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**No. 26**

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*Rising Tensions in East Asia and the Japanese Response*  
*The Geneva Symposium*

*Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS)*  
*and*  
*Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)*



**Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS)** is an independent research institution established in Tokyo in October 1978. The RIPS conducts research on issues of national and international peace and security, publishes research reports, and proposes policy recommendations.

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In addition to its research activities, the institute, together with the Japan Foundation's Center for Global Partnership, offers fellowships to young scholars wishing to pursue security studies. Many of these recipients have since become valuable contributors to security studies in Japan.

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## FOREWORD

The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), partnering with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), held a public symposium in Geneva on 12 January 2018. In this symposium with the theme: “Rising Tensions in East Asia and Japanese Response,” a keynote speaker and five panelists were invited from the three regions of the world: Europe, the United States, and Japan.

The papers they wrote for the symposium are filed here to suggest that lively discussions ensued among the panelists and between the panelists and the audience. We were very pleased to learn that there was a broad consensus that Europeans share the seriousness of the security concern that the Americans and Japanese have in East Asia, especially regarding military activities by North Korea and China as well as tensions surrounding territorial issues in East Asia (Takeshima and the Senkaku islands) and the South China Sea. Hopefully, continued exchanges of views through symposia such as ours will contribute to peaceful solution.

Masashi Nishihara  
President  
Research Institute for Peace and Security  
March 2018

去る 2018 年 1 月 12 日、平和・安全保障研究所 (RIPS) はスイスのジュネーブで、ジュネーブ安全保障政策センター (GCSP) との共催で公開シンポジウムを開催した。テーマは「高まる東アジアの緊張と日本の対応」で、道下徳成氏 (政策研究大学院大学教授) の基調講演に続いて、「東アジアの安全保障の挑戦」と題してラルフ・コッサ氏 (パシフィック・フォーラム理事長)、神谷万丈氏 (防衛大学校教授)、ニコラ・カサリーニ氏 (イタリア国際問題研究所東アジア研究部長) による討論会、および「日本の対応」と題してマリー・ソデルベリー氏 (ストックホルム商科大学欧州日本研究所長)、ロバート・エルドリッジ氏 (世界平和研究所客員研究員)、道下徳成氏による討論会を行った。

ここに討論会のために書かれた論文を、日本語の抄訳と併せて収録し、読者の参考に供したい。

平和・安全保障研究所  
理事長 西原 正  
2018 年 3 月

## FOREWORD

The Symposium on “Rising Tensions in East Asia and the Japanese Response”, jointly held by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) gathered prominent scholars and experts from Europe, Japan and the US, in Geneva on 12 January 2018.

The presentations and exchanges with a large public centred on the geopolitical shifts taking place in East Asia and the Pacific and the correlated competition for regional pre-eminence, as well as on the rising regional tensions, in particular in the context of the deepening North Korean nuclear crisis and persistent sovereignty disputes in the China Seas.

The primary concerns expressed by European panelists relate to the maintenance of peace and security in a region that is vital for Europe and the world, against a background of increasing threats of arms conflicts and rising instability. Even though Europe is not a prominent security actor in the region, it is a core economic partner, which shares strong interest in the maintenance of international rules and institutions aimed at enhancing cooperation and tackling international threats.

In a context of increasing uncertainties on the fate of the world order, numerous voices called for respect of international rules and standards, including in the context of the Law of the Sea and international trade cooperation.

Several speakers supported the view that Japan is at a particular juncture, facing both serious nuclear threats from North Korea and pressures from a rising China, in particular in the East China Sea. They called for further measures aimed at strengthening the alliance with the US and developing further partnerships with neighbouring countries, including India, while avoiding the risks of devastating conflicts in the Asia-Pacific.

The GCSP looks forward to further public discussions jointly held with RIPS as well as other partner institutions, centred around current Asia-Pacific challenges.

Alain Guidetti  
Senior diplomatic adviser  
Geneva Centre for Security Policy  
March 2018

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# 1. Rising Tensions in East Asia and the Japanese Response

Narushige Michishita

Professor, Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)

## North Korea

On November 29 last year, North Korea fired its longest-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), named *Hwasong* (or Mars)-15 in the lofted trajectory. The missile reached the apogee of 4,500 kilometers, flew 950 kilometers and dived into the Sea of Japan after flying for 53 minutes. If launched in a range-maximizing trajectory, the missile would have flown some 13,000 kilometers, more than enough to reach Washington DC and New York.

North Korea can now hit different targets with different missiles. Its Scud missiles can hit South Korea. No Dong can hit Japan. *Hwasong*-12 can hit Guam. *Hwasong*-14 can hit Hawaii and Alaska. And *Hwasong*-15 can hit Los Angeles, New York, and Washington DC.

