Executive Summary

The evolving security architecture in the Indo-Pacific faces unprecedented challenges from coordinated actions by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK). Drawing parallels to scenarios outlined in Carlo Masala’s “If Russia Wins,”[1] this brief examines the potential for China to orchestrate multiple, simultaneous regional crises designed to fragment allied responses and create opportunities for forced reunification with Taiwan. Japan and its allies must rapidly develop multi-domain capabilities, enhance maritime domain awareness, and strengthen multilateral coordination mechanisms to deter such contingencies while maintaining strategic stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Introduction

The security environment in the Indo-Pacific has entered a period of heightened complexity, characterized by the emerging coordination among revisionist powers seeking to challenge the existing international order. North Korea’s recent provocations, including the January 2024 artillery shelling near Yeonpyeong Island that forced civilian evacuations, demonstrate the potential for rapid escalation along multiple fronts.[2] This analysis examines how China might leverage relationships with Russia, Iran, and North Korea to create a multi-front crisis that would overwhelm allied response capabilities and create conditions favorable for forced reunification with Taiwan.

The CRINK Coordination Framework

Carlo Masala’s “If Russia Wins” provides a theoretical framework for understanding how revisionist powers might coordinate seemingly unrelated provocations to achieve strategic objectives.[3] In Masala’s scenario, Russia employs multiple distractions that include instigating North African migration flows to supporting Chinese gray-zone activities in order to prevent a unified Western response to its territorial ambitions in the Baltic states. This model of coordinated distraction operations offers critical insights for Indo-Pacific security planning.

The CRINK framework represents an evolution from bilateral partnerships to a more coordinated approach among authoritarian states. Evidence suggests deepening military-technical cooperation, particularly between Russia and North Korea, between Iran and Russia, and between China and Russia through 3rd countries to help Russia’s war effort is creating new vectors for technology transfer and operational coordination that could be leveraged in a Taiwan contingency.[4]

Primary Scenario: Taiwan Strait Crisis

In a forced reunification scenario, China would likely employ a combination of naval blockade, air and missile strikes, and amphibious operations against Taiwan. However, the success of such operations would depend significantly on preventing or delaying a coordinated allied response.
This is where the multiple contingency approach becomes critical.
China’s military modernization has focused extensively on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to complicate U.S. and allied intervention. However, these capabilities alone may not suffice against a unified coalition response. By orchestrating simultaneous crises across the region, China could fragment allied attention and resources, creating operational windows for action against Taiwan.

Supporting Crisis: Korean Peninsula Escalation

North Korea’s October 2024 destruction of inter-Korean road and rail links and subsequent threats demonstrate its capacity for rapid escalation.[5] In a coordinated scenario, North Korea could initiate kinetic operations against South Korea, potentially including artillery strikes on border communities, following the pattern of the January 2024 incident where over 200 artillery rounds were fired toward South Korean islands.[6] Large-scale cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure could paralyze government and economic functions, while deployment of drones in swarm formations, leveraging experience gained from observing the Ukraine conflict, could overwhelm conventional air defenses.

The December 2022 incident involving five North Korean drones crossing the DMZ highlighted South Korea’s vulnerabilities to unconventional aerial threats.[7] A coordinated drone swarm attack, potentially numbering in the hundreds or thousands, could overwhelm air defense systems and create significant disruption, forcing Seoul and Washington to divert resources from potential Taiwan operations.

Supporting Crisis: Myanmar Destabilization

Myanmar’s civil war has already created a massive humanitarian crisis, with 3.5 million people displaced since the 2021 military coup.[8] In a coordinated scenario, China could provide implicit support to the Myanmar junta, exacerbating the conflict and triggering massive refugee flows into neighboring countries.

Such a humanitarian catastrophe would demand immediate attention from ASEAN and the international community, diverting diplomatic and potentially military resources from the Taiwan Strait. Myanmar topped the global list of landmine casualties for the first time in 2023, indicating the conflict’s intensifying brutality and its potential to generate even larger displacement waves.[9] The strategic timing of increased support to Myanmar’s military could create a regional crisis precisely when allied attention is needed elsewhere.

