
|
21 |
1 |
|
28 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Date |
Topics |
12/15 |
On December 15, meeting between Japan’s state minister for foreign affairs and the UK parliamentary under-secretary of state (Indo-Pacific) was held.
Japan’s state minister expressed her intention to further expand cooperation between Japan and the UK, an “enhanced global strategic partner” that share fundamental values and strategic interests. Both sides exchanged views on a wide range of issues, including bilateral relations in areas such as security as well as regional issues including in the Indo-Pacific, and concurred to continue close coordination between the two countries. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
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12/15 |
Three Filipino fishermen were injured and two fishing vessels damaged when Chinese coast guard ships blasted water cannons and cut their anchor lines near Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea on December 12, the Philippine Coast Guard said.
China said the Philippines deployed numerous ships on December 12 to “create trouble,” ignored repeated warnings, and remained in the lagoon. It also alleged that Philippine vessels took dangerous actions, including abrupt course changes, and that personnel even brandished knives at Chinese coast guard officers, according to a foreign ministry spokesperson on December 15.
The Philippines’ maritime council called on the Chinese coast guard to act responsibly, adhere to international standards, and place the preservation of life at sea above actions that sow fear and endanger civilians. It said the use of water cannons and dangerous manoeuvres causing injury and damage cannot be justified, and said the Philippines would lodge a strong protest and demand China cease such aggressive acts. Presidential press officer told reporters that the Philippines will file a demarche to the Chinese embassy on December 15.
The United States has condemned China’s use of water cannons and the cutting of Filipino fishermen’s anchor lines, saying it stands with the Philippines against China’s provocative and increasingly dangerous actions that undermine regional stability. |
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12/15 |
South China Sea: Statement by the Spokesperson on the recent dangerous actions
The EU condemns the recent dangerous actions by the Chinese Coast Guard - deployment of water cannons and cutting anchor lines - in the South China Sea against Philippine fishing vessels. These actions threatened the safety of life at sea, causing injury to civilians and undermined the lawful exercise of maritime rights. The EU recalls that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the legal framework governing all activities in the oceans and seas, which should be upheld and respected at all times. The 2016 Arbitral Award is final and legally binding on the parties concerned. The EU calls for de-escalation of tensions and expects China to exercise restraint, refrain from the use of force or coercion, and resolve disputes peacefully, in full respect of international law. |
The European External Action Service |
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12/16 |
On December 16, the Philippine defense secretary denounced what he described as “dangerous” and “inhumane” actions by the Chinese coast guard, after three Filipino fishermen were injured and two fishing vessels damaged when they used water cannons and cut their anchor lines at a contested South China Sea shoal last week. "Water cannoning, aggressive manoeuvring, and the cutting of anchor lines resulting in physical injuries of Filipino civilians are wholly inconsistent with the duty of all States to ensure the safety of human lives," he said in a statement. He dismissed as "blatant lies" China's assertions that the fishermen brandished knives to threaten Chinese coast guard officers. "We call on China to stop spreading false narratives and engaging in a state-orchestrated disinformation campaign," he said. |
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12/16 |
China’s permanent representative to the UN has reiterated his demand that Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae retract her remark about a Taiwan contingency. At a December 15 UN Security Council meeting, he described the remark as rude interference in China’s domestic affairs and emphasized that Taiwan is part of China’s territory and cannot be separated. His comments deviated from the council’s agenda that day, which included the selection of the next secretary-general.
Japan’s permanent representative said it is regrettable that China has made a "groundless statement against Japan." He added that China’s remarks seek to sow division among member states in a venue for constructive discussion, which is inappropriate and irrelevant. He reiterated that Japan will respond calmly through dialogue and hopes these debates help member countries find the truth about Japan’s actions over the past 80 years. |
Reference: Japan's position on China's statement against Japan (24 November) |
Reference: Japan's position on China's statement against Japan (4 December) |
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12/17 |
China continues to protest remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on a Taiwan contingency by promoting its position at home and abroad. China’s Foreign Ministry says its foreign minister toured the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Jordan from December 12 to 16, stating that China firmly opposes Japan’s leader interfering in China’s internal affairs. China has explained its stance since last month at meetings with foreign ministers and other officials from Central Asia, Europe and Southeast Asia, and has repeatedly criticized Japan at the UN. Sources familiar with Japan-China relations say China has been explaining its stance to foreign diplomats in Beijing and seeking their support.
