Vol.32. October 31. 2025
What is happening in East Asian Maritime Security? The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) publishes the biweekly newsletter, the information on maritime security relevant to East Asia and Japan's territory. |
Monthly Column
Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific
Preparing for Multiple Contingency Scenarios
in the Taiwan Strait
Stephen R. Nagy
Professor of Politics and International Studies,
International Christian University
Executive Summary
The evolving security architecture in the Indo-Pacific faces unprecedented challenges from coordinated actions by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK). Drawing parallels to scenarios outlined in Carlo Masala’s “If Russia Wins,”[1] this brief examines the potential for China to orchestrate multiple, simultaneous regional crises designed to fragment allied responses and create opportunities for forced reunification with Taiwan. Japan and its allies must rapidly develop multi-domain capabilities, enhance maritime domain awareness, and strengthen multilateral coordination mechanisms to deter such contingencies while maintaining strategic stability across the Taiwan Strait.
Introduction
The security environment in the Indo-Pacific has entered a period of heightened complexity, characterized by the emerging coordination among revisionist powers seeking to challenge the existing international order. North Korea’s recent provocations, including the January 2024 artillery shelling near Yeonpyeong Island that forced civilian evacuations, demonstrate the potential for rapid escalation along multiple fronts.[2] This analysis examines how China might leverage relationships with Russia, Iran, and North Korea to create a multi-front crisis that would overwhelm allied response capabilities and create conditions favorable for forced reunification with Taiwan.
The CRINK Coordination Framework
Carlo Masala’s “If Russia Wins” provides a theoretical framework for understanding how revisionist powers might coordinate seemingly unrelated provocations to achieve strategic objectives.[3] In Masala’s scenario, Russia employs multiple distractions that include instigating North African migration flows to supporting Chinese gray-zone activities in order to prevent a unified Western response to its territorial ambitions in the Baltic states. This model of coordinated distraction operations offers critical insights for Indo-Pacific security planning.
The CRINK framework represents an evolution from bilateral partnerships to a more coordinated approach among authoritarian states. Evidence suggests deepening military-technical cooperation, particularly between Russia and North Korea, between Iran and Russia, and between China and Russia through 3rd countries to help Russia’s war effort is creating new vectors for technology transfer and operational coordination that could be leveraged in a Taiwan contingency.[4]
Primary Scenario: Taiwan Strait Crisis
In a forced reunification scenario, China would likely employ a combination of naval blockade, air and missile strikes, and amphibious operations against Taiwan. However, the success of such operations would depend significantly on preventing or delaying a coordinated allied response.
This is where the multiple contingency approach becomes critical.
China’s military modernization has focused extensively on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to complicate U.S. and allied intervention. However, these capabilities alone may not suffice against a unified coalition response. By orchestrating simultaneous crises across the region, China could fragment allied attention and resources, creating operational windows for action against Taiwan.
Supporting Crisis: Korean Peninsula Escalation
North Korea’s October 2024 destruction of inter-Korean road and rail links and subsequent threats demonstrate its capacity for rapid escalation.[5] In a coordinated scenario, North Korea could initiate kinetic operations against South Korea, potentially including artillery strikes on border communities, following the pattern of the January 2024 incident where over 200 artillery rounds were fired toward South Korean islands.[6] Large-scale cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure could paralyze government and economic functions, while deployment of drones in swarm formations, leveraging experience gained from observing the Ukraine conflict, could overwhelm conventional air defenses.
The December 2022 incident involving five North Korean drones crossing the DMZ highlighted South Korea’s vulnerabilities to unconventional aerial threats.[7] A coordinated drone swarm attack, potentially numbering in the hundreds or thousands, could overwhelm air defense systems and create significant disruption, forcing Seoul and Washington to divert resources from potential Taiwan operations.
Supporting Crisis: Myanmar Destabilization
Myanmar’s civil war has already created a massive humanitarian crisis, with 3.5 million people displaced since the 2021 military coup.[8] In a coordinated scenario, China could provide implicit support to the Myanmar junta, exacerbating the conflict and triggering massive refugee flows into neighboring countries.
Such a humanitarian catastrophe would demand immediate attention from ASEAN and the international community, diverting diplomatic and potentially military resources from the Taiwan Strait. Myanmar topped the global list of landmine casualties for the first time in 2023, indicating the conflict’s intensifying brutality and its potential to generate even larger displacement waves.[9] The strategic timing of increased support to Myanmar’s military could create a regional crisis precisely when allied attention is needed elsewhere.
Supporting Crisis: South China Sea Escalation
China’s gray-zone operations in the South China Sea, particularly against the Philippines, could intensify dramatically during a Taiwan contingency. Using its maritime militia and coast guard forces, China could blockade or seize disputed features currently occupied by the Philippines, conduct dangerous maneuvers against Philippine vessels, and create maritime exclusion zones under the pretext of military exercises. These actions would force the United States to honor its mutual defense treaty commitments to the Philippines, potentially drawing naval assets away from the Taiwan theater.