Supporting Crisis: South China Sea Escalation

China’s gray-zone operations in the South China Sea, particularly against the Philippines, could intensify dramatically during a Taiwan contingency. Using its maritime militia and coast guard forces, China could blockade or seize disputed features currently occupied by the Philippines, conduct dangerous maneuvers against Philippine vessels, and create maritime exclusion zones under the pretext of military exercises. These actions would force the United States to honor its mutual defense treaty commitments to the Philippines, potentially drawing naval assets away from the Taiwan theater.

European and Middle East Diversions

Russia’s role in this scenario would focus on creating crises that prevent European powers from contributing to Indo-Pacific operations. Potential Russian actions include military provocations in the Baltic states or renewed offensives in Ukraine, hybrid operations targeting critical infrastructure in Eastern Europe, and naval deployments to the Arctic or Mediterranean designed to fix NATO assets. The pattern established in Masala’s analysis suggests Russia would calibrate these provocations to maximize European concern without triggering Article 5 responses that could unify NATO action.

Iran could contribute by escalating tensions with Israel through proxy forces or direct action, particularly following any perceived military setback. Such escalation would absorb U.S. and allied attention while potentially disrupting energy markets, creating additional economic pressure on countries supporting Taiwan. The coordination between these actions would be designed to appear coincidental while creating compound effects that strain allied decision-making capacity.

Japan’s Response Architecture

Japan’s geographic position and alliance relationships make it central to any effective response to these multiple contingencies. The response architecture must include several key elements integrated into a coherent strategic framework including Maritime Domain Awareness, Offensive and Defensive Capabilities, Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Protection, and Multilateral Coordination Mechanisms, and Diplomatic Strategies.

First, Japan must invest substantially in integrated maritime, air, and space surveillance systems capable of tracking all vessels and aircraft across the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and surrounding waters. This requires enhanced satellite constellation for persistent surveillance, underwater sensor networks to detect submarine movements, AI-enabled data fusion centers to process multi-source intelligence, and real-time information sharing mechanisms with allies. The challenge lies not merely in collecting data but in processing and disseminating actionable intelligence rapidly enough to enable effective responses across multiple crisis zones simultaneously.

Second, Japan’s acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles represents an important step in developing standoff strike capabilities.[10] However, the multiple contingency scenario demands additional investments in autonomous drone swarms capable of both ISR and strike missions, hypersonic weapons to hold high-value targets at risk, enhanced electronic warfare capabilities to disrupt enemy communications, and distributed air and missile defense systems protecting critical infrastructure. These capabilities must be networked and able to operate in degraded communication environments, anticipating that adversaries will target command and control systems early in any conflict.

Third, China’s dependence on maritime trade, particularly energy imports from the Middle East, creates vulnerabilities that allied forces could exploit. Japan should develop capabilities to monitor and potentially interdict shipping in key chokepoints, protect allied shipping from Chinese maritime militia harassment, maintain freedom of navigation in contested waters, and coordinate with partners on maritime security operations. The ability to threaten China’s economic lifelines while protecting allied commerce provides both deterrent and wartime leverage.

Fourth, the complexity of multiple contingency scenarios demands unprecedented coordination among allies and partners. Japan should champion enhanced intelligence sharing through real-time intelligence fusion centers linking Japan, the United States, Australia, and other partners, standardized communication protocols enabling seamless information exchange, joint threat assessment processes to identify emerging crisis indicators, and coordinated warning systems for multiple contingency scenarios.

Fifth, operational coordination requires pre-positioned logistics networks supporting distributed operations, joint command structures capable of managing multi-theater responses, integrated air and missile defense architectures, and coordinated rules of engagement for gray-zone scenarios. The challenge lies in maintaining operational security while enabling rapid, coordinated responses across multiple theaters.

Sixth, deterring multiple contingencies requires clear diplomatic messaging to both China and Taiwan. To Beijing, allied nations must communicate that any forced reunification attempt will trigger comprehensive economic sanctions, military action will result in the activation of all alliance commitments, the costs to China’s development and regime stability will be catastrophic, and peaceful resolution remains the only acceptable path forward. This messaging must be consistent, credible, and backed by demonstrable capabilities.