In September, North Korea conducted the sixth nuclear test, which achieved the explosion yield of about 160 kilotons, a big jump from about 12 kilotons in the previous test.

Why is North Korea so keen to develop nuclear weapons and missiles? In my analysis, there are four objectives: first, to deter US preventive strikes; second, to make it difficult for the United States and Japan to assist South Korea in case of war; third, to create a situation where North Korea can use force in a limited way and get away with it; and finally, to enable brinkmanship diplomacy again.

In terms of the first objective, North Korea needs to have a peacetime deterrent, to avoid the United States launching a preventive strike. By stating that “all options are on the table”, the United States has hinted at its willingness to use military force against North Korea.

It would be hard for the United States to undertake such attacks, however, because North Korea has significant retaliation capabilities. If the United States attacks North Korea, North Korea could inflict massive destruction on Seoul, the capital of South Korea, by using its long-range artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers, and ballistic missiles. Addition of nuclear weapons and longer-range ballistic missiles will further enhance North Korea’s ability to deter US preventive actions.

Second, in the event of a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea would need to prevent the United States and Japan from assisting South Korea.

North Korea would try to intimidate the United States and Japan, saying: “If you help South Korea, we will attack the United States and Japan with nuclear weapons”, or asking: “Would you be willing to sacrifice Washington, New York, and Tokyo for Seoul?” If this happens, our nations’ leaders and people would be put in a very difficult position.

To make such threats more credible, North Korea might even detonate a nuclear bomb off the coast of South Korea as a warning. As North Korea's nuclear and missile technologies mature, our ability to go to South Korea’s help will wane.

Third, developing nuclear weapons and missiles gives North Korea scope to launch limited military strikes against South Korea. Security experts believe that the “stability-instability paradox” is emerging on the Korean Peninsula.

If North Korea has the capacity to attack Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and the US mainland with nuclear weapons, that will create a situation of mutual deterrence and increase stability at a strategic level. This is good news because there will be a much lower likelihood of full-scale war.

A situation like that, however, makes it easier for North Korea to engage in limited military action, on the expectation that there is no chance of it escalating into a major war. Essentially, stability on a strategic level leads to instability on a tactical level.

If, for example, North Korea fires 10 long-range artillery shells into the vicinity of Seoul, the South Korean military would retaliate by firing 30 shells back into North Korea.

However, with the threat of a nuclear attack hanging in the air, Washington and Tokyo would ask Seoul not to further escalate the situation, resulting in a ceasefire. Tightly integrated in the global market, South Korea’s country risk premium would shoot up as a result, possibly causing a major capital flight. As an isolated state on the other hand, North Korea would be largely unaffected. This would put South Korea in a very difficult position.

Finally, there is the potential for brinkmanship diplomacy. After launching its ICBM, North Korea once again called on the United States to abandon its “hostile policy” towards the country. This might mean that North Korea is trying to improve relations with the United States through coercive actions.

North Korea halted the operation of nuclear facilities for eight years as part of an agreement with the United States in 1994, and for a further six to seven years following an agreement in 2007. In return, the countries party to these agreements provided North

Korea with assistance costing \$2.5 billion and \$430 million respectively. A North Korea with nuclear ICBM capabilities is sure to demand a far higher price for the next deal.

What is Japan doing to deal with the nuclear North Korea? It has taken at least two important defense measures so far. First, it has deployed a sea-based SM-3 upper-tier ballistic missile defense system and a land-based Patriot PAC-3 lower-tier defense system in order to protect its homeland as well as US military bases there. Japan has spent about \$18 billion so far, and purchased these systems from the United States. It's a lot of money that we are talking about, and President Trump must be very happy to hear that.

Second, early-warning systems have been installed for civil defense purposes. The Emergency Information Network, or EM-NET, system will provide text-based warning information, and the J-Alert system would automatically generate early-warning voice messages and siren signals in case of a missile attack. The Japanese government sponsored a civil defense exercise based on the missile attack scenario for the first time in March last year. Fortunately or unfortunately, North Korea's active missile launch operations have helped Japan become better prepared for missile-related contingencies.

Despite these efforts, there is a limit to what Japan can do alone. In March last year, North Korea launched four missiles simultaneously, apparently simulating a saturation attack to defeat Japan's missile defense shields.

Japanese radars cannot detect North Korea's missiles until they come over the horizon. In contrast, radars in South Korea are capable of detecting North Korea's missile launches immediately. Missile defense cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan would greatly enhance Japan's ability to defend itself and, therefore, remain committed to the defense of South Korea even in the face of North Korea's nuclear and missiles threat.