European and Middle East Diversions
Russia’s role in this scenario would focus on creating crises that prevent European powers from contributing to Indo-Pacific operations. Potential Russian actions include military provocations in the Baltic states or renewed offensives in Ukraine, hybrid operations targeting critical infrastructure in Eastern Europe, and naval deployments to the Arctic or Mediterranean designed to fix NATO assets. The pattern established in Masala’s analysis suggests Russia would calibrate these provocations to maximize European concern without triggering Article 5 responses that could unify NATO action.
Iran could contribute by escalating tensions with Israel through proxy forces or direct action, particularly following any perceived military setback. Such escalation would absorb U.S. and allied attention while potentially disrupting energy markets, creating additional economic pressure on countries supporting Taiwan. The coordination between these actions would be designed to appear coincidental while creating compound effects that strain allied decision-making capacity.
Japan’s Response Architecture
Japan’s geographic position and alliance relationships make it central to any effective response to these multiple contingencies. The response architecture must include several key elements integrated into a coherent strategic framework including Maritime Domain Awareness, Offensive and Defensive Capabilities, Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Protection, and Multilateral Coordination Mechanisms, and Diplomatic Strategies.
First, Japan must invest substantially in integrated maritime, air, and space surveillance systems capable of tracking all vessels and aircraft across the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and surrounding waters. This requires enhanced satellite constellation for persistent surveillance, underwater sensor networks to detect submarine movements, AI-enabled data fusion centers to process multi-source intelligence, and real-time information sharing mechanisms with allies. The challenge lies not merely in collecting data but in processing and disseminating actionable intelligence rapidly enough to enable effective responses across multiple crisis zones simultaneously.
Second, Japan’s acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles represents an important step in developing standoff strike capabilities.[10] However, the multiple contingency scenario demands additional investments in autonomous drone swarms capable of both ISR and strike missions, hypersonic weapons to hold high-value targets at risk, enhanced electronic warfare capabilities to disrupt enemy communications, and distributed air and missile defense systems protecting critical infrastructure. These capabilities must be networked and able to operate in degraded communication environments, anticipating that adversaries will target command and control systems early in any conflict.
Third, China’s dependence on maritime trade, particularly energy imports from the Middle East, creates vulnerabilities that allied forces could exploit. Japan should develop capabilities to monitor and potentially interdict shipping in key chokepoints, protect allied shipping from Chinese maritime militia harassment, maintain freedom of navigation in contested waters, and coordinate with partners on maritime security operations. The ability to threaten China’s economic lifelines while protecting allied commerce provides both deterrent and wartime leverage.
Fourth, the complexity of multiple contingency scenarios demands unprecedented coordination among allies and partners. Japan should champion enhanced intelligence sharing through real-time intelligence fusion centers linking Japan, the United States, Australia, and other partners, standardized communication protocols enabling seamless information exchange, joint threat assessment processes to identify emerging crisis indicators, and coordinated warning systems for multiple contingency scenarios.
Fifth, operational coordination requires pre-positioned logistics networks supporting distributed operations, joint command structures capable of managing multi-theater responses, integrated air and missile defense architectures, and coordinated rules of engagement for gray-zone scenarios. The challenge lies in maintaining operational security while enabling rapid, coordinated responses across multiple theaters.
Sixth, deterring multiple contingencies requires clear diplomatic messaging to both China and Taiwan. To Beijing, allied nations must communicate that any forced reunification attempt will trigger comprehensive economic sanctions, military action will result in the activation of all alliance commitments, the costs to China’s development and regime stability will be catastrophic, and peaceful resolution remains the only acceptable path forward. This messaging must be consistent, credible, and backed by demonstrable capabilities.
To Taipei, allies must clarify that unilateral declarations of independence will not receive allied support, defensive assistance depends on maintaining the status quo, provocative actions that could trigger Chinese responses must be avoided, and strengthening resilience and deterrence should be the primary focus. This delicate balance requires continuous diplomatic engagement to prevent miscalculation while maintaining deterrent credibility.
Recommendations
First, Japan should accelerate multi-domain integration by rapidly integrating capabilities across all domains including land, sea, air, space, and cyber to enable effective responses to simultaneous crises. This includes developing joint doctrine for multiple contingency scenarios and conducting regular exercises simulating coordinated CRINK actions. The integration must extend beyond technical interoperability to include conceptual alignment and unified command structures.
Second, Japan must strengthen regional partnerships beyond traditional alliances by deepening security cooperation with India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and other regional powers that share concerns about Chinese assertiveness. This includes capacity building, intelligence sharing, and coordinated diplomatic initiatives. The goal is creating a web of relationships that complicates adversary planning while providing multiple response options.
