{"id":7469,"date":"2026-08-31T14:45:06","date_gmt":"2026-08-31T05:45:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/?page_id=7469"},"modified":"2026-09-03T13:48:32","modified_gmt":"2026-09-03T04:48:32","slug":"vol-52-august-31-2026","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/newsletter\/vol-52-august-31-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Vol. 52 August 31, 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<style>\n    body {\n      background-color: #fafafa;\n    }\n    h1,\n    h2,\n    h3,\n    h4,\n    th,\n    td,\n    p,\n    div {\n      font-family: \"Helvetica\", sans-serif;\n    }\n    .center-wrapper {\n      max-width: 600px;\n      margin: 0 auto;\n      background-color: #ffffff;\n      padding: 20px 10px;\n    }\n    hr,\n    .hr {\n      border: none;\n      border-bottom: 1px solid #000;\n      margin: 10px 0;\n      max-width: none;\n    }\n    .topics-table th,\n    .topics-table td {\n      padding: 3.75pt 13.5pt;\n      vertical-align: top;\n      border: 1px solid #ffffff !important;\n    }\n    .topics-header-date {\n      background: #a5e9ff;\n      border-right: solid white 1pt;\n      border-bottom: none;\n      text-align: center !important;\n      width: 100px;\n      white-space: nowrap;\n    }\n    .topics-header-title {\n      background: #eeeeee;\n      font-weight: bold;\n      text-align: center;\n    }\n    .topics-date {\n      background: #a5e9ff;\n      border-top: solid white 1pt;\n      border-right: solid white 1pt;\n      border-bottom: none;\n      text-align: center;\n      white-space: nowrap;\n    }\n    .topics-content {\n      background: #eeeeee;\n      border-top: solid white 1pt;\n      border-bottom: none;\n    }\n    .topics-source {\n      color: #2322e4;\n      font-weight: bold;\n    }\n    .topics-link {\n      color: #337ab7;\n      word-break: break-all;\n    }\n    .analysis-box {\n      margin-bottom: 1.5rem;\n      padding: 1rem;\n      background: #aeedf1;\n    }<\/p>\n<p>    .l-post-content table.stats-table {\n      border-collapse: collapse;\n      border-top: none;\n      word-break: break-all;\n    }\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th,\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td {\n      border: 1px solid #000;\n      text-align: center;\n      vertical-align: middle;\n      padding: 4px;\n      background-color: #d9e1f2;\n    }\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th {\n      background-color: #b4c6e7;\n      font-weight: bold;\n    }\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td.stats-spacer-col {\n      border: none;\n      width: 10px;\n      background-color: #fff;\n    }\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th:nth-child(1),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td:nth-child(1),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th:nth-child(5),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td:nth-child(5) {\n      width: 10%;\n    }\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th:nth-child(2),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td:nth-child(2),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th:nth-child(3),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td:nth-child(3),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th:nth-child(6),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td:nth-child(6),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th:nth-child(7),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td:nth-child(7) {\n      width: 20%;\n    }\n    .monthly-column-wrapper a {\n      color: #337ab7;\n      overflow-wrap: anywhere;\n    }\n  <\/style>\n<div class=\"center-wrapper\">\n<h1 style=\"text-align: center; font-size: 18pt; color: #202020; margin-bottom: 20px\">Vol.52. August 31. 2026<\/h1>\n<p>What is happening in East Asian Maritime Security? The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) publishes the biweekly newsletter, the information on maritime security relevant to East Asia and Japan&#8217;s territory.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>    <!-- Manthly Column --><\/p>\n<div class=\"monthly-column-wrapper\">\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 40px 0\">\n<p style=\"font-size: 16pt; font-weight: bold; margin-bottom: 10px\">Monthly Column<\/p>\n<p style=\"font-size: 18pt; font-weight: bold; margin-bottom: 10px\">Could Divided-State Status Support Japan\u2019s Direct Defense of Taiwan?<\/p>\n<p style=\"font-weight: bold; margin-bottom: 0\">by Prof. Masahiro Kurosaki<\/p>\n<p style=\"font-weight: bold; margin-top: 0\">Professor of International Law, Tohoku University School of Law, Japan<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\n        Whether Japan could lawfully join in the defense of Taiwan is a question that has drawn renewed attention. In November 2025, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told the Diet that a Taiwan contingency involving warships and the use of force could, in her words, \u201cby any<br \/>\n        reckoning,\u201d amount to a \u201csurvival-threatening situation\u201d (sonritsu kiki jitai)\u2014the trigger under the 2015 peace and security legislation for Japan\u2019s limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense.[i] The statutory formula requires \u201can armed attack against a<br \/>\n        foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan\u201d which in turn threatens Japan\u2019s survival. Two different legal questions hide inside that one formula, depending on which foreign country is attacked. If it is the United States\u2014whose forces might intervene in a<br \/>\n        Taiwan contingency and come under Chinese fire\u2014the statehood question presents no special difficulty; the United States is unquestionably a State, though whether Japan would act remains a separate political judgment. If the victim is Taiwan itself, the analysis changes.<br \/>\n        The International Court of Justice\u2019s 1986 Nicaragua judgment confirmed that collective self-defense is a right exercised for the benefit of a victim State, one that must itself declare that it has been attacked and request assistance.[ii] Taiwan\u2019s own statehood is<br \/>\n        precisely what is in doubt. This essay is about that harder question\u2014not whether Japan can defend American forces coming to Taiwan\u2019s aid, but whether Japan can defend Taiwan directly.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        Taiwan, as matters stand, cannot readily be evaluated as a State. Effectiveness is not seriously in question within the area Taiwan actually governs; it has a population of some twenty-three million, a defined territory\u2014Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu\u2014under its unbroken<br \/>\n        control since 1955, and a government of undoubted capacity. The difficulty, as I have argued elsewhere,[iii] lies instead in the mismatch between that effective control and the Republic of China\u2019s own official claim, which nominally still extends to the Chinese mainland.<br \/>\n        Taiwan\u2019s constitutional order remains that of the Republic of China. The Additional Articles, in force since 1991, are framed \u201cto meet the requisites of the Nation prior to national unification\u201d and confine themselves to regulating relations between a \u201cfree area\u201d and a<br \/>\n        \u201cmainland area,\u201d without redefining the Republic\u2019s territory as Taiwan alone. Individual leaders have gone further politically than legally\u2014Lee Teng-hui called cross-strait relations a \u201cspecial state-to-state relationship\u201d in 1999, Chen Shui-bian called Taiwan and China<br \/>\n        \u201cone country on each side\u201d in 2002, Lai Ching-te insisted in 2025 that Taiwan is \u201cof course\u201d a country. Lee\u2019s and Chen\u2019s statements were each met within days by an official clarification that they changed nothing; Lai\u2019s does not appear to have been withdrawn, but neither<br \/>\n        has it been entrenched in any constitutional or legislative act. And the closest occasion on which voters were asked to endorse an international-status claim under the name \u201cTaiwan,\u201d a 2008 referendum on U.N. membership, carried 94 percent of the vote cast but failed<br \/>\n        Taiwan\u2019s own fifty percent turnout requirement and had no legal effect\u2014although abstention does not necessarily imply opposition, and the question itself fell short of a vote on independence. Because recognition is declaratory rather than constitutive, other States\u2019<br \/>\n        treatment of Taiwan is relevant evidence but not dispositive. What also matters here is whether Taiwan\u2019s own competent organs have settled on an unequivocal claim reflecting the will of its people and the status quo. On the constitutional record, for now, they have not.\n      <\/p>\n<p>If Taiwan is not a State, a Japanese use of force in its direct defense cannot straightforwardly be justified as collective self-defense in the ordinary Article 51 sense.<\/p>\n<p>\n        Yet the Japanese government has itself suggested an opening in its own doctrine. During the 2015 Diet deliberations, then-Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida was asked whether the existence of diplomatic relations was relevant to identifying a \u201cforeign country in a close<br \/>\n        relationship,\u201d and answered that since the right of self-defense is exercised by States, the country concerned must be a State\u2014but that, as the government had traditionally explained, \u201cunrecognized states\u201d (mish\u014dnin-koku) and \u201cdivided states\u201d (bunretsu kokka) are<br \/>\n        included.[iv] This was a general proposition, not a claim about Taiwan specifically. Pressed directly on whether Taiwan qualified, Kishida declined to answer, citing Japan\u2019s renunciation of all right, title, and claim to Taiwan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty.[v] If<br \/>\n        sound, that proposition points to the one route by which Japan might still defend Taiwan directly without conventional statehood: showing both that Taiwan qualifies as a \u201cdivided state\u201d and that divided-state status carries some protection under the law on the use of<br \/>\n        force. Yet neither half of that claim survives testing comfortably.\n      <\/p>\n<p>[i] Statement of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, House of Representatives, Budget Committee, Nov. 7, 2025.<\/p>\n<p>[ii] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, paras. 195, 199.<\/p>\n<p>\n        [iii] Masahiro Kurosaki, \u201cReformulating Taiwan\u2019s Statehood Claim,\u201d Lawfare,<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/www.lawfaremedia.org\/article\/reformulating-taiwan-s-statehood-claim\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.lawfaremedia.org\/article\/reformulating-taiwan-s-statehood-claim<\/a>.\n      <\/p>\n<p>[iv] Statement of Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, House of Representatives, Special Committee on the Peace and Security Legislation, June 15, 2015.<\/p>\n<p>[v] Kishida, House of Representatives, Special Committee on the Peace and Security Legislation, June 15, 2015.<\/p>\n<p><strong>I. The Diet Formula and Its Cold War Origins<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\n        Kishida described the inclusion of unrecognized and divided states as something the government had \u201ctraditionally explained.