{"id":5338,"date":"2026-05-29T10:40:08","date_gmt":"2026-05-29T01:40:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/?page_id=5338"},"modified":"2026-06-04T14:49:30","modified_gmt":"2026-06-04T05:49:30","slug":"vol-46-may-29-2026","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/newsletter\/vol-46-may-29-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Vol. 46 May 29, 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<style>\n    body {\n      background-color: #fafafa;\n    }\n    h1,\n    h2,\n    h3,\n    h4,\n    th,\n    td,\n    p,\n    div {\n      font-family: \"Helvetica\", sans-serif;\n    }\n    .center-wrapper {\n      max-width: 600px;\n      margin: 0 auto;\n      background-color: #ffffff;\n      padding: 20px 10px;\n    }\n    hr,\n    .hr {\n      border: none;\n      border-bottom: 1px solid #000;\n      margin: 10px 0;\n      max-width: none;\n    }\n    .topics-table th,\n    .topics-table td {\n      padding: 3.75pt 13.5pt;\n      vertical-align: top;\n      border: 1px solid #ffffff !important;\n    }\n    .topics-header-date {\n      background: #a5e9ff;\n      border-right: solid white 1pt;\n      border-bottom: none;\n      text-align: center !important;\n      width: 100px;\n      white-space: nowrap;\n    }\n    .topics-header-title {\n      background: #eeeeee;\n      font-weight: bold;\n      text-align: center;\n    }\n    .topics-date {\n      background: #a5e9ff;\n      border-top: solid white 1pt;\n      border-right: solid white 1pt;\n      border-bottom: none;\n      text-align: center;\n      white-space: nowrap;\n    }\n    .topics-content {\n      background: #eeeeee;\n      border-top: solid white 1pt;\n      border-bottom: none;\n    }\n    .topics-source {\n      color: #2322e4;\n      font-weight: bold;\n    }\n    .topics-link {\n      color: #337ab7;\n      word-break: break-all;\n    }\n    .analysis-box {\n      margin-bottom: 1.5rem;\n      padding: 1rem;\n      background: #aeedf1;\n    }<\/p>\n<p>    .l-post-content table.stats-table {\n      border-collapse: collapse;\n      border-top: none;\n      word-break: break-all;\n    }\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th,\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td {\n      border: 1px solid #000;\n      text-align: center;\n      vertical-align: middle;\n      padding: 4px;\n      background-color: #d9e1f2;\n    }\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th {\n      background-color: #b4c6e7;\n      font-weight: bold;\n    }\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td.stats-spacer-col {\n      border: none;\n      width: 10px;\n      background-color: #fff;\n    }\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th:nth-child(1),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td:nth-child(1),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th:nth-child(5),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td:nth-child(5) {\n      width: 10%;\n    }\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th:nth-child(2),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td:nth-child(2),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th:nth-child(3),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td:nth-child(3),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th:nth-child(6),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td:nth-child(6),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table th:nth-child(7),\n    .l-post-content table.stats-table td:nth-child(7) {\n      width: 20%;\n    }\n  <\/style>\n<div class=\"center-wrapper\">\n<h1 style=\"text-align: center; font-size: 18pt; color: #202020; margin-bottom: 20px\">Vol.46. May 29. 2026<\/h1>\n<p>What is happening in East Asian Maritime Security? The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) publishes the biweekly newsletter, the information on maritime security relevant to East Asia and Japan&#8217;s territory.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>    <!-- Manthly Column --><\/p>\n<div class=\"monthly-column-wrapper\">\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 40px 0\">\n<p style=\"font-size: 16pt; font-weight: bold; margin-bottom: 10px\">Monthly Column<\/p>\n<p style=\"font-size: 18pt; font-weight: bold; margin-bottom: 10px\">Preparing for the \u201cAutonomy Era\u201d of Maritime Security in East Asia<\/p>\n<p style=\"font-weight: bold; margin-bottom: 0\">by James L. Schoff<\/p>\n<p style=\"font-weight: bold; margin-top: 0\">Distinguished Sr. Fellow (Non-Resident), Sasakawa USA<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\n        In response to an increasingly severe regional security environment, the Japanese government is reviewing its national security and defense strategies with a goal of producing updated versions by year\u2019s end that can strengthen deterrence and enhance national resilience.<br \/>\n        Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae addressed the first <a href=\"https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260427_20\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">meeting<\/a> of her strategy review advisory<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/abcnews.com\/International\/wireStory\/japans-prime-minister-launches-panel-review-countrys-defense-132425180\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">panel<\/a> in April 2026,<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/mainichi.jp\/english\/articles\/20260428\/p2g\/00m\/0na\/004000c\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">urging<\/a> them to consider &quot;new ways of warfare&quot; using artificial intelligence (AI), drones, and other technologies to be prepared for possible sustained<br \/>\n        combat operations in the future. The mention of drones and AI usually prompts thoughts of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), both small and large, that have become ubiquitous during Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, but the Indo-Pacific theater also requires careful evaluation of<br \/>\n        underwater and marine surface systems. This field is advancing quickly and will likely produce a more congested, contested, and complex maritime domain with faster innovation cycles. This could have dramatic implications for Japan\u2019s defense and US-Japan (and other allied)<br \/>\n        security cooperation in the future.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        Japan\u2019s current strategy already includes some increased investment in unmanned assets for littoral defense, calling for quick development of an asymmetrical drone SHIELD (or \u201cSynchronized, Hybrid, Integrated and Enhanced Littoral Defense\u201d). The fiscal year (FY) 2026<br \/>\n        defense budget allocates about \u00a5100 billion (~$650 million) to advance the SHIELD project for at least partial deployment in FY2027. It will be made up of a networked array of relatively inexpensive and large-quantity ground\/ship-launched UAVs supported by small<br \/>\n        multi-purpose drone boats (unmanned surface vehicles or USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Japan\u2019s Ministry of Defense (MOD) added about \u00a5177 billion (~$1.1 billion) in FY2026 to support broader acquisition and deployment of uncrewed defense systems including<br \/>\n        small USVs for surveillance and reconnaissance. All of this, however, represents just the beginning of what is likely to be an extended period of technical and tactical innovation related to maritime defense systems, with AI at the center.\n      <\/p>\n<p><strong>Evolving Maritime Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\n        The scale of maritime security challenges facing Japan and the United States in the Indo-Pacific theater is immense. Chinese naval modernization is<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/RL33153#:~:text=The%20PLAN's%20overall%20battle%20force%20is%20expected,will%20be%20in%20major%20surface%20combatants.%22%20The\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">well-documented<\/a>, now forming the world\u2019s largest maritime<br \/>\n        force that is among the more technically advanced. China\u2019s fleet includes roughly twice as many modern destroyers, frigates, and submarines as those in Japan\u2019s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and it includes three aircraft carriers, all of which raises concerns in<br \/>\n        Tokyo that beyond the East China Sea, the western Pacific could become a new area of Chinese operations against Japan\u2019s eastern and southern shores.