Unfortunately though, bilateral issues such as the territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan have prevented closer defense cooperation so far. In November last year, South Korean President Moon Jae-in offered jumbo shrimp from the waters near the disputed islands called Takeshima in the Sea of Japan on the dinner table for President Trump.

South Korea's action was unfortunate for three reasons. First, it contradicted with the principle that disputes such as this should be resolved through the decision of the international dispute settlement process. Second, it was politically unwise and diplomatically indiscreet to draw the US president into a dispute which was bilateral in nature. Third, such an action would undermine South Korea and Japan's ability to work on the North Korea issue in a well-coordinated manner.

The dispute over Takeshima islands would best be resolved at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Japanese government has proposed to the South Korean government that this matter be brought to the ICJ three times in the past, in 1954, 1962, and 2012. In 1954, the US government also informally encouraged the South Korean government to bring the matter to the ICJ. Unfortunately, the South Korean government refused each time<sup>1</sup>.

While the bilateral political issues between South Korea and Japan prevent the two countries from strengthening their cooperation, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities. This is the time for South Korea and Japan to work more closely together in order to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.

## **China**

Another security policy challenge that Japan faces today is the rise of China. In fact, Japan's most important security policy goal today is to create an environment in which China's rise will be peaceful and cooperative. In strategic terms, maintaining balance of power in the region and creating crisis prevention and management mechanisms are the most effective means of achieving this goal.

To this end, Japan is currently undertaking three security policy reforms. First, it is strengthening its defense capabilities. Since the cumulative government debt that Japan has is larger than 200% of its gross domestic product, the name of the game here is "doing more with the same or less resources" by enhancing efficiency of its security policy.

As such, the Japanese government has undertaken initiatives such as establishing a National Security Council as a system for effective and coherent national security policymaking. It has loosened self-imposed ban on arms export and participation in international joint arms development programs, which will open the door for the procurement of highly capable military equipment at reasonable prices. And it has made it possible for Japan to start exercising the right of collective self-defense so that its Self-Defense Force could operate more effectively, undertaking broader defense missions.

Put simply, the aim of the new Japanese security policy is to improve defense capabilities

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<sup>1</sup> Japan's position is that Takeshima legally came under the jurisdiction of one of its prefectures in January 1905, but the islands were illegally and forcibly occupied by South Korea. South Korea unilaterally declared that Takeshima was under its jurisdiction in January 1952 (when Japan was still under US occupation), deployed a Coast Guard unit on the islands in 1954, and South Korean security personnel on the island fired upon a Japanese coast guard vessel later in the same year. South Korea has its own reasons why it thinks Takeshima belongs to it. If the South Korean government is really confident, there should be no reason why it refuses to bring the matter to the ICJ. While Japan has accepted the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction, South Korea has not. The ICJ therefore cannot take up the Takeshima issue as long as South Korea does not agree to refer it to the court.

in real terms without a significant increase in defense spending.

Second, Japan is strengthening its security relationship with the United States — including through the revision of the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines. In response to China's anti-access/area denial strategy, the United States is developing the Third Offset Strategy and JAM-GC, or Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons. Japan, for its part, is paying attention to the defense of the Ryukyu Island chain in order to contribute to the new strategy developed by the United States.

In terms of defense expenditure, the United States remained indisputably in first place globally, with \$611 billion spent in 2016, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI. In second place, China spent \$215 billion, and — in eighth place — Japan spent \$46 billion. But when one considers the long-term trends, it is clear that in the future it will be difficult for the United States and Japan to keep competing with China on military spending, regardless of how closely the two allies cooperate. In the past decade, while the US defense spending has declined by 4.8 percent and Japan's increased by only 2.5 percent, China's defense spending has increased by 118 percent.

Because of this, the third aspect of national security strategy that Japan is undertaking is security collaboration with other countries in the region. South Korea, Australia, Southeast Asian nations, and India are all security partners which Japan is seeking to expand cooperation. The plan is to develop a broader regional defense network, with the aforementioned countries as strategic partners.

Unlike during the Cold War, the countries of Asia are coming to possess considerable military capabilities of their own. According to the previously mentioned SIPRI data, India's defense spending increased by 54 percent over the last decade, to a total of \$56 billion in 2016, making India the world's fifth largest spender on defense. In tenth place globally, South Korea's spending on defense increased by 35 percent over the same time, for a total of \$37 billion. Australia is in 12th place in defense outlays; its spending went up by 29 percent, to \$25 billion.

In this context, Japan's ability to exercise the right to collective self-defense has a level of importance that is difficult to exaggerate. Collective self-defense affords the opportunity for Japan to conduct more robust combined training and exercises with security partners. Furthermore, if the countries in the region including Japan can work closely together to conduct patrol and surveillance, as well as intelligence gathering missions, unilateral actions by China to change the status quo can be more effectively checked in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

The territorial issue between Japan and China remains unresolved. To the detriment of

the rule of law and of Sino-Japanese relations, Chinese coast guard vessels continue to enter Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands.