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12/17 |
According to sources in the Defense Ministry, Japan’s defense minister began coordination to hold telephone talks with his counterparts in Britain and the Philippines about a recent incident in which Chinese military aircraft inappropriately directed radar toward JASDF aircraft. He also plans a telephone conference with South Korea’s defense minister. The Japanese side aims to seek understanding for Japan’s position on the issue and obtain support from international public opinion.
On December 15, a spokesperson for China’s Defense Ministry said the Chinese military had notified Japan that carrier-borne aircraft would conduct flight drills mainly south of the aircraft carrier for about six hours from 3 p.m., and that Japan received the radio message. In response, Japan’s defense minister said on December 16 that when a radar illumination incident occurred on December 6, a Chinese Navy ship contacted a Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyer, but the communication did not include details such as the scale of the drill or the latitude, longitude, or airspace of the exercise. |
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12/17 |
On December 17, the Japan-UK defense ministerial VTC was held.
Japan’s minister expressed his resolve to exercise leadership together with the UK secretary, based on the shared recognition that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific is inseparable. The UK secretary endorsed the remark.
Both ministers discussed the regional security environment. Japan’s minister briefed the December 6 radar incident, in which Chinese aircraft illuminated JASDF fighters, and the December 9 Chinese-Russian bombers’ joint flight from the East China Sea to the Pacific. They shared serious concerns and stressed their unwavering commitment to a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, and concurred on the need for a calm and resolute posture, and on communicating and cooperating to preserve stability in the region. |
Ministry of Defense of Japan |
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12/18 |
On December 18, Japan-Thailand foreign ministers’ working lunch was held.
Regarding bilateral relations, Japan’s minister expressed his desire to strengthen security cooperation to ensure regional peace and stability in the region. The two ministers confirmed the importance of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific amid a worsening international situation and concurred on continuing cooperation on regional issues, including the East China Sea and South China Sea. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
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12/18 |
On December 18, the Japan-Philippines defense ministerial VTC was held.
Both ministers reaffirmed the need to further strengthen bilateral cooperation amid an increasingly severe security environment. They also exchanged views on regional security issues. Japan’s minister briefed on the December 6 radar incident in which a Chinese military aircraft illuminated a JASDF aircraft with radar and the December 9 joint Chinese-Russian bomber flight from the Eastern Sea to the Pacific, and shared his grave concerns. They reiterated their strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in the East and South China Seas. |
Ministry of Defense of Japan |
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12/18 |
On December 17, bipartisan U.S. senators introduced a resolution expressing support for Japan and condemning China's economic and military pressure following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's remarks on a Taiwan contingency. The measure was led by Sen. Pete Ricketts, Republican chair, and Sen. Christopher Coons, Democratic ranking member, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's East Asia Subcommittee. The resolution criticizes Beijing for "economic, military, and diplomatic coercion and aggression" against Japan while praising Tokyo's "efforts to diffuse tensions" amid China's "continuous unilateral provocation."
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12/19 |
On December 19, Japan-New Zealand defense minister meeting was held.
Japan’s minister briefed the December 6 radar incident in which Chinese military aircraft illuminated JASDF fighters and the December 9 joint Chinese-Russian bomber flight, sharing grave concerns. They concurred on maintaining close communication. Japan’s minister emphasized responding to such Chinese actions in a calm yet resolute manner. They also agreed to further deepen bilateral defense cooperation toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. |
Ministry of Defense of Japan |
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12/19 |
On December 19, the Japan-New Zealand Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and the Japan-New Zealand Information Security Agreement were signed. After the signing, Japan’s foreign minister and New Zealand’s defence minister exchanged views on bilateral security cooperation, regional issues, and the importance of U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and concurred on further strengthening their security and defense partnership in promoting a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
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12/19 |
On December 18, the JMSDF confirmed one Russian Steregushchiy Ⅲ class frigate (hull number 337) sailing northeast in waters 120km south of Yonagunijima Island (Okinawa Prefecture). This vessel sailed northeast through the waters including the contiguous zone between Yonagunijima Island and Iriomotejima Island (Okinawa Prefecture) and navigated to the East China Sea. |
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12/19 |
On December 19, Japan’s defense minister received a courtesy call from the Thai foreign minister.