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        Less often discussed is China\u2019s investment in an \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/threats\/2025\/10\/chinas-burgeoning-undersea-sensor-net-aims-turn-ocean-transparent\/408815\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">invisible net<\/a>\u201d or \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.usni.org\/magazines\/proceedings\/2026\/march\/transparent-ocean-chinas-vision-digitized-battlespace\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Transparent Ocean<\/a\n        >\u201d strategy that involves a 5-layer seabed-to-space sensor architecture in the western Pacific and East China Sea that Beijing hopes will deny US and Japanese access in a crisis. The five layers include: 1) satellites in space, 2) a surface\/near-surface component of smart<br \/>\n        buoys, wave gliders, and USVs, 3) deep floats and UUVs in the water column, 4) a seabed grid of observatories hosting passive arrays and navigation beacons connected by undersea cables, and 5) a core command layer leveraging AI that is meant to synthesize the whole<br \/>\n        picture and orchestrate maintenance and deployments.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        Actually building this ambitious far-flung network and having it function properly is fraught with technical and environmental challenges, so this might not be a near-term reality, but it indicates Beijing\u2019s<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/investigations\/china-is-mapping-ocean-floor-it-prepares-submarine-warfare-with-us-2026-03-24\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">direction<\/a>, and China has already<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/maritimeindia.org\/chinas-undersea-great-wall-project-implications\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">deployed<\/a> some of these<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/maritime-executive.com\/editorials\/china-s-underwater-great-wall#:~:text=According%20to%20an%20article%20in%20*The%20Strategist*,or%20even%20of%20the%20USS%20Jimmy%20Carter**\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">technologies<\/a> in the South China Sea and<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/www.asianmilitaryreview.com\/2025\/09\/china-rolls-out-new-unmanned-underwater-systems-in-parade-foc\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">unveiled<\/a> new extra-large UUVs and autonomous sea mines at its military parade in 2025. The role for AI appears to be<br \/>\n        growing, as China <a href=\"https:\/\/www.armyrecognition.com\/news\/navy-news\/2026\/china-tests-first-autonomous-maritime-drone-swarm-to-counter-future-us-naval-operations\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">demonstrated<\/a> in March 2026 its first operational test for swarming<br \/>\n        USV technology (L30s) that can carry out a sequence of patrol, monitoring, and interception tasks under a command system that required limited operator input once the mission started.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        Eventually, these kinds of systems will have increasingly capable AI and computing power \u201cat the edge\u201d on the USVs and UUVs themselves to overcome communication limitations at sea and improve efficiency (both in terms of power management and data storage). The systems<br \/>\n        will be part of a broader network featuring underwater or floating \u201crelay stations\u201d where the vehicles can temporarily dock, recharge, conduct data transfer, and receive mission or software updates. The networks would be primarily defensive and support an anti-access\/area<br \/>\n        denial (A2AD) strategy, but China has begun <a href=\"https:\/\/indsr.org.tw\/en\/respublicationcon?uid=15&amp;resid=44&amp;pid=1502\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">installing<\/a> them in maritime areas within the South China Sea that belong to other countries, so they can end<br \/>\n        up becoming a tool in support of Chinese territorial expansion or an underwater \u201cland grab\u201d of sorts. The networks can also include offensive components to enforce the A2AD mission.\n      <\/p>\n<p><strong>Strategic Implications Forcing New Models of Innovation<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\n        Japan is closely <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/j\/press\/wp\/wp2025\/pdf\/DOJ2025_EN_Full.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">monitoring<\/a> China\u2019s maritime activities in the region and noting incidents in the<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/building-cooperative-frameworks-subsea-cable-security-indo-pacific\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Indo-Pacific<\/a> and around the<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/jsis.washington.edu\/news\/baltic-sea-undersea-cable-security\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">world<\/a> where undersea communications infrastructure has been disrupted or sabotaged. Because Japan relies on undersea cables for nearly all its international<br \/>\n        communications, the government is enhancing its surveillance capabilities in the East China Sea to track maritime infiltration and protect against seabed threats, but in the AI autonomous era, this will become increasingly difficult if not countered with a similar allied<br \/>\n        effort.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        AI will become even more important to maximize the efficiency of surveillance for seabed defense, given the inevitable smaller scale of Japan\u2019s material investment compared to China. Japan\u2019s FY2026 defense budget does include \u00a52 billion (~$13 million) to begin introducing<br \/>\n        AI for MSDF communication infrastructure, but this is only a small initial step. Also, for all of Japan\u2019s high-level emphasis on the importance of expanding its unmanned defense capabilities, the government<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/en\/d_act\/d_budget\/pdf\/fy2026_20260302a.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">added<\/a> only six civilian officials in 2025 to help with this category of the defense buildup plan, out of a net total increase of 91 officials.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        In addition to maritime critical infrastructure protection, the US\/Israel war with Iran has reminded defense planners of how important sea lines of communication (SLOC) and freedom of navigation are for economic security, and China\u2019s growing chokehold over the South China<br \/>\n        Sea is a concern in this regard. The United States can be a valuable partner for Japan in its effort to build up autonomous capabilities for broader maritime security, and it will be in America\u2019s interest to collaborate with Japan and other East Asian allies.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        There are multiple strategic implications from all these developments, stemming from a denser and more contested undersea environment that is potentially widely distributed with both offensive and defensive components. Similar to the air domain, the rapid expansion of<br \/>\n        autonomous maritime systems will make it more difficult for crewed platforms to operate. Critical underwater infrastructure protection and SLOC protection will also evolve. Effective software updates for UUVs could become as important as building new hardware systems in a<br \/>\n        new cat-and-mouse game with AI underwater.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        In addition, swarm risks to surface vessels will grow, while force replenishment options could expand by using autonomous transport ships. Defense procurement processes will need to adapt and cycle faster, suggesting a closer relationship among government policy makers,<br \/>\n        the military, and private defense contractors. It is also possible that denser deployments will lead to underwater incidents and accidents that blur the lines between exercise, reconnaissance, and pre-positioning for conflict, increasing gray-zone pressure and creating<br \/>\n        ambiguous signaling and escalation risks.