In my view, the Japanese claim that the islands belong to Japan is rock solid. The Japanese government formally incorporated the Senkaku Islands in 1895. From the late 1940s through 1978, US forces actively used two of the islands — Taisho-jima and Kuba-jima — as gunnery ranges, and the United States still maintains the right to use them for military purposes today.

China began claiming the islands in 1971, after a survey conducted with the support of one of the UN commissions suggested possible oil reserves in the East China Sea. In 1992, China enacted a law concerning its territorial sea, designating the Senkaku Islands to be Chinese. By taking these actions, China has dug itself into the position where renouncing its claim on the islands would undermine the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.

I do not think it easy for China and Japan to resolve the issue in the near future. However, it is absolutely necessary for us to keep pressing Beijing to renounce its unjustified claim for the sake of not only the future of our relationship but also the rule of law and international justice.

In the meantime, positive steps have been taken for crisis prevention and management between Japan and China. In December last year, the two countries reached an agreement in principle to set up a hotline designed to prevent incidents at sea and in the air in the East China Sea. The two sides also agreed on annual assessment meetings and standardized communication protocols between their civilian law enforcement vessels.

On the international development policy, the Japanese government has recently expressed its willingness to cooperate with China on its One Belt One Road Initiative, on the condition that the initiative is open, transparent, economically viable, and fiscally sound. This will make it possible for the two countries to work closely together on the issues in the Indo-Pacific region.

One last good news for the Sino-Japanese relationship. In the public opinion poll conducted in China by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) last year, it was found out that the most favored foreign travel destination for the Chinese adults living in six major cities - Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, and Chengdu — was Japan. I most sincerely hope that the good combination of deterrence, cooperation, and grass-root interactions will bring about peace and genuinely cooperative relationship between Japan and China.

## 2. Security Challenges in East Asia

**Ralph A. Cossa**

President, Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu

The most immediate security challenge facing the United States and the countries of East Asia is the threat posed by DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea or North Korea) nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs and the potential US (over-)reaction to this threat, given President Trump's preference for unpredictability and his penchant for meeting fire with fire (or at least fiery rhetoric with fiery rhetoric) when it comes to the North's traditional bluster.

From the Trump administration's perspective, the source of the problem rests in Pyongyang, but also with prior US administrations, whose approaches, both soft and hard, bore little fruit. This has led to the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" policy toward the North which I have previously described as very similar to President Obama's "strategic patience" approach, only louder.

While many have accused the Trump administration of sending mixed messages regarding North Korea, critics and supporters alike have acknowledged that he sent a clear and consistent message regarding North Korea policy during his first visit to Asia this past November. Trump's top three priorities during the trip seemed to be North Korea, North Korea, and North Korea. In Tokyo and Seoul, he reassured America's two vital Northeast Asia allies of Washington's commitment to their defense in the face of a growing threat from Pyongyang. His speech to the Korean National Assembly was particularly well-received. He contrasted the remarkable progress made by the democratic ROK, compared to the human rights abuses and terrible conditions experienced in the North, an approach that no doubt made some Progressives squirm but which drew repeated applause.

Trump also conditionally reached out to the North: "Yet despite every crime you have committed against God and man... we will offer a path to a much better future. It begins with an end to the aggression of your regime, a stop to your development of ballistic missiles, and complete, verifiable, and total denuclearization... We seek a future of light, prosperity, and peace. But we are only prepared to discuss this brighter path for North Korea if its leaders cease their threats and dismantle their nuclear program." While this message was in fact consistent with earlier pronouncements, those fearful that Trump



would repeat his “Rocket Man” insults – he didn’t; in fact he largely refrained from tweeting during the trip – saw this as a new opening for US-DPRK dialogue (it wasn’t).

In Beijing, Trump pressed the Chinese to do more to persuade (read: compel) Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions and return to denuclearization talks, even while applauding Xi’s increased (yet still inadequate) efforts to “bring Kim Jung un to his senses. In his post-trip remarks, Trump asserted that he and Xi “agreed that we would not accept a so-called ‘freeze for freeze’ agreement like those that have consistently failed in the past.” This seems to have come as a surprise to Beijing which continues (with Moscow) to promote this option, although many now call it “suspension for suspension.”

In Southeast Asia, Trump sought and generally received individual and multilateral condemnation of North Korea’s illegal nuclear and missile programs (both outlawed by UN Security Council Resolutions) and increased adherence to tighter UN sanctions. As Trump himself explained, “throughout the trip, we asked all nations to support our campaign of maximum pressure for North Korean denuclearization. And they are responding by cutting trade with North Korea, restricting financial ties to the regime, and expelling North Korean diplomats and workers.”