\u201d The \u201cclose relationship\u201d concept is a product of that same 2015 legislation, so the exact phrase has no earlier history; the term \u201cdivided state\u201d<br \/>\n        does not share that limitation. What the record does disclose is the doctrine\u2019s substance. During the Vietnam War, the Foreign Ministry\u2019s treaty bureau chief told the Diet that crossing an internationally established line partitioning a divided state would amount to<br \/>\n        aggression and, in the same breath, to an armed attack, against which the attacked side would naturally hold a right of self-defense\u2014a principle, he added, already settled beyond doubt since the Korean War.[\u2175] The paradigm is North Korea; never recognized by Japan as an<br \/>\n        independent State, yet\u2014a United Nations member since 1991\u2014a State capable of committing an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        What this history shows is limited: the absence of Japanese recognition or diplomatic relations does not remove an entity from the class of States for the use of force. But that understanding formed in a world where both halves of every divided nation had come to satisfy<br \/>\n        the criteria of statehood. Whether the formula can do any work for an entity that has not\u2014Taiwan\u2019s situation\u2014depends on what \u201cdivided state\u201d actually means, and why it was ever thought to matter for the use of force.\n      <\/p>\n<p>[\u2175] Statement of Banri Fujisaki, Director-General of the Treaty Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Budget Committee, July 18, 1966.<\/p>\n<p><strong>II. What Is a \u201cDivided State,\u201d and Could Taiwan Be One?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\n        The term is descriptive before it is legal. It entered the vocabulary after the Second World War to capture the parallel predicaments of Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and China: single nations within which rival authorities emerged, each claiming to be the sole legitimate<br \/>\n        government of the whole. A divided state, by the standard definition, exists where the partitioning line cannot be regarded as a frontier in the legal sense.[\u2176] Yet the prevailing doctrinal verdict is deflationary: there is no separate juridical category of the \u201cdivided<br \/>\n        state.\u201d Whether the components of a divided nation constitute parts of a single State or two States \u201cdepends on general criteria for statehood\u2014not on some postulated category of \u2018divided States\u2019 into which a variety of cases are supposed to fit.\u201d[\u2177] The case histories of<br \/>\n        Germany, Korea, and Vietnam bear this out. In each case, crucially, both halves could be characterized as independent States by ordinary criteria\u2014before self-determination had crystallized as a cardinal principle, when a people\u2019s own claim to separate statehood was not<br \/>\n        itself decisive\u2014notwithstanding each side\u2019s own un-renounced claim to the whole nation. This is why Crawford calls the \u201cdivided state\u201d label legally idle; it added nothing that statehood criteria did not already supply.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        Taiwan\u2019s situation, on the analysis above, is harder to assimilate to the classic cases. Although it satisfies the effectiveness criteria, it has not unequivocally claimed separate statehood within the territory it actually governs\u2014itself a requirement of contemporary<br \/>\n        self-determination doctrine, not of any recognition-based theory. Whether Taiwan can even be called a divided state is itself disputed, and scholars divide on the question. A further, structural difference reinforces the point: the Taiwan Strait has been stabilized since<br \/>\n        the mid-1950s by deterrence and geography, not by an agreed demarcation line\u2014its median line was drawn unilaterally by the United States in 1955, and Beijing has never accepted it as binding. Further, there has been no mutual accommodation of the sort that matured the<br \/>\n        German and Korean divisions into settled fact\u2014no equivalent of the Basic Treaty, no simultaneous U.N. admission. Under the loose, traditional understanding grouping these four cases together, Taiwan can plausibly be counted among them; under any more demanding test, it<br \/>\n        cannot confidently be. That looser label carries no legal significance here. What matters is the one feature Taiwan lacks\u2014an internationally established boundary\u2014on which the use-of-force theory examined next depends.\n      <\/p>\n<p>[\u2176] James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 450.<\/p>\n<p>[\u2177] Crawford, The Creation of States, p. 451.<\/p>\n<p><strong>III. Why Might Divided-State Status Matter for the Use of Force? The Korean Precedent<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\n        The clue lies in Korea in 1950, not in any definition of \u201cdivided state.\u201d When North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, the U.N. Security Council did not pause to resolve whether the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea was a State, or whether the<br \/>\n        Republic of Korea was, or whether the parallel was an international boundary in the strict sense\u2014all genuinely unsettled at that date. Noting \u201cwith grave concern the armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,\u201d U.N. Security Council Resolution 82<br \/>\n        determined that this action \u201cconstitutes a breach of the peace\u201d\u2014not quite \u201caggression\u201d in the Charter\u2019s terms. Two days later, U.N. Security Council Resolution 83 recommended that member States \u201cfurnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel<br \/>\n        the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area\u201d (italics added in both quotations). Twenty years later, the General Assembly\u2019s Friendly Relations Declaration articulated a broader principle to similar effect: every State must refrain from the<br \/>\n        threat or use of force \u201cto violate international lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, established by or pursuant to an international agreement to which it is a party or which it is otherwise bound to respect,\u201d even where the line falls short of a full<br \/>\n        international frontier. An inter-State boundary is one limit on the use of force, Crawford notes, \u201cbut, as resolution 2625 (XXV) recognizes, there can be other such boundaries.\u201d[\u2178]\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        Put together, Korea 1950 and the Friendly Relations Declaration suggest a theory: that crossing an established demarcation line separating the two halves of a divided nation can itself be an unlawful use of force of the gravity the ICJ\u2019s Nicaragua judgment later required<br \/>\n        for an armed attack\u2014one of \u201cthe most grave forms of the use of force\u201d\u2014against which the attacked side, and those coming to its aid, might in principle act in self-defense, without first resolving every question about the attacked side\u2019s formal statehood. On that theory,<br \/>\n        Japan\u2019s collective self-defense would rest not on Taiwan\u2019s statehood but on the protected status of the line and the armed attack its crossing would constitute. Whether that also supplies the victim-State standing Article 51 requires is the difficulty addressed next.\n      <\/p>\n<p>[\u2178] Crawford, The Creation of States, p. 450.<\/p>\n<p><strong>IV. Why the Theory Is Too Fragile to Rely On<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\n        Attractive as it is, the theory is not itself the holding of any single authority: it is an inference drawn by combining two sources, neither of which, on its own terms, supplies it. Korea 1950 shows that the Security Council can recommend collective assistance to a<br \/>\n        divided state\u2019s half without resolving its statehood\u2014but the Council did not invoke Article 51 in doing so, only language the United Nations\u2019 own repertory of practice describes as merely having \u201csome bearing on\u201d it.[\u2179] The Friendly Relations Declaration\u2019s<br \/>\n        demarcation-line principle, for its part, obliges States not to use force against protected lines but says nothing about who may invoke Article 51 self-defense in response to a violation, and in any event confines the protected lines to those established by an agreement<br \/>\n        binding the State concerned\u2014a description the Taiwan Strait, as noted above, does not meet. Vietnam shows why that last condition is no formality\u2014and shows it using the very line Japan\u2019s own Foreign Ministry cited in 1966 as the doctrine\u2019s guiding example: the 1954 Geneva<br \/>\n        Final Declaration provided that the 17th parallel \u201cshould not\u2026 be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary,\u201d yet the United States invoked collective self-defense under Article 51 to defend South Vietnam against forces crossing it\u2014a controversial<br \/>\n        claim made independently of Security Council collective-security action. The Taiwan Strait, lacking even Vietnam\u2019s degree of formal agreement, meets the Friendly Relations Declaration\u2019s condition even less.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        On the current record, neither route is available: Taiwan has made no independent and unequivocal claim to statehood, and, as just shown, the divided-state theory does not reach the Taiwan Strait either. It is accordingly difficult to identify a solid legal basis on which<br \/>\n        Japan could defend Taiwan directly, as distinct from defending American forces that come to its aid.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        [\u2179] United Nations, Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, vol. 2 (1945\u20131954), Article 51, p. 430 n. 5,<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/legal.un.org\/repertory\/art51\/english\/rep_orig_vol2_art51.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/legal.un.org\/repertory\/art51\/english\/rep_orig_vol2_art51.pdf<\/a>.\n      <\/p>\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\n        Rightly understood, the divided state is not a shortcut to Japan\u2019s direct defense of Taiwan; tracing its logic to the source shows how much still depends on the requirement of statehood. Japan\u2019s Diet formula\u2014that unrecognized and divided states may be objects of<br \/>\n        collective self-defense\u2014was offered as a general proposition, and this essay has found no reason to think it wrong. The possibility of a lawful Japanese defense of a divided-state Taiwan is not zero, and the theory could, in principle, be extended to Taiwan\u2019s case. All<br \/>\n        that said, that theory asks more of its foundations than they supply: the Friendly Relations Declaration\u2019s principle does not extend to the Taiwan Strait, where no relevant line has been established by or pursuant to an international agreement binding the PRC. Taiwan\u2019s<br \/>\n        possible status as a divided state cannot, on the current state of international law, by itself supply a sufficiently secure legal basis for direct Japanese defense of Taiwan. Short of an independent and unequivocal Taiwanese claim to statehood, then, Japan\u2019s soundest<br \/>\n        route to involvement in a Taiwan contingency remains the indirect one: defending American forces that come to Taiwan\u2019s assistance, rather than defending Taiwan directly on the divided-state theory examined here. That indirect route, however, necessarily assumes that the<br \/>\n        United States\u2019 intervention is lawful and that an attack on its forces constitutes an armed attack giving rise to its own right of self-defense.