Third, preparing for multiple contingencies requires enhanced economic resilience including strategic reserve stockpiling, supply chain diversification, and financial system hardening against potential Chinese economic warfare. Japan should lead regional efforts to reduce dependencies on China while maintaining economic engagement where possible. Economic preparation is as crucial as military readiness in deterring and responding to multiple contingency scenarios.
Conclusion
The potential for coordinated CRINK actions creating multiple, simultaneous crises represents a fundamental challenge to Indo-Pacific security. While the scenario outlined may appear extreme, the increasing alignment among revisionist powers and their demonstrated willingness to challenge international norms demands serious preparation. Japan’s response must be comprehensive, combining enhanced capabilities, strengthened partnerships, and clear strategic messaging. Only through such preparation can the region maintain stability and deter attempts at forced reunification across the Taiwan Strait.The lessons from Masala’s analysis of European scenarios apply directly to the Indo-Pacific: authoritarian coordination can create strategic advantages through synchronized disruption. However, democratic allies possess inherent advantages in coordination, innovation, and legitimacy that, if properly leveraged, can maintain deterrence even against complex, multi-front challenges. The key lies in recognizing the threat, preparing comprehensive responses, and maintaining the unity of purpose necessary to preserve peace and stability in the world's most dynamic region.
Notes
[1] Carlo Masala, If Russia Wins: The Global Consequences of a Ukrainian Defeat (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2024), 87-92.
[2] BBC News, “North Korea Fires Artillery Shells towards South’s Border Islands, Prompting Evacuations,” BBC News, January 4, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67889551.
[3] Masala, 87-92.
[4] Center for Strategic and International Studies, “CRINK Security Ties: Growing Cooperation, Anchored by China and Russia,” CSIS China Power Project, September 29, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/crink-security-ties-growing-cooperation-anchored-china-and-russia.
[5] “North Korea Blows Up Roads Near South Korean Border as Tensions Soar,” Al Jazeera, October 15, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/15/north-korea-blows-up-roads-near-south-korean-border-as-tensions-soar. (Link:https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/15/…)
[6] “North Korea Fires Artillery Towards South’s Islands, Prompting Evacuations,” Al Jazeera, January 5, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/5/north-korea-fires-artillery-towards-souths-islands-prompting-evacuations.(Link:https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/5/…)
[7] Yonhap News Agency. “(7th LD) 5 N. Korean Drones Trespass across Border; S. Korea Sends Drones in ‘Corresponding’ Step.” Yonhap News Agency, December 26, 2022. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221226007055325
[8] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 46 | 23 May 2025,” May 23, 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-46-23-may-2025.
[9] “Myanmar: Surging Landmine Use Claims Lives, Livelihoods：Highest Casualties Worldwide Since 2023, ” Human Rights Watch, November 20th, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/20/myanmar-surging-landmine-use-claims-lives-livelihoods.
[10] Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Japan – Tomahawk Weapon System,” News Release 23-69, November 17, 2023, https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-tomahawk-weapon-system. |
Statistical Data and Analysis (as of October 31)
In the latter half of this month, China repeatedly engaged in unilateral actions involving the use of force and coercion.
Chinese Coast Guard vessels had been continuously navigating within Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands for 335 consecutive days since November last year, but the streak temporarily ended on October 19. The 335-day streak, the longest on record, came to a halt as the vessels may have moved away to avoid rough weather. However, Chinese Coast Guard vessels resumed their navigation in the area on October 24.
On October 16, the China Coast Guard announced that it had “driven away” Philippine reconnaissance aircraft over Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. On October 20, a Chinese fighter jet released flares in close proximity to an Australian P-8A maritime patrol aircraft conducting a surveillance mission in the area.
Japan took the opportunities of the ASEAN Summit held from October 26 to 28, the U.S.
President’s visit to Japan from October 27 to 29, and the APEC Summit from October 29 to November 1 to hold multilateral and bilateral meetings with ASEAN members, as well as with the United States, Australia, India and others, calling for and reaffirming cooperation toward the realization of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
[Statistical Data as of October 31]
Japan Coast Guard (JCG) daily updates the statistical data on the number of China Coast Guard vessels entering in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands and intruding into Japanese territorial waters. The below is from the website of JCG.