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        The US and Japan bring complementary skills and many shared or complementary strategic interests to the table when addressing these challenges. US venture capital firms have poured many billions of dollars in recent years into the defense arena to fund startups related to<br \/>\n        AI and autonomous systems. Much of this defense equipment is already being fielded in Ukraine and in the Middle East, and it is evolving rapidly. Traditional US defense contractors are also investing heavily in autonomy, for example on the US Navy\u2019s extra-large UUV<br \/>\n        (\u201cOrca\u201d) project and the \u201cOdyssey\u201d and \u201cREMUS\u201d maritime autonomy programs.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        The US\/Israel war with Iran has demonstrated some early advantages from leveraging AI for data integration and intelligence related to targeting and speeding up the \u201cadaptation cycle\u201d for recognizing and responding to threats. Although details are few, an<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/asia.nikkei.com\/spotlight\/comment\/how-ai-speeds-kill-chain-in-us-attacks-on-iran\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">analysis<\/a> by a UAE-based think tank suggests the preparatory work by US and Israeli forces that would normally have taken hundreds of<br \/>\n        analysts more than three months to complete was instead produced in about 90 minutes, enabling a nimbleness that facilitated the strike killing Iran\u2019s supreme leader and other top officials. This US capability and experience combined with Japan\u2019s technical strengths in<br \/>\n        materials and robotics, and its local area knowledge would be valuable to both countries in the East China Sea and Pacific Ocean.\n      <\/p>\n<p><strong>Next Steps for Japan and the Alliance<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\n        Japan is trying to <a href=\"https:\/\/japannews.yomiuri.co.jp\/politics\/politics-government\/20260326-318683\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">build up<\/a> the AI component of its robotics strengths by taking advantage of the abundance of data its firms generate through their<br \/>\n        70 percent share of the global market for industrial robots. The government will support international hubs for AI robotics to promote research and development while cultivating human resources and building international partnerships. This is part of a draft \u201cAI Robotics<br \/>\n        Strategy\u201d due to be finalized this year that sees the convergence of AI and robotics as a \u201conce-in-a-century opportunity\u201d for Japan. The government also established a \u00a5380 billion (~$2.5 billion) fund in FY2026 to help develop a globally competitive multimodal foundation<br \/>\n        model for physical AI, with additional funding expected until 2030.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        On the defense front specifically, MOD and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) have teamed up to support high-tech defense startups to help keep pace with accelerating defense technology development. The initiative combines a defense-oriented small business<br \/>\n        innovation research program with fast-track field testing and feedback from SDF units, flexible prototyping contracts, and measures to attract capital that can help new firms succeed quickly with dual-use technologies. Defense-only products will have a difficult time<br \/>\n        gaining sufficient scale in Japan to sustain innovation, even with <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/newshour\/world\/japan-lifts-ban-on-lethal-weapons-exports-in-major-change-of-its-postwar-pacifist-policy\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">looser<\/a> restrictions on defense<br \/>\n        exports. But commercial products with defense applications have a better chance to grow.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        Private sector competition and the Japanese government\u2019s desire to <a href=\"https:\/\/finance.yahoo.com\/sectors\/technology\/articles\/japans-tech-titans-just-teamed-210103504.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">enhance<\/a> its \u201cAI sovereignty\u201d could limit the scope of<br \/>\n        US-Japan collaboration in AI and autonomous system development, but there are various avenues among private companies and between the two governments that could benefit each side. A foundational step is to elevate alliance strategy consultations with a focused dialogue on<br \/>\n        maritime security in a new age of AI and autonomy. Some of this is already happening at the service, joint staff, and defense policy levels, but this is not enough for what could be a fast-moving, fundamental shift in maritime defense.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        To take this step, the allies could launch a time-bound series of intensive engagements involving a wider range of technical and operational expertise, sharing intelligence assessments of Chinese capabilities, surveying the near-term trajectory of technical innovation for<br \/>\n        maritime autonomy, identifying areas of strategic alignment, and then crafting a plan to bolster cooperative security in the maritime domain. This effort could help to bridge some of the traditional gaps that exist between different bilateral dialogues on deterrence<br \/>\n        strategy, roles and missions, and defense equipment cooperation. Other interested and capable partners could be included at key times such as Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        The purpose of this exercise would be to find areas of strategic synergy that will help the allies maximize the deterrence value of their maritime security investments. At the very least they should be developing autonomous maritime systems that can communicate with each<br \/>\n        other securely with some degree of interoperability. Allies can pool resources and knowledge that will help drive technical and operational improvements in this new era. The private sector will be a critical player in this process, and even though companies are competing,<br \/>\n        there is some productive cross-fertilization already happening as US high-tech venture capital <a href=\"https:\/\/asia.nikkei.com\/business\/startups\/andreessen-horowitz-to-open-japan-office-by-summer-co-founder-tells-takaichi\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">firms<\/a><br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/www.prnewswire.com\/news-releases\/geodesic-capital-announces-the-geodesic-alliance-fund-to-strengthen-usjapan-technology-and-security-collaboration-302477363.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">engage<\/a> more with Japan.\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        Technological change has always been disruptive to naval strategy traditions, forcing navies and industry to adapt or become vulnerable. We are in the early stages of another seismic shift in maritime technology, similar to the change from sailing ships to powered<br \/>\n        vessels, or the introduction of submarines and aircraft carriers. The end result of this new era is unclear at the moment, but we can be certain that leveraging alliances will help all partners adapt more quickly and successfully.\n      <\/p>\n<div style=\"border-top: 1px solid #ccc; height: 1px; margin: 10px 0\"><\/div>\n<p>\n        <strong>James Schoff<\/strong> is a Distinguished Sr. Fellow (non-resident) at Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, where he was previously Senior Director for 4 and a half years. Overall, his career spans 38 years working in the fields of business, government, and the<br \/>\n        non-profit sector, all related to East Asia and the US-Japan alliance, including two years as senior adviser for East Asia policy at the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense. His recent publications include &quot;Allied on AI Assurance: Technology and Policy to Enhance<br \/>\n        AI Security&quot; (Sasakawa USA, 2026); \u201cUpdating Alliance Strategies to Sustain Nuclear Deterrence,\u201d (Sasakawa USA, 2025); and &quot;Modernizing US-Japan Command &amp; Control Relationships for New Challenges&quot; (Sasakawa USA, 2023).