\n      <\/p>\n<div style=\"border-top: 1px solid #ccc; height: 1px; margin: 10px 0\"><\/div>\n<p>Views expressed or implied in this article are solely those of the author. They must not be construed as representing the views and positions of RIPS or any other organizations.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>    <!-- \/Manthly Column --><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>    <!-- Statistical Data and Analysis --><\/p>\n<div class=\"sdaa-wrapper\">\n<p style=\"font-weight: bold; text-align: center; font-size: 16pt; margin: 30px 0 10px\">Statistical Data and Analysis (as of August 31)<\/p>\n<div class=\"analysis-box\">\n<p>\n          China is routinely making maritime intrusions into Japanese territorial waters and conducting unauthorized research within its EEZ. It has also encroached upon waters around Taiwan\u2019s Pratas Islands while advancing development in the Paracels. To pressure the<br \/>\n          Philippines, China gathered as many as 200 fishing boats at Mischief Reef and conducted live-fire exercises in the northern South China Sea.\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          Amidst the protracted conflict with Iran, the U.S. has paused aircraft carrier deployments in the Pacific, likely expanding China\u2019s Western Pacific presence. President Trump\u2019s directives to alter carrier designs have sparked fears of future vessel shortages,<br \/>\n          intensifying concerns over a relative decline in U.S. presence.\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          To address this situation, Asian countries are seeking to strengthen their defense capabilities. They are substantially increasing defense budgets. Taiwan conducted realistic drills during its annual Han Kuang exercises to boost contingency response capabilities.<br \/>\n          Japan\u2019s defense minister, meeting with his Australian and Indian counterparts, pledged to strengthen security cooperation, while Australia is enhancing maritime security with intelligence-gathering operations in the South China Sea.\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>\n        <strong>[Statistical Data as of August 31]<br \/> <\/strong>\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) daily updates the statistical data on the number of China Coast Guard vessels entering in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands and intruding into Japanese territorial waters. The below is from the website of the JCG.<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp\/mission\/senkaku\/senkaku.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp\/mission\/senkaku\/senkaku.html<\/a>\n      <\/p>\n<div class=\"table-box\">\n<table class=\"stats-table\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<th>Aug.<\/th>\n<th>Contiguous<br \/>zone<\/th>\n<th>Territorial<br \/>sea<\/th>\n<td rowspan=\"100\" class=\"stats-spacer-col\"><\/td>\n<th>Aug.<\/th>\n<th>Contiguous<br \/>zone<\/th>\n<th>Territorial<br \/>sea<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>14<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td>23<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>15<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>24<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>16<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>25<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>17<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>26<\/td>\n<td>2<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>18<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>27<\/td>\n<td>2<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>19<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>28<\/td>\n<td>2<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>20<\/td>\n<td>3<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>29<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>21<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>30<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>22<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>31<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>    <!-- \/Statistical Data and Analysis --><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>    <!-- Topics --><\/p>\n<div class=\"topics-wrapper\">\n<p style=\"font-weight: bold; text-align: center; font-size: 16pt; margin: 30px 0 10px\">Topics<\/p>\n<div class=\"table-box\">\n<table class=\"topics-table\">\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th class=\"topics-header-date\">Date<\/th>\n<th class=\"topics-header-title\" style=\"text-align: center\">Topics<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/13<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  Taiwan announced in July that it had detected \u201cabnormal\u201d cyberattacks against government agencies. Experts stated that open-source AI agents are being used to build autonomous hacking tools. Although Taiwan did not suggest China\u2019s involvement in these attacks,<br \/>\n                  experts noted that China&#8217;s involvement is somewhat likely.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Gurdian<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/technology\/2026\/aug\/13\/taiwan-ai-assisted-cyber-attacks-overseas\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/technology\/2026\/aug\/13\/taiwan-ai-assisted-cyber-attacks-overseas<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/13<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The US Under Secretary of War was once skeptical of AUKUS and perceived as reluctant to provide nuclear-powered submarines. However, following the President&#8217;s positive stance toward the pact, he shifted to a proactive approach. He stated that the United States<br \/>\n                  has no better ally than Australia, adding that the two nations are aligned in their thinking.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Gurdian<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/aug\/13\/pentagon-official-and-former-aukus-sceptic-says-deal-is-full-steam-ahead-echoing-trump\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/aug\/13\/pentagon-official-and-former-aukus-sceptic-says-deal-is-full-steam-ahead-echoing-trump<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/13<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  China has been conducting marine surveys in waters that include Japan\u2019s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), aiming to secure rare earth elements discovered around Minamitorishima Island. Under these circumstances, U.S. cooperation has become increasingly vital for<br \/>\n                  Japan. To break free from its dependence on China for rare earth elements, developing the resources around Minamitorishima is crucial.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Japan Times<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/news\/2026\/08\/13\/japan\/us-japan-undersea-mine-china\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/news\/2026\/08\/13\/japan\/us-japan-undersea-mine-china\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/14<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 13, the JMSDF confirmed one Russian one Improved Kilo class submarine and one Igor Belousov class submarine rescue ship sailing northeast in waters 80km south of Yonagunijima Island (Okinawa Prefecture). These vessels sailed northeast through waters<br \/>\n                  between Yonagunijima Island and Iriomotejima Island (Okinawa Prefecture) and navigated to the East China Sea.\n                <\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_1.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260814_04.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260814_04.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/14<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>On August 14, the JMSDF confirmed four Russian Tarantul-III class corvettes (hull number 916, 946, 971 and 978) sailing west in waters 40km northeast of Cape Soya (Hokkaido Prefecture). These vessels sailed west through the Soya Strait.<\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_2.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260814_05.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260814_05.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/14<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 14, according to the JCG, four Chinese government vessels entered Japan\u2019s territorial waters off the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Their hull numbers are 2501, 2304, 2302 and 2303. This was the first confirmed entry of Chinese government ships<br \/>\n                  into the area since July 23.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">NHK World<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260814_12\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260814_12\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Yaeyama Nippo (Japanese)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.yaeyama-nippo.co.jp\/article\/32835\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.yaeyama-nippo.co.jp\/article\/32835<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/14<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The US Ambassador to Japan stated on X that the U.S. remains unwavering in its recognition of Japan\u2019s sovereignty over the Northern Territories, following the Russian President&#8217;s visit to one of the disputed islands. He also reaffirmed U.S. support for Japan and<br \/>\n                  expressed strong opposition to actions that undermine the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific. The Northern Territories have been illegally occupied by Russia since the end of World War II.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">AFP (Barron&#8217;s)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.barrons.com\/news\/us-backs-japan-over-putin-trip-to-disputed-islands-bba60d57\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.barrons.com\/news\/us-backs-japan-over-putin-trip-to-disputed-islands-bba60d57<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/14<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 14, the annual Han Kuang military exercise concluded. U.S.-style military training methods were adopted in this year\u2019s exercise to enhance Taiwan&#8217;s coordination and combat readiness. The President of Taiwan participated in the exercise to simulate<br \/>\n                  maintaining government functions under attack. Taiwan\u2019s Navy and Coast Guard conducted their first joint anti-blockade exercise to practice how to escort civilian vessels transporting strategic supplies to Taiwan.