If one of the “core goals” of the trip was “to unite the world against the nuclear menace posed by the North Korean regime” (which it was), the effort appears to be succeeding. In response, North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un seems to be changing tactics. With his missile and nuclear testing cycles apparently complete (at least for now), he used his New Year’s message to float an olive branch toward Seoul, even while continuing to warn Washington about the nuclear button which is sitting on his desk – a boastful comment that drew an even more undignified boastful response.

Readers of the Pacific Forum’s Comparative Connections tri-annual publication should not have been surprised by Kim’s recent overture. In the September 2017 issue we wrote: “Hard as it is to believe right now (and as foolhardy as it is to try to make predictions regarding Pyongyang), we are more likely to be writing about the North’s latest smile offensive in four months’ time than picking up the pieces after a military strike by one side or the other.” While acknowledging that even a broken clock is correct twice a day, it’s still nice to be able to say we got one right.

Looking ahead, it would be wise not to be too optimistic about the impending North-South talks. While we will hopefully experience a peaceful Olympics (perhaps even with the North and South marching together in the opening ceremony), a significant breakthrough remains unlikely. While President Moon would love to talk denuclearization with the North, Pyongyang has made it very clear that it will only talk about nuclear issues with the US (and then only in terms of strategic arms talks like the US once had with the

Soviets). Meanwhile, the North at some point will insist that Moon deliver on all the outlandish promises made by his Progressive predecessors, which Moon couldn't do, even if he wanted to. At the end of the day, what Pyongyang really wants is sanctions relief and President Moon can't give them that.

If the President's trip focused on North Korea, the Trump administration's first *National Security Strategy* put this challenge in broader perspective. The *NSS* identified three main categories of threat: regional dictators that spread terror, threaten their neighbors, and pursue weapons of mass destruction; jihadist terrorists that foment hatred to incite violence against innocents in the name of a wicked ideology, and transnational criminal organizations that spill drugs and violence into our communities; and revisionist powers, such as China and Russia, that use technology, propaganda, and coercion to shape a world antithetical to our interests and values.

North Korea shares pride of place in the first category with Iran and other non-Asian actors. The second category relates primarily to the Middle East but terrorism today knows no geographical boundaries. The last category clearly reflects the thinking of the US strategic and intelligence communities, but flies in the face of many of the president's own pronouncement, before, after, and even during the release of the *NSS*. For example, during his roll-out of the document, President Trump described China and Russia as "rival powers... that seek to challenge American influence, values, and wealth." In the very next sentence, however, he went on to express his desire "to build a great partnership" with both, albeit "in a manner that always protects our national interest." He then talked fondly of a phone call he had received from President Putin.

For the purposes of this discussion, I am much more inclined than President Trump to echo his own National Security Strategy document. It clearly states that China and Russia are indeed "revisionist powers" that want to shape a world antithetical to US [and European and Japanese] values." The *NSS* clearly accuses Moscow of "using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America's commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and government." There is no hint of "fake news" in the assertion that "Russia uses information operations as part of its offensive cyber efforts to influence public opinion across the globe," or that Moscow's "influence campaigns blend covert intelligence operations and false online persons with state-funded media. Clearly democracy is under attack in Europe and in the United States; thus far (to the best of my knowledge at least) Japan has been spared but should not be complacent in the face of this growing Russian threat.

There is no need to remind Japan of the threat posed by China. In fact, Tokyo should be relieved that the budding "bromance" between Trump and Xi appears to be coming to an

end, although the alternative — what looks like an impending trade war — could have a negative impact on Japan, Europe, and global commerce in general. I have characterized the US-China “win-win” relationship as follows: The US has decided not to accuse China of doing what China is in fact not doing (i.e., currency manipulation) and in return China is pretending to help the US regarding North Korea. As President Trump comes to the realization that China is not going to put sufficient pressure on Pyongyang to force it to choose between nuclear weapons and economic collapse, the likelihood of an economic showdown increases. Trump’s recent *New York Times* interview brings home this point: “China on trade has ripped off this country more than any other element of the world in history has ripped off anything... If they don’t help us with North Korea, then I do what I’ve always said I want to do.”

Meanwhile, China continues its assertive behavior in the South China Sea and East China Sea and increasingly has been putting pressure on Taipei to adopt the “1992 Consensus” which governed relationship with the previous KMT government but which is a bridge too far for President Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party. It seems inevitable that Sino-US tensions will rise in the New Year and, while this may bring Tokyo and Washington closer together, it could create new challenges for trans-Atlantic relations.