\n      <\/p>\n<div style=\"border-top: 1px solid #ccc; height: 1px; margin: 10px 0\"><\/div>\n<p>Views expressed or implied in this article are solely those of the author. They must not be construed as representing the views and positions of RIPS or any other organizations.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>    <!-- \/Manthly Column --><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>    <!-- Statistical Data and Analysis --><\/p>\n<div class=\"sdaa-wrapper\">\n<p style=\"font-weight: bold; text-align: center; font-size: 16pt; margin: 30px 0 10px\">Statistical Data and Analysis (as of May 29)<\/p>\n<div class=\"analysis-box\">\n<p>\n          In the latter half of this month, security cooperation among allies and like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific further advanced. The Quad Foreign Ministers\u2019 Meeting and the Japan-U.S., Japan-ROK, and Japan-Philippines summit meetings confirmed closer coordination and<br \/>\n          cooperation to promote regional security and stability. Multilateral security cooperation also deepened through joint naval activities involving the United States, Australia, and Canada, as well as Japan\u2019s dispatch of instructors to an Australia-hosted Indo-Pacific<br \/>\n          coast guard workshop.\n        <\/p>\n<p>\n          Meanwhile, China deployed over 100 naval vessels in the East China Sea, Yellow Sea, and western Pacific, conducted repeated \u201cjoint combat patrols\u201d around Taiwan, and carried out aircraft carrier flight operations in the western Pacific. In the South China Sea, a Dutch<br \/>\n          naval vessel, expected to participate in RIMPAC 2026, confronted the Chinese navy. China\u2019s maritime expansion and gray-zone activities also continued, including incursions around the Senkaku Islands, confrontations between Chinese and Taiwanese authorities\u2019 vessels near<br \/>\n          the Pratas Islands, Chinese maritime militia activities near the Philippines, and the discovery of Chinese underwater surveillance devices in Indonesia. Reports further indicated that China\u2019s maritime activities were expanding beyond the Indo-Pacific, including fishing<br \/>\n          fleet operations off Argentina.\n        <\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>\n        <strong>[Statistical Data as of May 29]<br \/> <\/strong>\n      <\/p>\n<p>\n        The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) daily updates the statistical data on the number of China Coast Guard vessels entering in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands and intruding into Japanese territorial waters. The below is from the website of the JCG.<br \/>\n        <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp\/mission\/senkaku\/senkaku.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp\/mission\/senkaku\/senkaku.html<\/a>\n      <\/p>\n<div class=\"table-box\">\n<table class=\"stats-table\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<th>May<\/th>\n<th>Contiguous<br \/>zone<\/th>\n<th>Territorial<br \/>Waters<\/th>\n<td rowspan=\"100\" class=\"stats-spacer-col\"><\/td>\n<th>May<\/th>\n<th>Contiguous<br \/>zone<\/th>\n<th>Territorial<br \/>Waters<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>15<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>22<\/td>\n<td>2<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>16<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>23<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>17<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>24<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>18<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>25<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td>2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>19<\/td>\n<td>2<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>26<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td>2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>20<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>27<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>21<\/td>\n<td>2<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>28<\/td>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>    <!-- \/Statistical Data and Analysis --><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>    <!-- Topics --><\/p>\n<div class=\"topics-wrapper\">\n<p style=\"font-weight: bold; text-align: center; font-size: 16pt; margin: 30px 0 10px\">Topics<\/p>\n<div class=\"table-box\">\n<table class=\"topics-table\">\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th class=\"topics-header-date\">Date<\/th>\n<th class=\"topics-header-title\" style=\"text-align: center\">Topics<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/12<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  A Russian cargo ship believed to be carrying components for two submarine nuclear reactors\u2014possibly bound for North Korea\u2014exploded and sank off Spain in December 2024. CNN reporting suggests it may have been the target of a rare Western military intervention to<br \/>\n                  block nuclear technology transfers. US nuclear\u2011sniffer aircraft later surveyed the wreck, and a suspected Russian spy ship triggered additional explosions at the site.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  The cargo ship\u2019s captain told Spanish investigators it carried reactor components but did not know whether they contained nuclear fuel. It may have involved the use of a rare type of torpedo to breach the ship\u2019s hull, according to the Spanish investigation, as<br \/>\n                  described by the source familiar with its contents.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">CNN<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/05\/12\/world\/a-russian-ship-sank-in-mysterious-circumstances-it-may-have-been-carrying-nuclear-reactors-to-north-korea\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/05\/12\/world\/a-russian-ship-sank-in-mysterious-circumstances-it-may-have-been-carrying-nuclear-reactors-to-north-korea<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/13<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The Chinese fishing flotilla near Argentina has grown by nearly 50% in the past decade. Buenos Aires has increased surveillance, but concerns over overfishing, suspected intelligence gathering, and possible unauthorized seabed mapping\u2014also raised by<br \/>\n                  Washington\u2014persist. U.S. officials also worry China is using its fleet to expand its regional presence and test Argentina\u2019s control over South Atlantic waters. The Pentagon has warned about activities that challenge sovereign control of waters and the dual-use<br \/>\n                  nature of some distant-water fishing fleets.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Reuters<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/graphics\/CHINA-ARGENTINA\/FISHING\/gkplkejbqvb\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/graphics\/CHINA-ARGENTINA\/FISHING\/gkplkejbqvb\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/15<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 15, Japan\u2019s prime minister held a Japan\u2013U.S. summit call with the U.S. president. The two leaders discussed the U.S. president\u2019s recent visit to China and exchanged views on China-related issues, including security matters. They agreed to maintain close<br \/>\n                  communication on developments in the Indo-Pacific and reaffirmed the unwavering Japan\u2013U.S. Alliance, committing to continued close coordination going forward.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/na\/na1\/us\/pageite_000001_01645.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/na\/na1\/us\/pageite_000001_01645.