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">AP<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/taiwan-han-kuang-military-drills-china-283f26ae2757166fcd3542471f927f00\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/taiwan-han-kuang-military-drills-china-283f26ae2757166fcd3542471f927f00<\/a><\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">TBS Cross Dig (Japanese)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/newsdig.tbs.co.jp\/articles\/withbloomberg\/2873830?display=1\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/newsdig.tbs.co.jp\/articles\/withbloomberg\/2873830?display=1<\/a><\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Focus Taiwan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/focustaiwan.tw\/politics\/202608140008\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/focustaiwan.tw\/politics\/202608140008<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/14<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  It has been confirmed that the guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold was without power for four days in the South China Sea in July due to an engine failure. According to a statement from a U.S. 7th Fleet spokesperson, machinery related to the USS Benfold&#8217;s<br \/>\n                  generators failed on July 24, and the ship was towed by a contracted tugboat to Subic Bay, where it underwent repairs. The repairs were completed by August 7, and the vessel departed Subic Bay on August 8. The Navy is currently investigating the cause of the<br \/>\n                  failure.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">USNI News<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/news.usni.org\/2026\/08\/14\/uss-benfold-was-stalled-in-the-south-china-sea-for-four-days-after-engineering-casualty\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/news.usni.org\/2026\/08\/14\/uss-benfold-was-stalled-in-the-south-china-sea-for-four-days-after-engineering-casualty<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/14<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 14, the Taiwan Cabinet&#8217;s 2026 budget was approved by the Legislative Yuan after a record 266-day delay. The Taiwan Cabinet had submitted the budget bill to the Legislative Yuan on August 31, 2025, but the review of the proposal was delayed by a<br \/>\n                  prolonged political deadlock. The Legislative Yuan reduced the originally proposed budget by NT$48 billion, and expenditures on military equipment and facilities were reduced by 2.5 percent, while the budget for drone procurement and the development of the drone<br \/>\n                  industry was not cut.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Focus Taiwan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/focustaiwan.tw\/politics\/202608140026\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/focustaiwan.tw\/politics\/202608140026<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/14<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  Trade between China and Russia via the Northern Sea Route is growing, supporting Moscow&#8217;s war economy and strengthening Beijing&#8217;s energy security. Acting as a &#8220;near-Arctic state,&#8221; China is aggressively developing Arctic shipping lanes to establish its &#8220;Polar<br \/>\n                  Silk Road,&#8221; triggering heightened vigilance from Western nations.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">CNN<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/08\/14\/china\/china-arctic-northern-sea-route-russia-intl-hnk-vis-dst\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/08\/14\/china\/china-arctic-northern-sea-route-russia-intl-hnk-vis-dst<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/15<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The U.S. President has ordered the Navy to revert to steam-powered catapults instead of using the advanced electromagnetic system on future aircraft carriers. Analysts warn that this directive will lead to billions of dollars in extra costs and significantly<br \/>\n                  delay future carrier deployments.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">CNN<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/08\/14\/politics\/trump-steam-catapult-navy\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/08\/14\/politics\/trump-steam-catapult-navy<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/15<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 15, parliamentary staffers from 12 European countries visited Taiwan under the 2026 European Valued Important Partnership program, which is organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan and the Taiwan International Cooperation and Development<br \/>\n                  Fund. The visitors were from Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom. Taiwan\u2019s Deputy Foreign Minister stressed the importance of closer Taiwan-Europe cooperation<br \/>\n                  amid growing global instability at the reception he hosted.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Focus Taiwan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/focustaiwan.tw\/politics\/202608150011\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/focustaiwan.tw\/politics\/202608150011<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/16<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  According to the JCG, a Chinese maritime survey vessel was seen deploying what appeared to be a wire into the water within Japan\u2019s EEZ near the Senkaku Islands on August 15. A JCG patrol vessel demanded that the ship immediately cease its activities, stating<br \/>\n                  that conducting research without the Japanese government\u2019s approval is impermissible.\n                <\/p>\n<p>On August 16, a JCG patrol vessel found another Chinese maritime survey vessel doing similar activities in the water west of Kume Island (Okinawa Prefecture) within Japan\u2019s EEZ, and demanded that the Chinese vessel immediately cease its activities.<\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Yomiuri Shimbun online (Japanase)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.yomiuri.co.jp\/national\/20260816-GYT1T00041\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.yomiuri.co.jp\/national\/20260816-GYT1T00041\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/16<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 16, the annual fishing moratorium in the East China Sea, which includes areas around the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan, came to an end, prompting a large number of fishing boats to set sail from ports in Fujian Province. In 2016, hundreds of Chinese<br \/>\n                  vessels gathered around the Senkaku Islands, with some confirmed to have intruded into Japanese territorial waters. In recent years, however, local Chinese government officials have instructed Chinese fishing boats to avoid operating in &#8220;sensitive waters.&#8221;\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Yomiuri Shimbun online (Japanese)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.yomiuri.co.jp\/world\/20260816-GYT1T00163\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.yomiuri.co.jp\/world\/20260816-GYT1T00163\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/16<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>The USS George Washington is departing the Pacific to relieve the long-deployed USS Abraham Lincoln in the Middle East. This shift comes amid mounting concerns over supply shortages and mental health strain aboard the Lincoln.<\/p>\n<p>The USS George Washington&#8217;s departure leaves the Western Pacific with no U.S. aircraft carrier presence. Analysts warn that this security vacuum provides Beijing with an opportunity to assert its strength in the region.<\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">AP<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/aircraft-carriers-trump-china-pacific-iran-war-87cfb838de8c13464fa3cab1840ad87d\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/aircraft-carriers-trump-china-pacific-iran-war-87cfb838de8c13464fa3cab1840ad87d<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/17<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The U.S. Navy is considering redesigning its future aircraft carriers to accommodate the President&#8217;s preferences. The Navy is assessing the feasibility of moving the island tower further forward, mimicking World War II-era carriers . Experts noted that such<br \/>\n                  design changes would cost billions of dollars and delay deliveries.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  On August 13, the President issued a presidential directive requiring future aircraft carriers to adopt steam-powered catapults instead of the advanced electromagnetic system. This move had already drawn criticism for potentially causing billions of dollars in<br \/>\n                  additional expenses and procurement delays.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Washington Post<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/national-security\/2026\/08\/15\/navy-weighs-major-warship-redesign-match-trumps-preferences\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/national-security\/2026\/08\/15\/navy-weighs-major-warship-redesign-match-trumps-preferences\/<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/17<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>On August 15, JMSDF confirmed one Russian Udaloy-I class (hull number 548) sailing west in the waters 50km northwest of Cape Soya (Hokkaido Prefecture).<\/p>\n<p>This vessel sailed west through the Soya Strait.<\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_3.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260817_02.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260817_02.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/17<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>On August 15, the JMSDF confirmed one Russian Balzam class intelligence collection ship (hull number 80) sailing northwest in the waters 20km northeast of Cape Soya (Hokkaido Prefecture). This vessel then sailed west through the Soya Strait.<\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_4.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260817_03.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260817_03.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/17<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 16, the JMSDF confirmed one Russian one Improved Kilo class submarine and one Igor Belousov class submarine rescue ship sailing northeast in waters 170km southwest of Tsushima Island (Nagasaki Prefecture). These vessels sailed northeast through the<br \/>\n                  Tsushima Strait and navigated to the Japan Sea.\n                <\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_5.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260817_04.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260817_04.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/17<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The Royal Australian Air Force\u2019s No. 10 Squadron has started its first intelligence collection operation using the MC-55A Peregrine over the South China Sea. The MC-55A is equipped with an AESA radar and possesses advanced intelligence collection capabilities.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Maritime Executive<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/maritime-executive.com\/article\/australia-improves-its-surveillance-capability-over-the-south-china-sea\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/maritime-executive.com\/article\/australia-improves-its-surveillance-capability-over-the-south-china-sea<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/18<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  An Armed Forces of the Philippines spokesperson stated that the departure of the USS George Washington from the Western Pacific would not impact planned activities between Philippine and U.S. military units. Describing their naval capabilities as inherently<br \/>\n                  expeditionary, he emphasized that the bilateral defense commitment remains \u201cironclad.