Monthly Column
Escalating Naval Tensions
between the Philippines and China
Valérie Niquet
Director Japan Program,
Foundation for Strategic Research
Grey-Zone Pressure and Naval Asymmetry
The Philippines faces sustained pressure in the South China Sea, where confrontations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have intensified around Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal. For decades, Beijing has relied on “grey-zone” tactics to assert control, employing coast guard and maritime militia vessels to block, ram, or harass Philippine resupply missions. Water cannons, close maneuvers, and new unilateral restrictions of Philippines fishing and replenishment rights have become routine, allowing China to advance its claims without triggering direct military escalation. Over time, this persistent coercion risks undermining Philippine sovereignty and operational freedom within its exclusive economic zone.
The asymmetry in naval and coast guard capacity compounds these pressures. The PLA Navy, with a third aircraft carrier launched and a new one under construction, has grown into the world’s largest in terms of numbers, supported by the heavily armed China Coast Guard and a broad network of maritime militia. This layered force structure ensures a constant Chinese presence in disputed waters and provides Beijing with escalation dominance. Manila, by contrast, continues to modernize from a low base. The introduction of two Jose Rizal–class frigates, new patrol vessels, and improved coast guard assets marks progress, but these remain modest compared to China’s scale and capabilities. The imbalance constrains the Philippines’ ability to resist pressure independently and shapes the broader perception of vulnerability.
Alliance Responses and U.S. Presence
China’s assertiveness has been reinforced by doubts about U.S. strategic implication. With Washington managing crises elsewhere, including inside its own society, and looking increasingly inward, Beijing may judge that American attention is divided, creating opportunities to test alliance commitments. Such perceptions carry risks for Manila and Beijing also : coercive tactics may gradually shift realities on the ground, leaving Manila unable to maintain control even without outright conflict but also provoking a strong response from the United States.
The U.S.–Philippines alliance has been revitalized through the expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (2023). Four additional bases—among them facilities in northern Luzon near the Bashi Channel and in Palawan—now provide expanded access for U.S. forces. These sites improve intelligence, surveillance, logistics, and rapid deployment options, strengthening deterrence and complicating Chinese planning. They also signal a more durable American commitment to Philippine defense at a time of heightened uncertainty.
Japan’s Growing Role
Japan has also emerged as a significant partner. Tokyo has supplied patrol vessels and coastal radar systems, and in 2023 extended its new Official Security Assistance (OSA) program to Manila. The Reciprocal Access Agreement was signed in august 2025. It facilitates operational interoperability and joint exercises. Beyond bilateral ties, trilateral cooperation among the Philippines, the United States, and Japan has accelerated, embedding Manila within a wider framework of regional security and reinforcing deterrence in contested waters. On September 14, 2025, the Philippines, United States, and Japan have completed another round of joint maritime drills in the South China sea, reaffirming defense cooperation.
China’s Vulnerabilities
China itself faces internal challenges. Reports of corruption within the PLA and operational mishaps—including the collision of two Chinese vessels during a confrontation in August—highlight weaknesses beneath the surface of its growing fleet. Moreover, sustained grey-zone pressure generates reputational costs to China perceived as overly aggressive by its neighbours and beyond. By documenting and publicizing incidents and consistently invoking international law, notably the 2016 arbitral ruling, the Philippines has been able to frame China as a destabilizing actor, reinforcing diplomatic support from partners and international audiences. |
Statistical Data and Analysis (as of September 30)
In the latter half of this month, China has engaged in unilateral actions at sea.
On September 16, Chinese coast guard vessels engaged in aggressive behavior near Scarborough Shoal, a disputed area in the South China Sea claimed by both China and the Philippines. They fired water cannons at Philippine government vessels, causing damage and injuring one person.
On September 23, there were signs of possible new exploratory drilling by China near the median line in the East China Sea, where it has been unilaterally developing gas fields for years.
As part of diplomatic activities during the UN General Assembly High-Level Week, a trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting between Japan, the United States, and South Korea was held on September 22. On September 23, foreign ministers from eight countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, as well as the G7 foreign ministers, held meetings. On September 24, a foreign ministers' meeting focused on maritime safety and stability was also held. Japan reaffirmed its commitment to cooperating with the international community in upholding a free and open international order based on the rule of law, and shared this stance with like-minded
countries.
[Statistical Data as of September 30]
Japan Coast Guard (JCG) daily updates the statistical data on the number of China Coast Guard vessels entering in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands and intruding into Japanese territorial waters. The below is from the website of JCG.
https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/
mission/senkaku/senkaku.html
Sep. |
Contiguous zone |
Territorial
Waters |
Sep. |
Contiguous zone |
Territorial
Waters |
16 |
4 |
|
23 |
2 |
|
17 |
4 |
|
24 |
2 |
|
18 |
4 |
|
25 |
4 |
|
19 |
4 |
|
26 |
2 |
|
20 |
4 |
|
27 |
4 |
|
21 |
4 |
|
28 |
4 |
|
22 |
2 |
|
29 |
4 |
|
|
|
|
|
Date |
Topics |
9/16 |
On September 9, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) confirmed one Russian Vishnya class Intelligence ship (hull number 208) sailing southwest in the waters 50km east of Miyakejima Island (Tokyo Metropolis).
This vessel sailed south in the contiguous zone of Miyakejima Island, and then sailed southwest through the waters (contiguous zone) between Mikurajima Island (Tokyo Metropolis) and Hachijojima Island (Tokyo Metropolis).
From September 13 to 15, this vessel sailed southwest through the waters including the contiguous zone from east to south of Okinawajima Island, then sailed northwest through the waters including the contiguous zone south of Okinawajima Island. It subsequently sailed northwest in the contiguous zone southwest of Kumejima Island (Okinawa Prefecture), and navigated to the East China Sea.
|
|
9/16 |
On September 13, the JMSDF confirmed two Chinese Luyang III class destroyer (hull number 132 and 135) sailing southeast in the waters 120km northeast of Miyakojima Island (Okinawa Prefecture).
These vessels sailed southeast through the waters between Okinawajima Island and Miyakojima Island and navigated to the Pacific Ocean.
On September 16, the JMSDF confirmed one Chinese Luyang III class destroyer (hull number 135) sailing north in the waters 110km northeast of Miyakojima Island.
This vessel sailed north through the waters between Okinawajima Island and Miyakojima Island and navigated to the East China Sea.
|
On September 14, the JMSDF confirmed one Chinese Jangkai II class frigate (hull number 577) and one Chinese Fuchi class replenishment ship (hull number 890) sailing southeast in the waters 100km northeast of Miyakojima Island.
These vessels sailed southeast through the waters between Okinawajima Island and Miyakojima Island and navigated to the Pacific Ocean.
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