The two ministers exchanged views on regional security. Japan’s minister briefed the December 6 radar incident involving a Chinese military aircraft and the December 9 joint flight of Chinese-Russian bombers, expressing grave concerns. The Thai minister noted that a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific is a shared interest amid the increasingly severe security environment. They affirmed their commitment to strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges. |
Ministry of Defense of Japan |
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12/19 |
On December 18, at a UN General Assembly meeting, China’s permanent representative again condemned Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's remarks on a Taiwan contingency, saying they “challenge and attempt to overturn the postwar international order, creating global instability,” and calling for the immediate cessation of “provocative actions that cross a line” and the “retraction of incorrect remarks.”
Japan’s permanent representative countered, “We regret the Chinese representative's baseless remarks,” reiterated that “Japan's defense strategy is exclusively defensive,” and said that “China's claim that Japan can exercise self-defense without an armed attack is mistaken.” |
Jiji Press News (Japanese) |
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12/21 |
Half a month after Chinese fighter jets directed radar at JASDF aircraft, Japan and China continue clashing over whether China gave advance notice of its training and the dangers of radar use.
China insists JASDF jets intruded into training zones it had set up and claims it notified Japan in advance of the same-day training, releasing audio said to be from a radio exchange between the Chinese military and the SDF. Japan views it as problematic that China did not issue a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) or navigation warning for vessels, practices the SDF follows before training. “China is trying to make Japan look wrong and set up a straw man,” a senior SDF official said. The Japanese government sees the core problem in the dispute as the Chinese aircraft intermittently directing radar for about 30 minutes. China argues that using search radar during flight training is common. Radar is highly dangerous if used for fire control—target acquisition in preparation for firing—but China has not clarified if this was the case. Japan countered that fighter jets’ radar can serve that purpose and said prolonged radar use is dangerous and could trigger a military clash. In 2013, amid strained Japan-China relations, a Chinese frigate pointed fire-control radar at a Japanese destroyer. In the current dispute, China is believed to be using old tactics of intimidation and provocation, and similar incidents could occur in the future. |
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12/22 |
On December 21, the JMSDF confirmed one Steregushchiy Ⅲ class frigate (hull number 337) sailing northeast in waters 130km southwest of Tsushima Island (Nagasaki Prefecture). This vessel sailed northeast through the Tsushima Strait and navigated to the Sea of Japan. |
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12/22 |
On December 22, Japan-Australia foreign ministers' telephone meeting was held.
The two ministers exchanged candid views on the Indo-Pacific situation and reaffirmed close cooperation for regional peace and stability. They also agreed to promote multi-layered cooperation with the U.S. and other like-minded countries, including frameworks such as Japan-U.S.-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia-India (Quad), to realize a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
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12/22 |
On December 22, the Japan–Indonesia defense ministers’ video teleconference was held.
The two ministers exchanged views on regional security. Japan’s minister briefed the December 6 radar incident involving a Chinese military aircraft and the December 9 joint flight of Chinese-Russian bombers, expressing grave concerns. Indonesia’s minister expressed understanding that Japan’s response is grounded in international norms. They agreed on the importance of enhancing communication and promoting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. |
Ministry of Defense of Japan |
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12/23 |
On December 19, a bipartisan group of U.S. House members filed a resolution condemning China's "coercive actions" against Japan following the Japanese prime minister's remarks on a Taiwan contingency. The resolution reaffirms the United States' "ironclad commitment" to its security alliance with Japan and supports Japan's sovereign right "to express views on regional and international matters without fear of economic or military coercion." California lawmakers Republican Young Kim and Democrat Ami Bera, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, urged President Trump to "work with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to counter coercive economic and diplomatic practices."