Tokyo could also be caught in the middle. As Brad Glosserman and I argue in the January 2018 issue of *Comparative Connections*, the face-off between Trump and Xi has dominated analysis of the future of the international order; that is unfair to Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo who has done invaluable work shoring up the timbers of regional architecture. Abe has been instrumental in saving the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal after Trump pulled the US out on day one of his administration. Japan did yeoman’s work to push forward a revised TPP, now christened the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). There were even reports that the UK was considering joining the CPTPP in a bid to boost trade relations after the country leaves the European Union.

Japan and the European Union have also concluded the legal text for a trade deal between two economies that provide about 30 percent of global output. Abe called the agreement “a free, fair and rule-based economic zone, which will be a model of an economic order in the international community in the 21st century.” Intended or not, the deal sure looks like a rebuke to the US.

Abe is walking a fine line, having built a strong relationship with Trump while, at the same time, working to fortify key elements of the regional order that Trump seeks to tear down. He deserves real credit for managing both but that task will get harder in the year ahead if Trump, as anticipated, gets serious about redressing US trade balances and takes a

harder line with countries that enjoy persistent trade surpluses with the US. It is not clear how the US will address the tensions in its security and economic policies.

While it is easy to agree with the NSS as to what the main challenges are, it's harder to determine which is the greatest or most immediate threat. Is it, as many intelligence and military officials have argued, Russia? Or is it North Korea, as Trump stressed over and over again during his Asia trip? Or is it ISIS, which was candidate Trump's focus? Or is it an increasingly assertive China, which is flexing its military muscle in the South and East China Seas and its economic muscle almost everywhere?

This is not an academic question. The answer will (or at least should) drive American security policy and help determine if we should try to contain or cooperate with Russia, China, and others.

Let's look at Russia first. Former Director of National Intelligence once told the Senate Armed Services Committee that "when you look at the Russians, they do pose an existential threat to the United States." The operative word here is "existential." This statement is irrefutable! Russia (like the US) possesses the nuclear weapons capability to destroy human civilization several times over. In terms of *capability*, Russia has been, is, and remains our greatest existential threat. In terms of *intent* however, the prospects of an all-out nuclear war with Russia remain low, hacking, Crimea, and other real and imagined Russian sins notwithstanding.

Measured by *intent*, rather than capability or consequences, the greatest immediate threat to the US (and Europe, if not Japan) is the one posed by ISIS. But it is NOT an existential threat. ISIS sympathizers and operatives can blow up a dance hall or airplane, or wreak havoc in an unlimited number of ways that can bring about hundreds of casualties. If, God forbid, ISIS got its hands on a nuclear weapon, there could be thousands of casualties, but it still would not threaten our existence or way of life.

(This is not in any way meant to demean the threat caused by ISIS or other terrorist organizations. We have yet to fully recover as a nation from 9-11 and the suffering being inflicted on innocent souls by ISIS throughout the Islamic World and beyond — most notably Europe — is intolerable. Preventing another terrorist attack by ISIS or any other group remains a top priority, as well it should.)

If, in terms of emerging capabilities, potential consequences, and stated intent, North Korea tops your list of near-term security threats to the United States and our allies — and many experts argue that Pyongyang's rapidly-approaching (some would say already achieved) ability to put an operational nuclear warhead on a functioning ICBM will be a "game-changer" — then cooperation with both Russia and China seem essential to deal

effectively with this potentially imminent threat.

If, on the other hand, the Trump administration believes that the greatest threat to US security and Pax Americana is China's growing economic and military clout, then it will have to learn to live with a nuclear North Korea and be more forthcoming in promoting its own economic interests in the region (rather than squandering them away as Trump did when he pulled America out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership).

Where does Russia fit in if China is seen to be the main problem? While Beijing and Moscow both claim to enjoy a "strategic partnership," when the two states get in bed together, they both sleep with one eye open. Each recognizes that its relationship with the United States is more critical than their relationship with one another and, deep down inside, little trust exists on either side. Just as Nixon/Kissinger played the China card to help keep the Soviet Union in check, Trump/Tillerson may envision using a Russia card to its advantage in countering the long-term China threat.

In reality, the real answer is "all of the above." Attempts to "reset" the Russia relationship in the past have failed, in part, because Putin needed the US as an adversary to justify his own policies. Is he now ready to fully cooperate, even if we accept as a *fait accompli*, the annexation of Crimea (which is going to remain in Russian hands whether we accept it or not)? Or will a new detente with the Russians result in greater rather than less expansionism on Russia's part, with the threat of eventual escalation?

Is a trade war with China, long threatened by Trump, impending? At this writing it appeared so. But what are the unintended consequences? Would such a war result in self-inflicted wounds? And what would be the implications on for the maximum pressure campaign against Pyongyang. The Trump administration's learning curve on Korea continues to be a sharp one, and it seems to have had more curves than learning.