https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/
mission/senkaku/senkaku.html
Oct. |
Contiguous zone |
Territorial
Waters |
Oct. |
Contiguous zone |
Territorial
Waters |
15 |
4 |
4 |
23 |
|
|
16 |
4 |
|
24 |
2 |
|
17 |
4 |
|
25 |
2 |
|
18 |
4 |
|
26 |
4 |
|
19 |
2 |
|
27 |
4 |
|
20 |
|
|
28 |
4 |
|
21 |
|
|
29 |
4 |
|
22 |
|
|
30 |
4 |
|
|
|
|
|
Date |
Topics |
10/16 |
On October 15, four China Coast Guard vessels temporarily intruded into Japan's territorial waters off the Senkaku Islands in Ishigaki City, Okinawa Prefecture. According to the JCG, all four vessels left the territorial waters on the same day. This is the first intrusion by Chinese government vessels into Japan's territorial waters off the Senkaku Islands since September 14. |
Jiji Press News (Japanese) |
|
10/16 |
China has intensified its activities around the Pratas Islands in the South China Sea, which are under Taiwan's effective control. China’s intensified activities — including the installation of structures and operations by China Coast Guard vessels — appear to be part of a salami-slicing tactic, gradually creating faits accomplis through small, incremental steps. The aim seems to be both to pressure the Lai Ching-te administration and to signal the legitimacy of cross-strait unification to domestic and international audiences alike.
According to a report released in September by the U.S. think tank the Jamestown Foundation, it was confirmed that the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) had installed a total of 12 structures — including oil and gas drilling rigs — in waters approximately 370 kilometers off the coast of the Pratas Islands. Commenting on the installation of the structures, a spokesperson for China's Taiwan Affairs Office stated in September that China has 'indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and their surrounding waters.' According to sources familiar with cross-strait relations, the installation involved the Southern Theater Command of the Chinese military, which oversees the South China Sea, as well as the Guangdong Maritime Safety Administration and the China Coast Guard. The Pratas Islands are located close to mainland China, and since China maintains superiority in the surrounding sea and airspace, it would be difficult for Taiwan to retake them if they were ever occupied by China. China has little incentive to occupy the Pratas Islands, as it risks provoking U.S. intervention and backlash from other South China Sea claimants. Even so, China is increasing pressure on the Pratas Islands, viewing President Lai as a pro-independence and hostile figure.
In addition to installing structures, China Coast Guard vessels have repeatedly entered restricted waters designated by Taiwan. A source familiar with cross-strait relations revealed, "Instructions came from the top levels of China's leadership to break the tacit understanding on restricted waters between both sides of the Taiwan Strait." According to Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration, nine China Coast Guard vessels have conducted a total of 30 operations around the Pratas Islands since January of this year. On October 10, one of the vessels entered the restricted waters of the Pratas Islands without activating its Automatic Identification System (AIS).
Facing a war of attrition, the Taiwanese side is growing increasingly alarmed. Until now, China's military pressure had been concentrated around Taiwan's main island, with the frequent crossing of the Taiwan Strait’s median line by Chinese military aircraft becoming the norm. As China’s coercive actions extend to Taiwan’s outlying islands, the Taiwanese side is being forced to allocate its limited personnel and equipment across a wider area. If Taiwan is compelled to sustain such a long-term response, it raises concerns that it may struggle to respond to China’s operations, which are overwhelming in terms of budget and material resources. |
Yomiuri Shimbun News (Japanese) |
|
10/16 |
On October 16, according to Japanese government sources, the Taiwanese oceanographic research vessel New Ocean Researcher 1 was observed deploying what appeared to be a wire-like object into the sea within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), approximately 90 kilometers south of Yonagunijima Island in Okinawa Prefecture. There are suspicions that the vessel may be conducting unauthorized oceanographic research, and the JCG is closely monitoring its activities.
In June of this year, the New Ocean Researcher 1 was also observed deploying what appeared to be a wire-like object into the sea within Japan’s EEZ, approximately 48 kilometers west of Yonagunijima Island. |
Sankei Shimbun News (Japanese) |
|
10/16 |
On October 16, the China Coast Guard announced that two Philippine reconnaissance aircraft had “illegally intruded into China’s airspace” over Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, prompting Chinese vessels to track, monitor, and drive them away. The shoal is located within the Philippines’ EEZ, but China claims sovereignty over it.
Meanwhile, on October 16, China’s Guangdong Maritime Safety Administration announced that a navigation ban would be imposed due to military exercises scheduled to take place in the South China Sea on October 17. |
|
10/17 |
On October 17, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) confirmed one Chinese Luyang III class destroyer (hull number 156), one Chinese Luyang II class destroyer (hull number 150) and one Chinese Jangkai II class frigate (hull number 578) sailing northwest in the waters 130km northeast of Miyakojima Island (Okinawa Prefecture).
These vessels sailed northwest through the waters between Okinawajima Island (Okinawa Prefecture) and Miyakojima Island and navigated to the East China Sea. |
|
10/19 |
On October 17, the Russian government published a decree announcing that two uninhabited islands in the Lesser Kuril Islands (Shikotan and the Habomai Islands of the Northern Territories) have been named "Nikolai Kasatkin" and "Innocent Veniaminov" after historical Russian Orthodox priests.