\u201d\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Philippine News Agency<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pna.gov.ph\/articles\/1282144\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.pna.gov.ph\/articles\/1282144<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/18<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 18, the Japan Joint Staff confirmed one Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flying from the continent through the East China Sea toward the area off the coast of the Danjo Islands, Nagasaki Prefecture. The aircraft then proceeded toward the<br \/>\n                  continent.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  On the same day, the Japan Joint Staff confirmed one Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance\/attack UAV flying from the continent through the East China Sea toward the area off the coast of the Danjo Islands, Nagasaki Prefecture. The aircraft flew to off the coast of<br \/>\n                  Okinawa Island, and then proceeded toward the continent.\n                <\/p>\n<p>In response, the JASDF scrambled fighter jets.<\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_6.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260818_02.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260818_02.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/18<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 18, Japan\u2019s Minister for Foreign Affairs paid a courtesy call on the Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council of the Republic of Yemen in Riyadh. The minister reaffirmed Japan&#8217;s commitment to supporting the enhancement of Yemen\u2019s maritime law<br \/>\n                  enforcement capabilities, underscoring its contribution to the realization of the Japan-led \u201cFree and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)\u201d vision. The Chairman stated that as a maritime nation, Yemen highly values the FOIP and wishes to deepen bilateral cooperation from<br \/>\n                  this perspective.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/me_a\/me2\/ye\/pageite_000001_01769.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/me_a\/me2\/ye\/pageite_000001_01769.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/18<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 18, the Japan-Australia Defense Ministers\u2019 Meeting was held in Canberra. Both ministers agreed to deepen trilateral defense cooperation with the U.S. to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. The Japanese Defense Minister emphasized that defense<br \/>\n                  cooperation to realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific is crucial for regional peace and stability.\n                <\/p>\n<p>Prior to the talks, the Japanese minister paid a courtesy call on the Prime Minister of Australia to exchange views on defense cooperation.<\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">NHK World<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260818_11\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260818_11\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">(Reference) Ministry of Defense of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/en\/article\/2026\/08\/3b59625cce400f2b292741059785a188d789bb07.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/en\/article\/2026\/08\/3b59625cce400f2b292741059785a188d789bb07.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/18<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  Despite Western sanctions, cargo transport on Russia\u2019s Northern Sea Route (NSR) is increasing, driven by expanding trade between Russia and China. In the first half of 2026, bilateral cargo volume via this route exceeded 5 million tons, with both nations<br \/>\n                  targeting an expansion to 20 million tons by 2030. Meanwhile, China is considering utilizing the NSR not just for trade with Russia, but also for commerce with Europe. South Korea is also drawing attention to the route, viewing it as a strategic shipping lane<br \/>\n                  connecting East Asia and Europe.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">High North News<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/en.highnorthnews.com\/business\/russias-northern-sea-route-cargo-to-surpass-40m-tonnes-as-china-south-korea-dispatch-containerships\/1116787\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/en.highnorthnews.com\/business\/russias-northern-sea-route-cargo-to-surpass-40m-tonnes-as-china-south-korea-dispatch-containerships\/1116787<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/18<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  Diplomatic tensions between Japan and Russia have intensified following the Russian President&#8217;s visit to the Northern Territories. The president visited one of the islands occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. While Japan renounced its<br \/>\n                  sovereignty over the Kuril Islands\u2014excluding the Northern Territories\u2014under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Russia did not sign the treaty, leaving the dispute between the two nations unresolved. He is only the second Russian leader to visit the islands,<br \/>\n                  following Dmitry Medvedev, who visited previously as either president or prime minister. However, this first-ever visit to the Northern Territories by Vladimir Putin, who has effectively held supreme power since 2000, carries deep political symbolism and is seen<br \/>\n                  as a move that makes any improvement in relations highly difficult. For Russia, the Northern Territories remain critical due to their access to rich fishing grounds, mineral resources, and the Pacific Ocean for its naval fleet.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Gurdian<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/aug\/18\/kuril-islands-putin-takaichi-dispute-japan-russia-northern-territories\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/aug\/18\/kuril-islands-putin-takaichi-dispute-japan-russia-northern-territories<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/19<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 18, Russia\u2019s Foreign Ministry summoned the Japanese ambassador. The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister warned that Moscow maintains \u201cthe right to take appropriate countermeasures\u201d against Tokyo, citing Japan&#8217;s sanctions and its support for Ukraine<br \/>\n                  following the Russian invasion. He also lodged a protest with the Japanese side over what Moscow called &#8220;anti-Russian&#8221; statements by Japan&#8217;s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister concerning the Russian President&#8217;s recent visit to the Northern Territories. The<br \/>\n                  Japanese ambassador appropriately conveyed Japan\u2019s position during the meeting.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Mainichi<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/mainichi.jp\/english\/articles\/20260819\/p2g\/00m\/0in\/006000c\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/mainichi.jp\/english\/articles\/20260819\/p2g\/00m\/0in\/006000c<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/19<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary expressed an optimistic outlook that a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea would be finalized within the year. Speaking after the 9th Philippine-Malaysia Joint Commission Meeting in Manila, she welcomed the<br \/>\n                  positive progress in the negotiations. She noted that the Philippines and Malaysia share a common perspective on concerns over \u201cillegal and coercive actions\u201d in the South China Sea, without naming specific countries or citing particular incidents. Malaysia<br \/>\n                  serves as a co-chair of the COC negotiations alongside China.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Manila Bulletin<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/mb.com.ph\/2026\/08\/19\/philippines-optimistic-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct-talks-will-conclude-in-2026\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/mb.com.ph\/2026\/08\/19\/philippines-optimistic-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct-talks-will-conclude-in-2026<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/19<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 19, the third Japan-Saudi Arabia Foreign Ministerial Level Strategic Dialogue was held in Riyadh. The two ministers discussed bilateral and regional cooperation, exchanging views on international and regional affairs including military tensions between<br \/>\n                  the U.S. and Iran, the situation in the Red Sea, and the Palestinian issue. During the dialogue, the Japanese minister expressed Japan\u2019s intention to cooperate with Saudi Arabia, a major regional power, to promote a \u201cFree and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),\u201d and his<br \/>\n                  Saudi counterpart welcomed Japan\u2019s engagement.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Afffairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/me_a\/me2\/sa\/pageite_000001_01771.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/me_a\/me2\/sa\/pageite_000001_01771.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/19<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 19, the Japan Joint Staff confirmed one Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flying from the continent through the East China Sea toward the area south of the Danjo Islands, Nagasaki Prefecture. The aircraft flew southwest to the area off the<br \/>\n                  coast of Okinawa Island, then turned back. The aircraft then flew back and forth between the area south of the Danjo Islands and the area off the coast of Okinawa Island before flying to the continent.\n                <\/p>\n<p>In response, the JASDF scrambled fighter jets.<\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_7.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260819_02.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260819_02.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/19<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 18, Taiwan&#8217;s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) announced that two China Coast Guard vessels entered the restricted waters around the Pratas Islands in the South China Sea. The CGA also stated that it monitored the vessels with patrol boats and drove<br \/>\n                  them away. According to the CGA, this brings the total number of times China Coast Guard vessels have been turned away from the restricted waters around the Pratas Islands this fiscal year to 11 instances involving five vessels.