Even as the Trump administration tries to quantify the potential threats it will face, it will always have to hedge against other possibilities. That's the nature of foreign policy.

A closing word about foreign policy by tweets: During the campaign, we were told that President Trump's tweets "should be taken serious, but not literally." I now wonder about the serious part. When White House Chief of Staff John Kelly was asked recently if tweets drove US policy, he said they did not. "Believe it or not, I do not follow the tweets," he stated: "Someone, I read the other day, said we all just react to the tweets. We don't. I don't. I don't allow the staff to. We know what we're doing." The tweets "are what they are," Kelly asserted, "We develop policy in the normal traditional staff way... The tweets don't run my life — good staff work runs it." Now if only the rest of the world could as easily ignore them.

### **3. Return of Great Power Politics and Future of Regional Order in East Asia**

**Matake Kamiya**

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The security situation in East Asia today is becoming increasingly tense. One reason for this is of course North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles developments. There is, however, another more fundamental reason: the return of great power politics in the region.

#### **Return of Great Power Politics**

For about two decades since the end of the Cold War, many in the world, and particularly many in liberal democracies such as European countries and Japan, tended to believe that the era of great power politics was over. Traditionally, the biggest factor that shaped the course of international relations was rivalries and competitions among great powers. That was the "normalcy" in international relations. With the end of the Cold War, however, that normalcy started to become a thing of the past. Gradual incorporation of the former communist states into the existing liberal international order would bring about an environment in which traditional great power rivalries would be gradually replaced by great power cooperation based on the logics of interdependence and globalization. Such was the expectation shared by many in the world after the end of the Cold War.

However, that was an illusion created mainly by the following two factors. First, with the sudden demise of the Soviet Union, the world experienced the period of American unipolar preponderance. The rivalry between the two greatest powers in the world, which had largely determined the course of international relations throughout the Cold War years, abruptly disappeared. Many in the world, particularly in liberal democratic countries, believed that U.S. preponderance would last for many decades.

Second, immediately after the Soviet Union was gone, the world experienced an extraordinary period in which virtually all the great powers were friends. The United States, Japan, the Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada — they all shared basic liberal values and ideals, and they were the countries strongly united by alliances centered around the United States. Most importantly, they were all status-quo oriented powers. These liberal democracies were all satisfied with the existing liberal, open, rules-based international order. All of them were the countries which were willing to abide by international rules and norms. In other words, these great powers were basically willing to

act based on rules, rather than on their big powers. As long as this state of affairs continued, there was no need to worry about serious rivalry and competition among great powers. And many in the world, and particularly in liberal democracies, believed that this state of affairs was likely to endure for many years toward the future.

However, we now all know that the period of America's decisive preponderance was shorter-lived than expected. By around the turn of the century, the power of newly emerging states, such as China and India, reached great power level, and Russia recovered its vigor, at least in the military sphere, to a considerable extent. Consequently, since the beginning of the 21st Century, the world has gradually returned to the state of affairs which we have been familiar with. Not all the great powers are friends. Not all the great powers share the same basic values and ideals. Not every great power is status-quo oriented powers. Some great powers are not quite happy about the existing international order and seek to revise the status quo order. Some great powers are not hesitant to attempt to change the status quo by force, if possible. Consequently, rivalries and competitions among great powers, particularly between status-quo oriented powers and revisionist powers, have once again become salient in international relations in recent years. In Europe, "the return to normalcy" in this sense took place in 2014, which is called the "watershed year" by Europeans, when Russia seized Crimea and stoked a conflict in eastern Ukraine. In the East Asia, people started to sense that the great power politics in a traditional sense was returning to their region around 2009, when China's assertiveness reached proportions that could be described as eccentric, particularly in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea near Japan's Senkaku Islands.

## **Two Faces of China**

Thus, in a sense, international relations have been returning to its normal state of affairs. The great power politics today, however, is not the same as the great power politics of the past. The ongoing great power politics in East Asia, involving the United States, Japan, and China, demonstrates this point most clearly.

Looking back, the international relations during the Cold War years were much simpler than the current international relations. During the Cold War, for the advanced liberal democracies such as Japan, the United States and West European countries, the Soviet Union was simply a security threat. The economic and people-to-people exchanges between the advanced democracies and the Soviet Union were small, and the interdependence between the two camps was minimal. For the liberal democratic countries, Soviet Union was an enemy, and not the country with which they wanted to promote cooperation.

International relations in East Asia today are not that straightforward, because, for Japan, the United States, and many other countries in the East Asia, China represents simultaneously a country they want to cooperate with, and a country that poses serious security challenges to them.

China is now the second largest economy in the world. Every country in the world and in East Asia has come to depend increasingly on China for trade, investment, and markets. Japan and the United States are not the exceptions. They have strong incentives to enhance economic cooperation with China.