According to the published location data, the two islands are situated near the Habomai Islands. According to TASS, their combined area is approximately 2.2 hectares.
Nikolai Kasatkin was a Russian Orthodox priest who came to Japan in the 19th century and spread the faith. He is the founder of the Nikolai-do (Tokyo Resurrection Cathedral), which still stand in Kanda Surugadai, Tokyo. According to TASS, Innocent Veniaminov was the first priest to visit Sakhalin Island in the 19th century, when it was incorporated into the Russian Empire. |
|
10/20 |
On October 18, the JMSDF confirmed one Chinese Dongdiao class Intelligence ship (hull number 795) sailing east in the waters 80km west of Kuchino-Erabujima Island (Kagoshima Prefecture).
From October 18 to 19, this vessel sailed east through the Osumi Strait and navigated to the Pacific Ocean.
On October 19, the JMSDF confirmed one Chinese Luyang III class destroyer (hull number 131) sailing northeast in the waters 40km west of Kuchino-Erabujima Island.
This vessel sailed east through the Osumi Strait and navigated to the Pacific Ocean. |
|
10/20 |
On October 20, Japan’s foreign minister received a courtesy call from the President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Japan’s minister stated that Japan consistently attaches great importance to the “rule of law” at sea. He also stated that, the international community needs to work on strengthening the maritime order based on the rule of law within the universal and unified framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as it faces new challenges in the maritime sector. In addition, he communicated his expectation for ITLOS to further enhance its role as a "guardian" of the maritime order.
In response, ITLOS President expressed his gratitude for Japan's support and contributions to ITLOS. He also stated that he highly appreciates Japan's contribution to the maintenance of the international order based on the rule of law and told that ITLOS will continue to cooperate with Japan. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/20 |
On October 20, Australia’s defence department raised concerns with Beijing after a Chinese fighter jet released flares in close proximity to one of its maritime patrol aircraft carrying out surveillance in the South China Sea, posing a risk to the aircraft and its crew. The department labelled the incident as “an unsafe and unprofessional manoeuvre,” and added, “Australia expects all countries, including China, to operate their militaries in a safe and professional manner.” No injuries were reported in the encounter between the Chinese fighter jet and Australia’s P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft, according to an Australia’s defence department statement. The patrol aircraft was not damaged.
The Chinese jet fired flares on two occasions, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles said in a television interview with Sky News Australia. "It's really that, the proximity at which the flares were released, which has given us cause to deem this unsafe and unprofessional," he said.
China's military gave Australia a warning and called the incident an "intrusion" by the plane into its airspace around the Paracel Islands, which it deployed naval and air forces to monitor and expel. "Australia's actions constitute a grave violation of China's sovereignty and pose a high risk of triggering maritime and aerial incidents," the spokesperson for the Southern Theater Command air force said in a statement on October 20.
The incident is the latest of a series of military encounters involving China that Australia has called out publicly in similar terms. In February, it also criticised as "unsafe and unprofessional" the actions of a Chinese fighter jet that dropped flares within 30 m (100 ft) of a maritime patrol plane. |
|
10/21 |
On October 21, the JCG announced that two Chinese Coast Guard vessels had left the contiguous zone just outside Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands on October 19, and that no Chinese vessels remained active in the area. No Chinese vessels were confirmed in the zone on October 20. Chinese vessels may have moved away to avoid rough weather.
The record streak of Chinese vessels’ continuous presence in the zone, which had become the longest since the Japanese government nationalized the Senkaku Islands in September 2012, ended at 335 days. Chinese vessel activity around the Senkaku Islands had been continuously confirmed since November 19 last year, far exceeding the previous record of 215 consecutive days, which was set between December 2023 and July 2024. |
|
10/23 |
China's moves in the disputed waters, including the installation of man-made structures, have raised concerns in South Korea over the potential for China to change the status quo in its favor.
China and South Korea created the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) in the Yellow Sea under a 2000 agreement, where their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) overlap. The PMZ functions as a provisional measure pending the final maritime boundary settlement between the two nations. Under the agreement, China and South Korea agreed to avoid unilateral actions beyond fishing operations so as not to prejudice the eventual maritime boundary settlement.
South Korean lawmaker Yi Byeong-jin released a photo on October 22 showing five people, whom he claimed were working on Shenlan 2, a China-installed maritime structure in the PMZ. The structure is believed to be used for marine farming, Yonhap News Agency reported. One of the personnel was spotted wearing a wetsuit and handling an oxygen tank, the lawmaker said, noting that such equipment is rarely used for marine farming. He added that the latest development could not be regarded as "ordinary fish farming activity," and raised the possibility that the structure may have a purpose other than aquaculture, which could help China assert control over the disputed waters. The photo also showed a high-speed boat near the structure.