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12/23 |
On December 23, Japan’s foreign minister received a courtesy call from the president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The foreign minister conveyed that Japan attaches great importance to the ICJ’s role in strengthening the rule of law in the international community and will continue to strongly support it. In response, the ICJ President expressed appreciation for Japan’s commitment to the rule of law and its contribution to the Court’s activities. They also exchanged views on the situation surrounding the ICJ and confirmed continued coordination and cooperation to uphold and strengthen the rule of law internationally. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
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12/23 |
Department of Defense (War) released the annual report to the congress: Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China (China Military Power) on 23 December 2025.
The report argued that “China’s historic military buildup has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable,” and “the PLA continues to make steady progress toward its 2027 goals, whereby the PLA must be able to achieve 'strategic decisive victory' over Taiwan.”
The report notes that China is not only enhancing the combat capabilities of its Forces but also accelerating the development of various technologies including cyber warfare capabilities, military AI, biotechnology and hypersonic missiles.
Specifically, this includes the development of quantum cryptography technology and the utilization of large language models (LLMs). The report also pointed out that PLA fielded its intercontinental Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) and assessed its range covers much of the Pacific Ocean, up to the West Coast of the United States. |
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12/24 |
On December 24, following reports that the South Korean military conducted military exercises concerning Takeshima on December 23, the Japanese Foreign Ministry Director-General lodged a strong protest to the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Japan. In addition, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Japan in the Republic of Korea lodged a strong protest to the Korean Foreign Ministry Director-General, based on Japan’s consistent position on Takeshima. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Japanese) |
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12/24 |
In June, a Taiwanese court sentenced the Chinese captain of a Togo-registered ship to three years in jail for intentionally damaging undersea cables off Taiwan in February. On December 24, the public security bureau in Weihai, eastern China’s Shandong province, said two Taiwanese men led a frozen goods smuggling operation involving a Chinese-crewed vessel that damaged subsea cables earlier this year.
China previously accused Taiwan of “manipulating” allegations of Chinese involvement in the case, saying it made claims before the facts were clear. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said Taipei had ignored the facts and “maliciously hyped up” the situation.
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council urged Chinese authorities to provide concrete evidence, saying that publicly naming individuals and offering rewards without such evidence was “not a civilized practice” and amounted to cross-border repression and political manipulation. |
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12/25 |
On December 25, Japan-Cambodia Senior Officials’ Talks was held.
During the consultation, both sides discussed a wide range of bilateral relations including security and defense cooperation, with a view toward realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). They exchanged views on regional and international affairs including the Indo-Pacific region and confirmed their commitment to strengthen cooperation in regional and international fora. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
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12/25 |
On December 25, industry sources reported that Chinese authorities had instructed major domestic travel agencies to reduce visa applications for Japan and cut visitor numbers to 60% of previous levels.
According to sources in China’s travel industry, the instructions were issued in late November, following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on a Taiwan contingency. Chinese authorities cited deteriorating public safety in Japan as the reason, initially implementing the measures through December, but later extending them until March of next year.
The visa restrictions are seen as targeting not only group tourists but also individual travelers, who account for 80–90% of all visitors. In addition, the Chinese government has called on its citizens to refrain from traveling to Japan, apparently aiming to hurt Japan’s tourism industry. |
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12/25 |
On December 25, industry sources reported that Chinese authorities had instructed major domestic travel agencies to reduce visa applications for Japan and cut visitor numbers to 60% of previous levels.
According to sources in China’s travel industry, the instructions were issued in late November, following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on a Taiwan contingency. Chinese authorities cited deteriorating public safety in Japan as the reason, initially implementing the measures through December, but later extending them until March of next year.
The visa restrictions are seen as targeting not only group tourists but also individual travelers, who account for 80–90% of all visitors. In addition, the Chinese government has called on its citizens to refrain from traveling to Japan, apparently aiming to hurt Japan’s tourism industry. |
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12/25 |
China suddenly announced large military exercise around Taiwan on 29 December. The PLA Eastern Theater Command announced that it will conduct military exercises starting on 29 December and dispatch their troops to areas surrounding Taiwan. The exercises involve the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force.
The exercises are code-named “Justice Mission 2025” and these exercises include live-fire exercises in the waters and airspace around Taiwan, with the areas expanded from the previous exercises in April.
The theater command spokesperson said the drills serve as a "serious warning to 'Taiwan Independence' separatist forces and external interference forces." |
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