To Taipei, allies must clarify that unilateral declarations of independence will not receive allied support, defensive assistance depends on maintaining the status quo, provocative actions that could trigger Chinese responses must be avoided, and strengthening resilience and deterrence should be the primary focus. This delicate balance requires continuous diplomatic engagement to prevent miscalculation while maintaining deterrent credibility.

Recommendations

First, Japan should accelerate multi-domain integration by rapidly integrating capabilities across all domains including land, sea, air, space, and cyber to enable effective responses to simultaneous crises. This includes developing joint doctrine for multiple contingency scenarios and conducting regular exercises simulating coordinated CRINK actions. The integration must extend beyond technical interoperability to include conceptual alignment and unified command structures.

Second, Japan must strengthen regional partnerships beyond traditional alliances by deepening security cooperation with India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and other regional powers that share concerns about Chinese assertiveness. This includes capacity building, intelligence sharing, and coordinated diplomatic initiatives. The goal is creating a web of relationships that complicates adversary planning while providing multiple response options.

Third, preparing for multiple contingencies requires enhanced economic resilience including strategic reserve stockpiling, supply chain diversification, and financial system hardening against potential Chinese economic warfare. Japan should lead regional efforts to reduce dependencies on China while maintaining economic engagement where possible. Economic preparation is as crucial as military readiness in deterring and responding to multiple contingency scenarios.

Conclusion

The potential for coordinated CRINK actions creating multiple, simultaneous crises represents a fundamental challenge to Indo-Pacific security. While the scenario outlined may appear extreme, the increasing alignment among revisionist powers and their demonstrated willingness to challenge international norms demands serious preparation. Japan’s response must be comprehensive, combining enhanced capabilities, strengthened partnerships, and clear strategic messaging. Only through such preparation can the region maintain stability and deter attempts at forced reunification across the Taiwan Strait.The lessons from Masala’s analysis of European scenarios apply directly to the Indo-Pacific: authoritarian coordination can create strategic advantages through synchronized disruption. However, democratic allies possess inherent advantages in coordination, innovation, and legitimacy that, if properly leveraged, can maintain deterrence even against complex, multi-front challenges. The key lies in recognizing the threat, preparing comprehensive responses, and maintaining the unity of purpose necessary to preserve peace and stability in the world's most dynamic region.

Notes
[1] Carlo Masala, If Russia Wins: The Global Consequences of a Ukrainian Defeat (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2024), 87-92.
[2] BBC News, “North Korea Fires Artillery Shells towards South’s Border Islands, Prompting Evacuations,” BBC News, January 4, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67889551.
[3] Masala, 87-92.
[4] Center for Strategic and International Studies, “CRINK Security Ties: Growing Cooperation, Anchored by China and Russia,” CSIS China Power Project, September 29, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/crink-security-ties-growing-cooperation-anchored-china-and-russia. [5] “North Korea Blows Up Roads Near South Korean Border as Tensions Soar,” Al Jazeera, October 15, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/15/north-korea-blows-up-roads-near-south-korean-border-as-tensions-soar.　(Link:https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/15/…)
[6] “North Korea Fires Artillery Towards South’s Islands, Prompting Evacuations,” Al Jazeera, January 5, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/5/north-korea-fires-artillery-towards-souths-islands-prompting-evacuations.(Link:https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/5/…)
[7] Yonhap News Agency. “(7th LD) 5 N. Korean Drones Trespass across Border; S. Korea Sends Drones in ‘Corresponding’ Step.” Yonhap News Agency, December 26, 2022. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221226007055325
[8] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 46 | 23 May 2025,” May 23, 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-46-23-may-2025.
[9] “Myanmar: Surging Landmine Use Claims Lives, Livelihoods：Highest Casualties Worldwide Since 2023, ” Human Rights Watch, November 20th, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/20/myanmar-surging-landmine-use-claims-lives-livelihoods.
[10] Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Japan – Tomahawk Weapon System,” News Release 23-69, November 17, 2023, https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-tomahawk-weapon-system.