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/15<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) reported a renewed presence of Chinese militia and research vessels within the Philippines\u2019 EEZ in the West Philippine Sea. According to the PCG, several Chinese research vessels have recently been conducting suspected marine<br \/>\n                  scientific research without Philippine authorization, alongside Chinese militia vessels operating in key areas of the EEZ.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Global Media Arts Network<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gmanetwork.com\/news\/topstories\/nation\/987814\/chinese-militia-vessels-spotted-anew-in-philippines-eez-coast-guard-says\/story\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.gmanetwork.com\/news\/topstories\/nation\/987814\/chinese-militia-vessels-spotted-anew-in-philippines-eez-coast-guard-says\/story\/<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/16<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  China is advancing its Transparent Ocean Program to build a real-time undersea monitoring network across the western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea. The program is intended to strengthen China\u2019s ability to detect foreign submarines, support naval<br \/>\n                  operations, and expand access to deep-sea resources. The discovery of a Chinese deep-sea monitoring device in the Lombok Strait suggests that China\u2019s undersea surveillance capabilities are expanding farther from its shores.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  China\u2019s growing ability to monitor the undersea environment could reduce the traditional stealth advantages of submarines, raising questions about Australia\u2019s AUKUS submarine plans. Analysts argue that Australia should increase investment in uncrewed undersea<br \/>\n                  and maritime systems rather than relying primarily on conventional crewed submarines.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Australian Broadcasting Corporation<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.abc.net.au\/news\/2026-05-16\/undersea-monitoring-device-indonesia-china-maritime-strategy\/106670896\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.abc.net.au\/news\/2026-05-16\/undersea-monitoring-device-indonesia-china-maritime-strategy\/106670896<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/16<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  Australia\u2019s AUKUS submarine plan faces growing uncertainty as U.S. production of Virginia\u2011class submarines continues to fall behind. The U.S. Navy does not expect to reach a two\u2011per\u2011year build rate until 2032\u2014still short of the 2.33 needed to supply<br \/>\n                  Australia\u2014and its latest 30\u2011year shipbuilding plan includes no additional submarines for AUKUS. Recent U.S. analyses even suggest that submarines originally intended for Australia might instead remain under U.S. command and operate from Australian bases.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">The Guardian<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/may\/17\/australia-aukus-spending-delays-nuclear-submarines\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/may\/17\/australia-aukus-spending-delays-nuclear-submarines<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/18<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 18, President Marcos warned that the Philippines could be drawn into a Taiwan contingency, saying Japan might choose whether to get involved, whereas the Philippines \u201chas no choice\u201d because of its proximity and the nearly 200,000 Filipinos in Taiwan. He<br \/>\n                  called for a peaceful resolution of cross\u2011strait tensions, reaffirmed Manila\u2019s one\u2011China policy, and stressed that the Philippines will not intervene in the Taiwan issue.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  He also welcomed Japan\u2019s April decision to allow lethal\u2011weapon exports, calling it a new stage in bilateral ties and beneficial for his country, and thanked Japan for supporting the Philippine military\u2019s modernization. He said security cooperation will be a key<br \/>\n                  topic in his meeting with the Japanese prime minister, noting that both nations face similar challenges amid China\u2019s growing assertiveness.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Jiji Press News<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/sp.m.jiji.com\/english\/show\/47732\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/sp.m.jiji.com\/english\/show\/47732<\/a><\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">NHK World<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260519_03\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260519_03\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/19<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 18, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) confirmed one Chinese Jangkai III class frigate (hull number 545) and one Chinese Fuyu class fast combat support ship (hull number 901) sailing south in waters 520km northwest of Kumejima Island (Okinawa<br \/>\n                  Prefecture). The JMSDF, in terms of surveillance, has identified Jangkai III class frigate for the first time. On May 19, these vessels sailed southeast through waters between Okinawajima Island and Miyakojima Island (Okinawa Prefecture) and navigated to the<br \/>\n                  Pacific Ocean.\n                <\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/46_1.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260519_01.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260519_01.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/19<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>On May 19, Japan-ROK Summit Meeting was held in Andong, the ROK.<\/p>\n<p>\n                  The leaders of the two countries candidly exchanged views on the Indo-Pacific situation and shared the recognition that Japan and the ROK should take the lead in promoting regional peace and stability by maintaining and strengthening deterrence and response<br \/>\n                  capabilities through the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and strategic coordination. They reaffirmed the importance of strategic coordination, including security cooperation between Japan and the ROK, as well as among Japan, the ROK, and the U.S.,<br \/>\n                  and confirmed their intention to further strengthen information sharing and cooperation based on progress in joint exercises, missile defense, and maritime security.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/a_o\/na\/kr\/pageite_000001_01649.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/a_o\/na\/kr\/pageite_000001_01649.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/20<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>Monthly Statistics on Scrambles\uff08April\uff09<\/p>\n<p>The Japan Joint Staff released its monthly statistics on scrambles. In April, the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) conducted 55 scrambles. The most scrambles were against Chinese aircraft (43 times), followed by Russian aircraft (12 times).<\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260520_07.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260520_07.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/20<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  The Royal Australian Navy and Royal Canadian Navy conducted joint operations in the South China Sea for more than two weeks, enhancing interoperability and cooperation with regional partners and allies. The two frigates operated alongside a United States Navy<br \/>\n                  ship during a South China Sea transit, later took part in Exercise Balikatan, and then conducted bilateral activities at sea, including replenishment, boarding, towing and live-fire exercises.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  Canadian commanding officer stressed the importance of supporting freedom of navigation, safeguarding critical sea lines of communication, and contributing to stability in the Indo-Pacific. Australian commanding officer stressed the importance of cooperation<br \/>\n                  among like-minded nations to promote a prosperous, open and inclusive region and to uphold maritime security.