The Shenlan 2 is located on the western side of the PMZ, outside South Korea's EEZ but within China's self-declared maritime demarcation line, according to a map by the Korea JoongAng Daily. Another similar structure, the Shenlan 1, is installed nearby. Both the Shenlan 1 and the Shenlan 2 are octagonal steel structures resembling a circle with a central cylindrical tower, installed in the PMZ in 2018 and 2024, respectively.
The structure is a floating aquaculture facility that cultivates salmon in the cold waters of the Yellow Sea, and is capable of accommodating 1 million fish amid growing seafood demand in China, according to Xinhua News Agency.
China's Foreign Ministry said in April that the aquaculture facilities were set up by a Chinese company and that their installation did not violate a fishery agreement between China and South Korea, adding that they were not related to maritime delimitation. |
|
10/24 |
On October 24, the Japan-Palau foreign ministers’ meeting was held.
Japan’s minister stated that the two countries are important partners in maintaining a free and open international order based on the rule of law amidst an increasingly complex strategic environment surrounding the region. He also expressed his commitment to work with Palau toward the realization of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
In addition, he expressed his willingness to work closely with Palau which will assume the chair of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) next year and to further strengthen the reliable cooperative relations and the bond of trust with Palau and the Pacific Island countries, and to work on the common challenges and stride forward together.
Palau’s minister stated that he is committed to working closely with Japan’s minister for further development of relations between the two countries.
On other matters, both sides exchanged views on regional affairs. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/24 |
On October 24, the Japan Joint Staff confirmed two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two Russian Su-35 fighters flying from the continent over the Sea of Japan.
These aircraft flew southeast over the Sea of Japan, then turned northeast off the coast of Sadoshima Island (Niigata Prefecture) and flew along the vicinity of Japan’s territorial airspace. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) scrambled fighter jets in response to these Russian aircraft. |
|
10/25 |
On October 25, a traveling exhibition from the National Museum of Territory and Sovereignty in Tokyo opened in Matsue City. The exhibition features panels, as well as materials from the museum, which exhibits historical materials related to Takeshima in Shimane Prefecture, the Northern Territories, and the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture.
Among the exhibits are documents showing that during the Edo period, townspeople used Takeshima for ship anchorage and abalone harvesting under shogunate approval, despite South Korea’s current territorial claims over this inherently Japanese island. In addition, a VR (virtual reality) section offers visitors a virtual experience of Takeshima, based on photographs and footage taken in the early Showa period, roughly 90 years ago.
The Secretary-General of the National Museum of Territory and Sovereignty stated, “Issues concerning territory and sovereignty are very complex. We hope visitors will first appreciate the natural beauty and wildlife of Takeshima through VR experience, and then understand through the exhibits that Takeshima and other islands are part of Japan's territory.” |
|
10/26 |
On October 26, the Japan-Philippines Summit meeting was held.
Japan’s prime minister stated her desire to further strengthen relations with the Philippines, as a strategic partner, toward realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
Regarding security cooperation, both leaders concurred on continuing working to strengthen the foundation for security cooperation that contributes to the peace and stability of the Philippines and the region. Both leaders concurred on continuing close coordination in addressing various international challenges, including the situation in the South China Sea. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/26 |
On October 26, Japan-Malaysia Summit meeting was held.
Japan’s prime minister stated her wish to further strengthen cooperation in various fields with Malaysia, which is an important comprehensive and strategic partner for the realization of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
Regarding cooperation in the field of security, the two leaders welcomed hand-over of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and rescue boats from Japan to Malaysia through Japan’s Official Security Assistance (OSA) as well as new agreement for the provision of a diving support vessel and other equipment.
The two leaders exchanged views on various regional and international issues, including the situation in the South China Sea. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/26 |
On October 26, the 28th ASEAN Japan Summit was held.
Japan’s prime minister stated that Japan advocates for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" and consistently supports the " ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)," which shares fundamental principles with FOIP.
Concerns about the situations in the South China Sea, the importance of peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) were mentioned in the meeting.
In response, Japan’s prime minister made the following remarks:
The free and open international order based on the rule of law is currently facing challenges, and the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region is becoming increasingly severe. Attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion must not be tolerated anywhere in the world.
In the East China Sea, activities that infringe upon Japan's sovereignty, as well as provocative military activities, continue and are intensifying. In the South China Sea, militarization and coercive activities continue and intensify, causing serious concern. Any unjust maritime claims and activities that are not based on the UNCLOS cannot be accepted. Japan consistently supports the rule of law at sea and reaffirms the importance of resolving disputes peacefully based on international law. Peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are important issues, which directly impact regional security. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/26 |
On October 26, Japan-Australia Summit meeting was held.
Japan’s prime minister stated that Japan looks forward to strengthening the strategic cooperative relationship between Japan and Australia. She also mentioned that Japan and Australia are like minded countries that have the will and capability to play a leading role in realizing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP).