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Focus Taiwan (Japanese)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/japan.focustaiwan.tw\/cross-strait\/202608190005\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/japan.focustaiwan.tw\/cross-strait\/202608190005<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/19<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The U.S. Pacific Fleet conducted a joint exercise with the Royal Australian Navy in the South China Sea. During this joint exercise, an Australian MH-60R helicopter was operated from the USS George Washington, demonstrating a high level of interoperability<br \/>\n                  between the two militaries. The fact that the U.S. and Australia demonstrated such advanced interoperability in the South China Sea sends a strategic message to China.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Army Recognition<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.armyrecognition.com\/news\/navy-news\/2026\/us-australia-carrier-interoperability-sharpens-allied-sea-power-in-the-south-china-sea\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.armyrecognition.com\/news\/navy-news\/2026\/us-australia-carrier-interoperability-sharpens-allied-sea-power-in-the-south-china-sea<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/19<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  n May of this year, Japan and the Philippines officially agreed to initiate negotiations on their maritime boundaries. China immediately condemned the talks, declaring them &#8220;illegal, null, and void.&#8221; Beijing claimed that a significant portion of the waters under<br \/>\n                  negotiation overlaps with areas under Chinese sovereignty. In response, Taiwan maintained that consultations will ultimately be necessary, emphasizing that Taiwanese fishing rights must be protected. Beyond its diplomatic protests, China deployed coast guard and<br \/>\n                  marine research vessels to the contested waters east of Taiwan, executing operations that were deemed at least partially illegal.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  Determining maritime boundaries through bilateral negotiations aligns with established international practice, and such agreements do not infringe upon the rights of third parties. Consequently, China&#8217;s maneuvers have been flagged as highly irregular, drawing<br \/>\n                  sharp condemnation from Australia, France, Germany, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries worry that China is using the Japan-Philippines talks as an excuse. They fear China wants to tighten its sea blockade around Taiwan and step up<br \/>\n                  &#8220;illegal&#8221; law enforcement in international waters.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/amti.csis.org\/as-tokyo-and-manila-talk-boundaries-beijing-breaks-them\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/amti.csis.org\/as-tokyo-and-manila-talk-boundaries-beijing-breaks-them\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/20<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  China has completed the first phase of its artificial island construction project at Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands. According to satellite imagery, the artificial island spans approximately 6 kilometers in total length and features a straight coastline<br \/>\n                  stretching over 3 kilometers, which experts point out could potentially be used as a runway. Furthermore, the island has a deep-water port, where China Coast Guard vessels have already been spotted docking.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Reuters (Taipei Times)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.taipeitimes.com\/News\/front\/archives\/2026\/08\/20\/200386279\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.taipeitimes.com\/News\/front\/archives\/2026\/08\/20\/200386279<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/20<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>On August 20, JMSDF confirmed one Russian Slava class cruiser (hull number 011) sailing west in the waters 40km north of Cape Soya (Hokkaido Prefecture).<\/p>\n<p>This vessel sailed west through the Soya Strait.<\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_8.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260820_02.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260820_02.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/20<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 20, a Japan-Oman Foreign Ministers\u2019 Meeting was held in Muscat. The Japanese Foreign Minister explained Japan\u2019s intention to promote an updated \u201cFree and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)\u201d and to cooperate with Oman for the peace and stability of the Middle<br \/>\n                  East. The Omani Foreign Minister welcomed the promotion of cooperation between the two countries in various fields. They also discussed regional and international situations.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/me_a\/me2\/om\/pageite_000001_00003.html\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/me_a\/me2\/om\/pageite_000001_00003.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/20<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 20, a Japan-India Defense Ministers\u2019 Meeting was held in New Delhi. During the meeting, both ministers agreed to deepen cooperation in maritime security to address concerns in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, they signed a memorandum on maritime<br \/>\n                  security cooperation, which includes information sharing in the field of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and enhanced cooperation in areas such as search and rescue (SAR) and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Jiji Press<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/sp.m.jiji.com\/english\/show\/49789\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/sp.m.jiji.com\/english\/show\/49789<\/a><\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">(Reference) Ministry of Defese of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/en\/article\/2026\/08\/d53ab5504adee3c85a14df37a5b7e3108fa885e8.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/en\/article\/2026\/08\/d53ab5504adee3c85a14df37a5b7e3108fa885e8.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/20<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 20, the Taiwan government proposed the governmental budget for FY 2027. The 2027 budget for defense exceeds NT$1 trillion (US$31.4 billion). The defense budget is 18% higher than the current one and above 3% of GDP. To counter China\u2019s increasing<br \/>\n                  pressure, Taiwan is conducting military modernization and plans to build new submarines.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Reuters (Free Malaysia Today)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.freemalaysiatoday.com\/category\/world\/2026\/08\/20\/taiwan-proposes-boosting-2027-defence-spending-18\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.freemalaysiatoday.com\/category\/world\/2026\/08\/20\/taiwan-proposes-boosting-2027-defence-spending-18<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/20<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  China is questioning Japan&#8217;s sovereignty over Okinawa and the Philippines&#8217; sovereignty over the Batanes Islands to interfere with the Japan-Philippines maritime boundary talks. Since the 2000s, China has cast doubt on Japan&#8217;s sovereignty over Okinawa, which<br \/>\n                  experts label as a type of cognitive warfare.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Kyodo News (Japanese)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/news.jp\/i\/1463060488149745693?c=302675738515047521?c=302675738515047521\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/news.jp\/i\/1463060488149745693?c=302675738515047521?c=302675738515047521<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/20<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The Ministry of Defense of Japan is planning to request \u00a58.9 trillion for the defense budget for 2027. However, the total amount of the defense budget is anticipated to increase further because three key strategic documents for Japan\u2019s security are scheduled to<br \/>\n                  be updated. The defense budget request is considered to include the cost to produce long-range attack UAVs and to develop stand-off submarine-launched missiles to counterattack enemy bases\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Japan Times<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/news\/2026\/08\/20\/japan\/japan-record-defense-budget-request\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/news\/2026\/08\/20\/japan\/japan-record-defense-budget-request\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/21<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  According to reports, China is considering a multi-layered system that integrates UAVs, USVs, and UUVs to constantly protect the islands. This research comes as China expands its footprint in the South China Sea, with reports noting it could potentially be used<br \/>\n                  for a Taiwan contingency or as a countermeasure against the U.S. military.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Chosun Daily<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.chosun.com\/english\/world-en\/2026\/08\/21\/ZMHKDDH3DBFZZL2T5V57424KCA\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.chosun.com\/english\/world-en\/2026\/08\/21\/ZMHKDDH3DBFZZL2T5V57424KCA\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/21<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The Russian Navy&#8217;s Pacific Fleet conducted a military exercise simulating an attack on vessels off the coast of Japan\u2019s Northern Territories. Russia stated that a nuclear-powered submarine, a guided-missile cruiser, and a Bastion anti-ship missile system<br \/>\n                  participated in the drill.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">NHK World<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260821_N01\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260821_N01\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/21<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 21, China and Indonesia held their first Comprehensive Strategic Dialogue in Jakarta. The foreign ministers of both countries attended the meeting and agreed to work toward an early conclusion of a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea between<br \/>\n                  China and ASEAN. China and Indonesia also held a foreign and defense ministerial (2+2) meeting and agreed to strengthen defense cooperation.\n                <\/p>\n<p>While Indonesia maintains that it follows a neutral foreign policy, the Indonesian Navy recently conducted a joint naval exercise with the Chinese Navy in the waters east of Taiwan, which raised concerns in Taiwan.<\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">NHK World<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260822_06\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260822_06\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/21<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) announced that authorities in Kiribati, Palau, and Papua New Guinea have detained several Chinese and Indonesian fishing vessels for illegal fishing in the Pacific. While half of the world&#8217;s tuna is caught in the<br \/>\n                  region, Pacific island countries handle or process only 15% of the catch.