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Australian Government Defense<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defence.gov.au\/news-events\/news\/2026-05-20\/middle-powers-unite-sea\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.defence.gov.au\/news-events\/news\/2026-05-20\/middle-powers-unite-sea<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/21<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 21, the Japan Joint Staff confirmed one Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flying from the continent over the Sea of Japan. The aircraft flew to the area off the coast of Noto Peninsula, Ishikawa Prefecture, then changed course and flew toward<br \/>\n                  the continent. The JASDF scrambled fighter jets in response to this Russian aircraft.\n                <\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/46_2.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260521_01.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260521_01.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/21<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  It has been reported that Russia notified Japan of plans to conduct live-fire exercises from May 25 to June 25 in waters north of Shikotan Island and south of Kunashiri Island, both of which are part of the Northern Territories under Russia\u2019s illegal occupation.<br \/>\n                  Since the beginning of this year, Russia has repeatedly issued similar notifications for exercises near the Northern Territories. The Japanese government lodged a strong protest through diplomatic channels, saying the move is \u201cincompatible with Japan\u2019s position<br \/>\n                  and cannot be accepted,\u201d and is maintaining heightened vigilance over increased military activity.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Sankei Shimbun News (Japanese)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sankei.com\/article\/20260521-NWD5PWPNKZJTPG2YOQIIL4L3VI\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.sankei.com\/article\/20260521-NWD5PWPNKZJTPG2YOQIIL4L3VI\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/21<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  Asahi Shimbun has confirmed on at least four occasions since October 2024 that large fleets of Chinese fishing vessels have formed \u201cwalls\u201d near the Japan\u2013China median line in the East China Sea. Experts say this reflects formation training by China\u2019s maritime<br \/>\n                  militia, a reserve force for the Chinese military. In January, Asahi Shimbun identified a fishing vessel in one such area and interviewed its captain, who said, \u201cI am a militia member.\u201d He added that he normally works as a fisherman but must deploy whenever<br \/>\n                  ordered and has taken part in annual militia training.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Asahi Shimbun News (Japanese)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.asahi.com\/articles\/ASV5N5GYQV5NUHBI02CM.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.asahi.com\/articles\/ASV5N5GYQV5NUHBI02CM.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/22<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 22, the Japan Joint Staff confirmed one Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flying from the continent through the Sea of Okhotsk toward the Pacific Ocean. The aircraft flew south to the area off the coast of Iwate Prefecture, then turned back<br \/>\n                  and flew through the Sea of Okhotsk toward the Sea of Japan. The JASDF scrambled fighter jets in response to this Russian aircraft.\n                <\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/46_3.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260522_04.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260522_04.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/22<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 22 in Tokyo, Japan\u2019s Chief Cabinet Secretary received a courtesy call from Laos\u2019s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Japan\u2019s minister expressed Japan\u2019s intention to strengthen bilateral relations under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and<br \/>\n                  to deepen cooperation under the updated FOIP to enhance regional resilience and support countries\u2019 freedom of choice. They also exchanged views on regional issues, including the East and South China Seas, and agreed to maintain close coordination.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/s_sa\/sea1\/la\/pageite_000001_00006.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/s_sa\/sea1\/la\/pageite_000001_00006.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/22<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 22 in Tokyo, the Japan\u2013Laos Foreign Ministers\u2019 Meeting was held. Japan\u2019s foreign minister expressed his intention to strengthen the Comprehensive and Strategic Partnership and to promote cooperation under the updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),<br \/>\n                  including in security, to enhance Laos\u2019s autonomy and resilience. They also exchanged views on regional challenges, including the East and South China Seas, and reaffirmed close coordination.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/press\/release\/pressite_000001_02362.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/press\/release\/pressite_000001_02362.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/23<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 23, Taiwan\u2019s security officials said China had deployed more than 100 navy, coast guard and other vessels across waters from the Yellow Sea to the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. A map released by Taiwan\u2019s National Security Council showed Chinese<br \/>\n                  ships positioned from waters off the Korean Peninsula to the South China Sea and the Western Pacific.\n                <\/p>\n<p>A security official said the deployment began before the U.S.\u2013China leaders\u2019 meeting in Beijing and increased to over 100 vessels after the summit, noting that marine survey and research ships were included.<\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">AFP News (The Straits Times)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/east-asia\/taiwan-security-chief-says-china-deployed-over-100-vessels-in-regional-waters\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/east-asia\/taiwan-security-chief-says-china-deployed-over-100-vessels-in-regional-waters<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/24<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 23, Taiwan\u2019s coast guard said it detected a Chinese coast guard vessel approaching the Pratas Islands in the northern South China Sea and dispatched a ship in response, leading to a tense radio exchange in which both sides asserted sovereignty claims. The<br \/>\n                  Chinese vessel said it was on a routine mission and that China had jurisdiction over the area.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  The Taiwanese coast guard said the ship left on May 24 after a prolonged stay, calling China\u2019s sovereignty claims and the duration of the operation unusual. It also said it had driven away a Chinese research vessel near the islands for the second time in May.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Reuters (The Straits Times)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/east-asia\/taiwan-china-coast-guards-in-standoff-at-top-of-south-china-sea?ref=latest-headlines\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/east-asia\/taiwan-china-coast-guards-in-standoff-at-top-of-south-china-sea?ref=latest-headlines<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/25<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 22, the JMSDF confirmed one Chinese Jangkai II class frigate (hull number 599) and one Chinese Yushen class landing helicopter dock (hull number 33) sailing southeast in waters 110km southwest of Kumejima Island (Okinawa Prefecture). These vessels sailed<br \/>\n                  southeast through waters between Okinawajima Island and Miyakojima Island and navigated to the Pacific Ocean.\n                <\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/46_4.