The two leaders exchanged views on the security environment and strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, including the situations in East Asia, and concurred that they would further strengthen cooperation.
In addition, the two leaders affirmed that Japan and Australia would promote multi-layered cooperation with U.S. and other like-minded countries, including Japan-US-Australia, Japan-Australia-India-U.S.(Quad), and Japan-Australia-New Zealand-ROK. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/27 |
On October 25, the Japan Joint Staff confirmed one Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flying from the continent over the Sea of Japan. This aircraft flew southwest over the Sea of Japan, then turned northwest off the coast of Cape Kyogamisaki (Kyoto Prefecture) and flew toward the continent.
The JASDF scrambled fighter jets in response to this Russian aircraft. |
|
10/27 |
On October 27, Japan-India foreign ministers’ meeting was held.
Japan’s minister stated that the intentional situation and security environment surrounding us have become more severe in recent years. He emphasized that Japan and India, who share fundamental values and strategic interests, play a significant role in realizing peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and the international society. He expressed his desire to fulfill this role together, including through the Quad (Japan, Australia, India, and the United States). In response, Indo's minister stated that he shares the recognition stated by Japan’s minister. He also stated that the long-standing Japan-India partnership is special, and that he would like to work together toward regional stability.
Both ministers also held discussions on regional issues. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/27 |
On October 27, Japan-Vietnam foreign ministers’ meeting was held.
The two ministers affirmed their intention to further advance the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” and concurred on continuing to enhance cooperation in a broad range of areas, including security.
They also exchanged views on regional and international affairs and concurred on further strengthening coordination in addressing various issues, including the situations in the East and South China Seas. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/27 |
On October 27, the 20th East Asia Summit (EAS) was held.
Japan’s foreign minister made the following remarks:
Japan has, to date, contributed to regional peace and prosperity as a peaceful nation that is free, democratic, respects human rights, and upholds the rule of law. Building on this tradition, Japan will continue to work for regional peace, stability, and prosperity through the promotion of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).”
Anywhere in the world including the East China Sea, any attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo through force or intimidation is completely unacceptable. In the South China Sea as well, dangerous and intimidating activities that increase regional tensions are intensifying, causing serious concern. From the perspective of supporting the enforcement of the rule of law at sea, including freedom of navigation and overflight, Japan hopes for the compliance of the parties with the Philippines–China arbitral award and for the peaceful resolution of disputes.
The peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait are vital for the international community as a whole. In addition, other participating countries expressed concerns over the situations in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, as well as the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight, and the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law. There were also statements highlighting the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Among them, Philippine President Marcos strongly protested China’s coercive actions to designate Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea as a “nature reserve” and to strengthen law enforcement there under the pretext of “ecological conservation.” He said that the shoal has long been part of the Philippines, over which the country has sovereignty and jurisdiction, and declared, “We strongly oppose such a decision.” |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
Jiji Press News (Japanese) |
|
10/28 |
On October 27, the JMSDF confirmed one Chinese Jangkai II class frigate (hull number 515) sailing south in the waters 80km west of Kumejima Island (Okinawa Prefecture). This vessel sailed southeast through the waters between Okinawajima Island and Miyakojima Island and navigated to the Pacific Ocean.
On the same day, the JMSDF confirmed one Chinese Jangkai II class frigate (hull number 599) sailing south in the waters 80km west of Kumejima Island. This vessel sailed southeast through the waters between Okinawajima Island and Miyakojima Island and navigated to the Pacific Ocean. |
|
10/28 |
On October 28, Japan-U.S. foreign ministers’ meeting was held.
The two ministers concurred that they would advance concrete security cooperation to further strengthen Japan-U.S. Alliance deterrence and response capabilities.
They confirmed that they would further develop networks of like-minded countries, including Japan-U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan-U.S. Philippines, and Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/28 |
On October 28, Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting was held.
Japan’s prime minister stated that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is the foundation for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and that Japan is an indispensable partner for the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region.
The two leaders concurred to advance a broad range of security cooperation in order to further enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
Japan’s prime minister expressed her determination to continue strongly promoting the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" and to develop the concept in line with the eras. Additionally, the two leaders affirmed their commitment to work closely together to strongly advance the FOIP. Under this vision, they also affirmed the importance of strengthening regional networks among like-minded partners, such as Japan-U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan-U.S.-Philippines, and Japan-Australia-India-U.S.
The two leaders also exchanged views on the situation and various challenges facing the Indo-Pacific region. They exchanged views on issues concerning China. They opposed unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, and concurred to work closely between Japan and the U.S. They reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/28 |
On October 28, Japan-China foreign ministers’ telephone talk was held.
The two foreign ministers confirmed that they share a broad direction of building “constructive and stable Japan-China relations”. They confirmed that they would reduce issues and concerns and increase mutual understanding and cooperation under this broad direction.