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">AFP (The Strait Times)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/australianz\/pacific-nations-detain-chinese-indonesian-boats-for-illegal-fishing\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/australianz\/pacific-nations-detain-chinese-indonesian-boats-for-illegal-fishing<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/21<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>On August 21, JMSDF confirmed three Russian Steregushchiy class frigates (hull number 333, 335 and 339) sailing west in the waters 30km north of Cape Soya (Hokkaido Prefecture).<\/p>\n<p>These vessels sailed west through the Soya Strait.<\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_9.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260821_02.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260821_02.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/21<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 21, the Japan Joint Staff confirmed one Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flying from the continent over the Sea of Japan. The aircraft flew to the area off the coast of Ishikawa Prefecture, then turned back and flew toward the continent.\n                <\/p>\n<p>The JASDF scrambled fighter jets in response to this Russian aircraft.<\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_10.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260821_03.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260821_03.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/21<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 21, China stated that three Philippine aircraft had \u201cillegally intruded into\u201d the airspace over Scarborough Shoal without Beijing\u2019s approval. China condemned the action as a violation of its sovereignty and a potential cause of misunderstanding and<br \/>\n                  miscalculation. The Philippine side did not immediately respond to a request for comment.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Reuters (Business World)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/bworldonline.com\/the-nation\/2026\/08\/21\/771740\/china-says-philippine-aircraft-intrude-into-airspace-over-scarborough-shoal\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/bworldonline.com\/the-nation\/2026\/08\/21\/771740\/china-says-philippine-aircraft-intrude-into-airspace-over-scarborough-shoal\/<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/22<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  China announced that it had confirmed and monitored the flight of a U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft as it transited the Taiwan Strait. According to flight tracking data, the aircraft took off from Okinawa, passed through the Taiwan Strait, and<br \/>\n                  then headed toward the Bashi Channel. The U.S. 7th Fleet issued a statement, declaring that the flight demonstrates the United States&#8217; commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Taiwan News<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.taiwannews.com.tw\/news\/6426158\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.taiwannews.com.tw\/news\/6426158<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/24<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>Based on satellite imagery analysis, an expert announced that over 200 Chinese fishing vessels have gathered near Mischief Reef. Mischief Reef is located about 40 km from Second Thomas Shoal, which is effectively controlled by the Philippines.<\/p>\n<p>\n                  The satellite imagery identified flotillas of 10 to 20 vessels tied together. The expert indicated the possibility that these vessels are being used by the Chinese maritime militia to capture Second Thomas Shoal, as vessels tied together cannot be used for<br \/>\n                  fishing. Mischief Reef has been occupied by China since 1994 and is utilized as a military base.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  On August 23, China\u2019s Maritime Safety Administration announced that Beijing will conduct a live-fire naval exercise in the northern part of the South China Sea from August 24 to 28. This exercise is regarded as a response to Philippine aircraft entering the<br \/>\n                  airspace over Scarborough Shoal on August 21.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Chosun Daily<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.chosun.com\/english\/world-en\/2026\/08\/24\/VEXQ6KCI2FHHTBF66PH3XT4A7M\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.chosun.com\/english\/world-en\/2026\/08\/24\/VEXQ6KCI2FHHTBF66PH3XT4A7M\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/24<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 22, the JMSDF confirmed that one Chinese Luyang \u2162 class destroyer (hull number 159) and one Jiangkai-II class frigate (hull number 537) sailing southeast in waters 90km southwest of Kume Island (Okinawa Prefecture). These vessels then proceeded through<br \/>\n                  the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island into the Pacific.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  On the same day, the JMSDF confirmed that one Chinese Luyang \u2162 class destroyer (hull number 133) and one Jiangkai-II class frigate (hull number 535) sailing south in waters 70km west of Kume Island. These vessels then proceeded through the waters between Okinawa<br \/>\n                  Island and Miyako Island into the Pacific.\n                <\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_11.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_12.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260824_02.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260824_02.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/25<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 25, the Philippine Defense Secretary stated at a congressional meeting that the Philippine Navy intends to acquire two more missile frigates from South Korea. He added that the final decision to acquire has not yet been made. The Philippines is<br \/>\n                  conducting defense equipment modernization to counter China\u2019s pressure in the South China Sea.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Inquirer<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.inquirer.net\/486126\/dnd-eyes-additional-warships-amid-south-china-sea-tensions\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.inquirer.net\/486126\/dnd-eyes-additional-warships-amid-south-china-sea-tensions\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/25<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 25, the Japan Joint Staff confirmed one Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flying from the continent through the East China Sea. The aircraft flew toward the area off the coast of Okinawa Island, where it circled. The aircraft then flew back<br \/>\n                  and forth between the area off the coast of Amami Island (Kagoshima Prefecture) and the area off the coast of Okinawa Island. Afterward, the aircraft flew northeast toward the area off the coast of Danjo Island (Nagasaki Prefecture) before returning toward the<br \/>\n                  continent.\n                <\/p>\n<p>In response, the JASDF scrambled fighter jets.<\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_13.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260825_02.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260825_02.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/25<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  China has constructed new buildings in the Paracel Islands. A satellite image taken on August 17 revealed three buildings on Yangong Island. A security expert indicated that some of these structures are similar to other military radar facilities. Additionally,<br \/>\n                  on August 25, China completed the first phase of a construction project at Antelope Reef, also located in the Paracel Islands.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Reuters (Devdiscourse)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.devdiscourse.com\/article\/international\/3967521-new-installations-emerge-on-islet-as-china-accelerates-south-china-sea-build-up?amp\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.devdiscourse.com\/article\/international\/3967521-new-installations-emerge-on-islet-as-china-accelerates-south-china-sea-build-up?amp<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/26<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 26, the first Japan-Australia-Indonesia Trilateral Defense Ministers\u2019 Telephone Call was held. The three ministers exchanged views on the security environment in the Indo-Pacific and reaffirmed their commitment to further cooperation to contribute to<br \/>\n                  regional and global peace and stability.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/en\/article\/2026\/08\/501918b5cf80aaca785f019dcd7aaaa3e21793d2.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/en\/article\/2026\/08\/501918b5cf80aaca785f019dcd7aaaa3e21793d2.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/26<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  Taiwan\u2019s foreign minister will attend the 55th Pacific Islands Forum and strengthen partnerships with Pacific island countries. During the visit, he will join the 30th Taiwan-Pacific Islands Forum Dialogue. As a development partner, Taiwan has participated in<br \/>\n                  the Pacific Islands Forum since 1993. Taiwan has diplomatic relations with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu. China is expanding its influence in Pacific island countries; as a result, most other members have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In<br \/>\n                  addition, Pacific island countries could not reach a consensus on a unified condemnation of China&#8217;s ballistic missile test-firing in July, which landed in the Pacific Ocean.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Taiwan News<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.taiwannews.com.tw\/news\/6427985\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.taiwannews.com.tw\/news\/6427985<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/26<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 26, South Korea announced that its Air Force scrambled fighter jets to intercept a Russian military aircraft attempting to enter the South Korean Air Defense Identification Zone. Officials noted that South Korea detected the Russian aircraft and<br \/>\n                  responded appropriately, adding that the aircraft did not violate South Korean airspace.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Kyiv Post<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kyivpost.com\/post\/83109\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.kyivpost.com\/post\/83109<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/26<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  Australia announced that it conducted a joint maritime exercise with the Philippines and the U.S. from August 19 to 25 in the South China Sea, within the Philippines&#8217; Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Australia stated that the objective of the exercise was to<br \/>\n                  strengthen trilateral defense cooperation, ensure freedom of navigation and overflight, and enhance deterrence to maintain security in the Indo-Pacific region.