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260525_01.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260525_01.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/25<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>On May 25, Japan-India Foreign Ministers\u2019 Meeting was held in India.<\/p>\n<p>\n                  India\u2019s minister expressed hopes for stronger bilateral relations and cooperation amid the severe international situation. Japan\u2019s minister stressed the importance of Japan-India cooperation in realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), including through the<br \/>\n                  Quad. The two ministers agreed to advance cooperation in defense and security, while also promoting people-to-people exchanges as a foundation for broader cooperation. They also confirmed close communication on Indo-Pacific regional issues.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/s_sa\/sw\/in\/pageite_000001_01661.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/s_sa\/sw\/in\/pageite_000001_01661.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/26<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 25, Taiwan\u2019s Defence Ministry said it had detected 21 Chinese aircraft, including J-16 fighters and drones, operating around the island with warships in a \u201cjoint combat readiness patrol.\u201d China had carried out a similar patrol on May 19, just before<br \/>\n                  Taiwan President Lai\u2019s second year in office, making it the second such operation in a week. China has increased military pressure on Taiwan, and Taipei remains on high alert after Xi\u2013Trump talks on Taiwan in May.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Reuters (The Straits Times)<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/taiwan-tracks-second-chinese-combat-patrol-in-a-week-sends-ships-and-jets-to-monitor?ref=latest-headlines\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/taiwan-tracks-second-chinese-combat-patrol-in-a-week-sends-ships-and-jets-to-monitor?ref=latest-headlines<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/26<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 25, according to the JCG, two Chinese government vessels entered Japan\u2019s territorial waters off the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Their hull numbers are 1401 and 1306 (Source: the JCG). They tried to approach a Japanese fishing boat operating in<br \/>\n                  the area and remained in the waters for about 21 and a half hours. The vessels left on May 26 after the fishing boat departed. This was the first confirmed entry of Chinese government ships into the area since May 7.\n                <\/p>\n<p>Note: The hull numbers reported above are taken from a JCG press release.<\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">NHK World<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260526_20\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www3.nhk.or.jp\/nhkworld\/en\/news\/20260526_20\/<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/26<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 25, the JMSDF confirmed one Chinese Admiral Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier Liaoning (hull number 16), one Chinese Renhai class destroyer (hull number 104), one Chinese Luyang III class destroyer (hull number 124), one Chinese Jangkai III class frigate<br \/>\n                  (hull number 545) and one Chinese Fuyu class fast combat support ship (hull number 901) sailing in waters 880km southwest of Oki-no-Tori Shima Island (Tokyo Metropolis).\n                <\/p>\n<p>On May 26, the JMSDF confirmed takeoffs and landings by carrier-based fighter aircraft and helicopters from the aircraft carrier Liaoning.<\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/46_5.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260526_01.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260526_01.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/26<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>On May 26, the Quad Foreign Ministers\u2019 Meeting was held in Delhi, India, issuing a Joint Statement and other outcome documents.<\/p>\n<p>\n                  Japan\u2019s foreign minister presented Japan\u2019s updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. The four ministers reaffirmed their support for a resilient and inclusive Indo-Pacific and agreed to strengthen cooperation and advance concrete initiatives. They<br \/>\n                  discussed regional developments, including the East and South China Seas, and reaffirmed their opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. The Quad also agreed to deepen practical cooperation across security, economic,<br \/>\n                  technological, and humanitarian fields, and reaffirmed their commitment to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/fp\/nsp\/pageite_000001_00005.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/fp\/nsp\/pageite_000001_00005.html<\/a><\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">(Reference) Quad Foreign Ministers\u2019 Meeting Joint Statement<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/files\/101034337.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/files\/101034337.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">(Reference) Factsheet: Quad Foreign Ministers\u2019 Meeting<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/files\/101034339.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/files\/101034339.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/26<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 26, Japan\u2019s foreign minister, visiting India for the Quad Foreign Ministers\u2019 Meeting, met with the U.S. Secretary of State. They exchanged views on the Indo-Pacific regional situation and other issues, including China-related matters in the context of<br \/>\n                  President Trump\u2019s recent visit to China, and confirmed close coordination between Japan and the United States. They also reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/na\/na1\/us\/pageite_000001_00009.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/na\/na1\/us\/pageite_000001_00009.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/26<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 26, Japan\u2019s foreign minister, visiting India for the Quad Foreign Ministers\u2019 Meeting, met with Australia\u2019s foreign minister. They welcomed the launch of the Japan\u2013Australia Strategic Consultations and the Diplomatic Exchange Program, discussed<br \/>\n                  Indo\u2011Pacific regional affairs including the Pacific Island countries and Southeast Asia, and agreed to maintain close communication.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/a_o\/ocn\/au\/pageite_000001_00008.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/a_o\/ocn\/au\/pageite_000001_00008.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/26<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 26, Japan\u2019s foreign minister, visiting India for the Quad Foreign Ministers\u2019 Meeting, paid a courtesy call on India\u2019s prime minister. The prime minister noted continued progress in bilateral relations, while the foreign minister highlighted cooperation in<br \/>\n                  areas such as security. They agreed to work together to realize a resilient and prosperous Indo\u2011Pacific under the updated FOIP.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/s_sa\/sw\/in\/pageite_000001_00016.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/s_sa\/sw\/in\/pageite_000001_00016.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/26<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  From May 18 to 22, at the request of the Australian Border Force (ABF), the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) dispatched two officers to an MDA (Maritime Domain Awareness) Workshop for Indo-Pacific coast guard agencies. They served as instructors in lectures and tabletop<br \/>\n                  exercises on oil spill response. Participants came from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, the Maldives, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Timor-Leste, totaling 39 participants.