Japan’s minister reiterated serious concerns over China's activities in the East China Sea, including around the Senkaku Islands.
They confirmed the importance of having communication at various levels, including between the leaders and foreign ministers. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/29 |
On October 29, Japan-U.S. defense ministers’ meeting was held.
The ministers candidly exchanged and shared the views on increasingly severe security situation in the Indo-Pacific.
They concurred to promote various initiatives to further strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond, with a sense of urgency and speed, in order to respond to challenges posed by the changing security environment.
They concurred that they will continue to advance multilateral cooperation including information sharing and operational collaboration with regional partners namely Australia, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines, with Japan and the U.S. at the center of such cooperation. |
Ministry of Defense of Japan |
|
10/29 |
On October 29, Japan-India Summit telephone talk was held.
Japan’s prime minister stated that, as the two countries share fundamental values and strategic interests, Japan intends to continue to work together toward realizing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” including through Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad).
Indo's prime minister stated that he looks forward to further strengthening Japan-India relations through advancing concrete cooperation in various areas. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/29 |
On October 29, Japan-U.S.-ROK foreign ministers’ meeting was held.
The three ministers reaffirmed that, in light of the increasingly severe strategic environment that the three countries face, it remains important to strengthen the solidarity among the three countries, and, for the realization of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, continue to show the robust Japan-U.S. and U.S.-ROK alliances as well as the strategic coordination of these alliances.
They also welcomed the advancement of concrete trilateral cooperation through action-oriented discussions by the three countries. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/30 |
On October 29, the Japan Joint Staff confirmed one Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flying from the continent through the Sea of Okhotsk toward the Pacific Ocean. The aircraft flew south to the area off the coast of Iwate Prefecture, then turned back and flew through the Sea of Okhotsk toward the Sea of Japan. The JASDF scrambled fighter jets in response to this Russian aircraft. |
|
10/30 |
On October 30, Japan-Australia foreign ministers’ meeting was held.
Japan’s minister stated that Japan and Australia are the central pillar of the coordination among like-minded countries for realizing a “Free and Open Indo Pacific” and emphasized his commitment to working closely with Australia’s minister.
The two ministers shared an awareness of the current challenging strategic environment and concurred that Japan and Australia would promote multi-layered cooperation with the U.S. and other like-minded countries, including through frameworks such as Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-Australia-India-U.S.(Quad), and Japan-Australia-New Zealand-ROK.
They concurred that they would further strengthen concrete bilateral cooperation across a broad range of areas, including security. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/30 |
On October 30, Japan-ROK Summit meeting was held.
Japan’s prime minister stated that the importance of the Japan-ROK relations and the coordination among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK has grown even more. She expressed her intention to work closely with ROK’s president in a wide range of fields.
The two leaders had a candid exchange of views on the overall Japan-ROK relations. While acknowledging that there are various issues on which their positions differ due to their proximity as neighboring countries, the two leaders concurred to manage these issues through their leadership and to develop the Japan-ROK relations in a future-oriented and stable manner.
The two leaders concurred to continue close communication between the two governments. |
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan |
|
10/31 |
On October 30, the Commander of the 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters in Naha stated,in response to a question about the governor’s remark on October 24, that the JCG would continue to firmly protect fishermen operating near the Senkaku Islands from Chinese vessels.
The governor of Okinawa said on October 24 that it would be preferable for fishermen to operate in areas that are safe and secure, in reference to the issue of Chinese coast guard vessels repeatedly approaching and intimidating Japanese fishing boats near the Senkaku Islands. The comment could be interpreted as urging fishermen to refrain from operating near the Senkaku Islands because of the danger in the area.
The commander stated that, since the beginning of this year, Chinese coast guard vessels had sailed in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands on 299 of 303 days, and that there had been seven incidents in which Chinese vessels approached Japanese fishing boats. He explained that the situation around the Senkaku Islands is becoming increasingly severe and remains unpredictable, and that the JCG will continue to patrol territorial waters with high vigilance, ensuring that even the slightest changes are not overlooked, while responding calmly and resolutely. |
Sankei Shimbun News (Japanese) |
|
10/31 |
The United States will "stoutly defend its interests", Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told Chinese counterpart Dong Jun during a meeting on October 31 in Kuala Lumpur, flagging the importance of maintaining a balance of power in the region.
In a post on X, Hegseth said he told the Chinese minister of national defence that the United States was concerned about China's activities in the disputed South China Sea and around Taiwan, during a meeting he called "good and constructive".
"We will continue discussions with the People’s Liberation Army on matters of mutual importance," he wrote after the two met on the sidelines of a gathering of ASEAN defence ministers in the Malaysian capital.
"The United States does not seek conflict," he added. "It will continue to stoutly defend its interests and ensure it has the capabilities in the region to do so." |
|
|
|
|