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Nova.news<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.agenzianova.com\/en\/news\/South-China-Sea--Australia--the-Philippines--and-the-United-States-strengthen-joint-naval-and-air-maneuvers.\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.agenzianova.com\/en\/news\/South-China-Sea&#8211;Australia&#8211;the-Philippines&#8211;and-the-United-States-strengthen-joint-naval-and-air-maneuvers.\/<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/27<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 24, Chinese authorities conducted an inspection of a large saury fishing vessel belonging to the Akkeshi Fisheries Cooperative Association in Hokkaido. The inspection lasted three hours, and authorities did not report any rule infractions. While<br \/>\n                  high-seas vessel inspections are permitted for all countries, a source familiar with the matter stated that a Chinese inspection of a Japanese saury fishing vessel is rare.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Hokkaido News UHB (Japanese)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uhb.jp\/news\/single.html?id=61725\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.uhb.jp\/news\/single.html?id=61725<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/27<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) stated that the number of China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels appearing near Scarborough Shoal has increased significantly. According to an analysis conducted by AMTI, the CCG dispatched vessels for a total of 933<br \/>\n                  ship-days near Scarborough Shoal in the first half of this year, compared to 1,099 ship-days in 2025 and 516 in 2024. To counter these Chinese attempts, the Philippine Coast Guard and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources increased law enforcement<br \/>\n                  patrols near Scarborough Shoal.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Manila Times<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.manilatimes.net\/2026\/08\/27\/news\/national\/chinese-presence-in-masinloc-surges\/2412784\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.manilatimes.net\/2026\/08\/27\/news\/national\/chinese-presence-in-masinloc-surges\/2412784<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/27<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 27, the South Korean government announced that it will take tougher measures to counter illegal Chinese fishing vessels near the Northern Limit Line (NLL). South Korea will strengthen its crackdown on Chinese fishing vessels near the NLL, remove<br \/>\n                  illegal fishing gear forcibly, and build additional artificial structures to support these measures. It will also take appropriate steps including diplomatic cooperation and information-sharing between the Coast Guard and the military.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Korea JoongAng Daily<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.koreajoongangdaily.com\/korea\/govt-to-implement-new-measures-to-crack-down-more-strongly-on-illegal-fishing-near-nll\/12847401\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.koreajoongangdaily.com\/korea\/govt-to-implement-new-measures-to-crack-down-more-strongly-on-illegal-fishing-near-nll\/12847401<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/27<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  A cross-party delegation of Japanese lawmakers visited China and met with the vice minister of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The vice minister stated that withdrawing the Prime Minister\u2019s Diet replies<br \/>\n                  last November regarding a Taiwan contingency was necessary for a change in China&#8217;s diplomatic policy toward Japan. The two sides also discussed the resumption of cultural exchanges between the two countries, the detention of Japanese citizens, issues related to<br \/>\n                  rare-earth exports, and China&#8217;s military activities in the East and South China Seas.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Kyodo News (Japanese)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/news.jp\/i\/1465593933772637002\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/news.jp\/i\/1465593933772637002<\/a><\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Japan Time<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/news\/2026\/08\/27\/japan\/politics\/japanese-lawmakers-visit-china\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/news\/2026\/08\/27\/japan\/politics\/japanese-lawmakers-visit-china\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/27<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 27, the JMSDF confirmed two Russian Tarantul-III class corvettes (hull number 921 and 924) and one Amga class missile support ship sailing west in waters 40km northwest of Cape Soya (Hokkaido Prefecture). These vessels sailed west through the Soya<br \/>\n                  Strait.\n                <\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/52_14.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260827_02.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260827_02.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/28<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The Coast Guard Administration (CGA) of Taiwan announced that China dispatched 244 vessels near Taiwan\u2019s waters last month. This is the highest number on record, consisting of China Coast Guard vessels, maritime research vessels, and other ships. The number of<br \/>\n                  Chinese Navy vessels is not included. Some Taiwanese officials believe China is using these vessels as gray-zone tactics to claim sovereignty over the waters. The CGA also stated that maritime research conducted by Chinese vessels might contribute to building an<br \/>\n                  anti-submarine warfare database for China\u2019s Navy.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">AFP (Taipei Times)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.taipeitimes.com\/News\/front\/archives\/2026\/08\/28\/2003863266\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.taipeitimes.com\/News\/front\/archives\/2026\/08\/28\/2003863266<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/28<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 28, a Japan-Chile Foreign Ministers\u2019 meeting was held in Tokyo. The Foreign Minister of Japan welcomed the progress of cooperation toward a resilient supply chain with Chile, which is an important supplier of strategic minerals for Japan, under the<br \/>\n                  concept of the updated \u201cFree and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)\u201d. In response, the Foreign Minister of Chile expressed his intention to deepen economic relations by adding high value through Japan\u2019s advanced technologies. They also exchanged views on the situation in<br \/>\n                  East Asia, and reaffirmed close coordination in the international arena.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/press\/release\/pressite_000001_02608.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/press\/release\/pressite_000001_02608.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/28<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>Monthly Statistics on Scrambles\uff08July\uff09<\/p>\n<p>The Japan Joint Staff released its monthly statistics on scrambles. In July, the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) conducted 90 scrambles. The most scrambles were against Chinese aircraft (51 times), followed by Russian aircraft (38 times).<\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260828_08.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260828_08.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/28<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 27, the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) announced that it had dispatched a patrol vessel toward a Chinese maritime research vessel sailing in the waters southwest of the Port of Kaohsiung, and warned it by radio not to enter the restricted area.<br \/>\n                  According to the CGA, the Chinese vessel did not enter the restricted area and did not conduct maritime research in those waters.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Focus Taiwan (Japanese)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/japan.focustaiwan.tw\/cross-strait\/202608280004\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/japan.focustaiwan.tw\/cross-strait\/202608280004<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">8\/30<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On August 30, a Japan-Turkmenistan Foreign Ministers&#8217; Meeting and Working Lunch was held. The Foreign Minister of Japan explained the concept of the updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), and the Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of<br \/>\n                  Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan stated in response that Japan&#8217;s effort to realize the concept is important. They also exchanged views on regional and international affairs, and reaffirmed their commitment to continue close coordination in the international<br \/>\n                  arena.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/erp\/ca_c\/tm\/pageite_000001_01786.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/erp\/ca_c\/tm\/pageite_000001_01786.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>    <!-- \/Topics -->\n  <\/div>\n<\/div>\n<h3>Newsletter Registration<\/h3>\n<p>What is happening in East Asian Maritime Security? The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) publishes the biweekly newsletter, \u201cEast Asian Maritime Security (EAMS)\u201d and updates the information on maritime security relevant to East Asia and Japan&#8217;s territory.<\/p>\n<div class=\"u-mbs is-top mw-400\">\n  <a class=\"c-button\" href=\"https:\/\/forms.gle\/CiMT6bWdHrryT8mM6\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><span>Registration Form<\/span><\/a>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Vol.52. August 31. 2026 What is happening in East Asian Maritime Security? The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) publishes the biweekly newsletter, the information on maritime security relevant to East Asia and Japan&#8217;s territory. Monthly Column Could Divided-State Status Support Japan\u2019s Direct Defense of Taiwan? by Prof. Masahiro Kurosaki Professor of International Law, Tohoku University School of Law, Japan Introduction Whether Japan could lawfully join in the defense of Taiwan is a question that has drawn renewed attention. &hellip; <span>More<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"parent":2309,"menu_order":3,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":[],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v17.8 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Vol. 52 August 31, 2026 - RIPS - Research Institute for Peace and Security -<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"\u300cVol. 52 August 31, 2026 \u300d\u306b\u3064\u3044\u3066\u3054\u7d39\u4ecb\u3044\u305f\u3057\u307e\u3059\u3002- RIPS - Research Institute for Peace and Security - The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is Japan\u2019s first nonprofit, private think tank. 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