\n                <\/p>\n<p>The JCG continues to promote marine environmental protection and capacity-building cooperation with regional coast guard agencies, including the ABF, in support of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific based on the rule of law.<\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Coast Guard<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp\/e\/topics_archive\/article8901.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp\/e\/topics_archive\/article8901.html<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/27<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 27, China stated that it had taken \u201cnecessary measures,\u201d including warnings and electronic jamming, against a Dutch naval vessel that had allegedly \u201cillegally intruded\u201d near the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The Netherlands disputed<br \/>\n                  China\u2019s account, stating that its naval vessel was operating in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This vessel is expected to participate in multinational activities and exercises, including<br \/>\n                  RIMPAC 2026, according to reports.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  The Netherlands has become increasingly active in the Indo-Pacific in recent years, sending warships to the South China Sea, including a Dutch frigate sailing alongside a British carrier strike group in 2021 and another Dutch frigate conducting exercises with<br \/>\n                  U.S. naval forces in 2024, as part of efforts to deepen regional security ties.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">POLITICO<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/china-netherlands-warship-hnlms-de-ruyter-provocative-acts-south-china-sea\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/china-netherlands-warship-hnlms-de-ruyter-provocative-acts-south-china-sea\/<\/a\n                ><\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">(Reference) THEPHILBIZNEWS<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/thephilbiznews.com\/2026\/05\/26\/inside-hnlms-de-ruyter-dutch-naval-diplomacy-sails-into-manila\/\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/thephilbiznews.com\/2026\/05\/26\/inside-hnlms-de-ruyter-dutch-naval-diplomacy-sails-into-manila\/<\/a\n                >\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/28<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 28, the Japan Joint Staff confirmed one Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flying from the continent through the East China Sea toward the area south of the Danjo Islands, Nagasaki Prefecture. The aircraft flew southwest to the area off the coast<br \/>\n                  of Okinawajima Island before turning back. It flew back and forth between the area south of the Danjo Islands and the area off the coast of Okinawajima Island and flew toward the continent. The JASDF scrambled fighter jets in response to this Chinese aircraft.\n                <\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; margin: 10px 0\"><img src=\"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/46_6.png\" alt=\"Map\" \/><\/div>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Japan Joint Staff<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260528_01.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mod.go.jp\/js\/pdf\/2026\/p20260528_01.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td class=\"topics-date\">5\/28<\/td>\n<td class=\"topics-content\">\n<p>\n                  On May 28, Japan and the Philippines held a summit meeting in Tokyo. Japan\u2019s prime minister stressed the importance of strengthening cooperation to realize an updated FOIP amid growing international challenges, and the two leaders agreed to elevate bilateral<br \/>\n                  ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  They agreed to begin talks on protecting classified military information, while the Philippine president welcomed Japan\u2019s revision of its Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer System. They also decided to accelerate discussions on defense equipment<br \/>\n                  transfers, including Abukuma-class destroyers and TC-90 aircraft, and to strengthen security cooperation through OSA and the early convening of the next Japan-Philippines \u201c2+2\u201d meeting. Japan\u2019s prime minister pledged continued support for the Philippine Coast<br \/>\n                  Guard through patrol vessels and joint training, and the Philippine president expressed appreciation.\n                <\/p>\n<p>\n                  They voiced concern over the situation in the East and South China Seas and opposed unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. Japan\u2019s prime minister also reaffirmed support for ASEAN unity and centrality, while they agreed to strengthen<br \/>\n                  coordination with allies and like-minded countries, including Japan-U.S.-Philippines cooperation, to promote regional peace and stability, while confirming their intention to deepen cooperation in the international arena.\n                <\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/s_sa\/sea2\/ph\/pageite_000001_00012.html\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/s_sa\/sea2\/ph\/pageite_000001_00012.html<\/a><\/p>\n<p>                <span class=\"topics-source\">(Reference) Japan-Philippines Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership<\/span><br \/>\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/files\/101035755.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"topics-link\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/files\/101035755.pdf<\/a>\n              <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>    <!-- \/Topics -->\n  <\/div>\n<\/div>\n<h3>Newsletter Registration<\/h3>\n<p>What is happening in East Asian Maritime Security? The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) publishes the biweekly newsletter, \u201cEast Asian Maritime Security (EAMS)\u201d and updates the information on maritime security relevant to East Asia and Japan&#8217;s territory.<\/p>\n<div class=\"u-mbs is-top mw-400\">\n  <a class=\"c-button\" href=\"https:\/\/forms.gle\/CiMT6bWdHrryT8mM6\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><span>Registration Form<\/span><\/a>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Vol.46. May 29. 2026 What is happening in East Asian Maritime Security? The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) publishes the biweekly newsletter, the information on maritime security relevant to East Asia and Japan&#8217;s territory. Monthly Column Preparing for the \u201cAutonomy Era\u201d of Maritime Security in East Asia by James L. Schoff Distinguished Sr. Fellow (Non-Resident), Sasakawa USA Introduction In response to an increasingly severe regional security environment, the Japanese government is reviewing its national security and defense strategies &hellip; <span>More<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"parent":2309,"menu_order":3,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":[],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v17.8 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Vol. 46 May 29, 2026 - RIPS - Research Institute for Peace and Security -<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"\u300cVol. 46 May 29, 2026 \u300d\u306b\u3064\u3044\u3066\u3054\u7d39\u4ecb\u3044\u305f\u3057\u307e\u3059\u3002- RIPS - Research Institute for Peace and Security - The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is Japan\u2019s first nonprofit, private think tank. 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It was established in October 1978 and has a research history of more than 45 years.","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.rips.or.jp\/en\/newsletter\/vol-46-may-29-2026\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Vol. 46 May 29, 2026 - RIPS - Research Institute for Peace and Security -","og_description":"\u300cVol. 46 May 29, 2026 \u300d\u306b\u3064\u3044\u3066\u3054\u7d39\u4ecb\u3044\u305f\u3057\u307e\u3059\u3002- RIPS - Research Institute for Peace and Security - The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is Japan\u2019s first nonprofit, private think tank. 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