Tokyo and Washington also desire to promote cooperation with Beijing to deal with various international problems and challenges. Even in the face of the continuing rise of China, the United States still represents a country that possesses the largest economic and military power in the world. And Japan is still the world's third largest economic power. These two countries are allies and have expressed their determination to strengthen their alliance to address various international challenges. In fact, little in the world, and particularly in East Asia, can be done without active contributions from the United States and Japan. Contributions from these two allies, however, are not sufficient to deal with most of the problems in the region today. Cooperation from the second largest economy in the world is required.

The most obvious example is North Korea. The issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles development has become increasingly serious and immediate particularly in recent months. If it is at all possible to make Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and missile programs, coordinated pressure from the United States, Japan, and China on Kim Jong-un is a must. Also, China is facing a series of environmental problems – the most serious environmental pollution in East Asia. China's environmental pollution is not a simple domestic issue of that country. Pollution originated from China has already had increasingly harmful effects on environments of the neighboring countries, particularly Japan and South Korea. Japan and the United States are willing to cooperate with China to help Beijing's efforts to improve China's environment, and to stop the export of China's pollutions to its neighbors.

Despite all these facts, China also represents the preeminent geo-strategic challenge currently facing Japan and the United States in East Asia. In recent years, China has come to desire to increase its role in the international system commensurate with its increased national power. Beijing's establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its "One Belt, One Road" initiative reflect such ambitions. They are legitimate ambitions for the second largest economy in the world, as long as China keeps adhering to widely accepted rules and standards in the international society, and China does not try to



undermine the existing international order which is liberal, open, and rules-based in nature.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the international community, particularly Japan and the United States, have tried to induce China to support the current international order. The view that the international society must simultaneously “engage” with and “hedge” towards China was the prevailing view in the international society. Japan and the United States made it clear that they hoped and welcomed a Chinese foreign policy that would involve China’s participation in the existing international order, with an increased say.

However, in recent years, the international community has recognized that the increasingly powerful China is becoming increasingly assertive, and has not responded to the “engagement” by other countries in the expected manner. Particularly since 2009, China’s foreign policy has rapidly taken on a strong character of self-assertiveness, as demonstrated by the growing frequency of its attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion particularly in the South China Sea and the East China Seas based on its own territorial and other claims which are inconsistent with the existing international order. For example, China unilaterally claims almost the entire South China Sea encircled by the so-called “nine-dash line.” Nine-dash line is the U-shaped line which China unilaterally drew in the South China Sea. The line covers almost 90% of the South China Sea. In recent years, China has been carrying out rapid and extensive land reclamations in the South China Sea. Military use of these artificial islands is seriously worried, because airstrip constructions have been going on there. China has already deployed fighter jets and surface-to-air missiles to disputed islands in the South China Sea.

On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague rendered its ruling on the maritime dispute between the Philippines and China, stating that China’s expansive claims to “historic rights” through its nine-dash line in the South China Sea were not valid under international law. China however said that it would reject the verdict. China’s senior officials, including vice foreign minister Liu Zhenmin and vice minister of State Council Information Office Guo Weimin referred to the ruling as “nothing more than a piece of waste paper.”

### **China’s Actions against the Senkaku Islands**

China’s attempt to change the status quo by force is not limited to the South China Sea. In East China Sea, Japan has faced increasingly provocative actions by China against the Senkaku Islands, which belongs to Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture.

Historically, the Senkaku Islands were uninhabited. Until the end of the nineteenth

century they were not under the control of any particular country. The Japanese government confirmed that the islands did not belong to any other country before deciding in 1895 to incorporate them into Okinawa Prefecture. Later, at the height of the islands' prosperity, about 250 Japanese nationals lived there, making a living collecting albatross feathers and producing dried bonito flakes.

The Senkaku Islands were placed under U.S. administration as part of Okinawa after World War II under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Islands were returned to Japan in 1972, when Okinawa reverted to Japanese administration. Not once did China make any claim of territorial rights to these islands until 1971, that was shortly after the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East published a report that identified potential for enormous deposits of oil and natural gas resources at the bottom of the East China Sea near the Senkaku Islands.

On the contrary, on January 8, 1953, *The People's Daily* published an article titled "The Struggle to Oppose the U.S. Occupation of the Ryukyu Islands" (Liuqiu qundao renmin fandui Meiguo zhanling de douzheng) that clearly described the Senkaku Islands as a part of the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) in geographical terms.

The Ryukyu Islands are located northeast of our [China's] Taiwan Islands in the seas to the southwest of the Kyushu Islands of Japan. They consist of seven islands including the *Senkaku Islands*, Sakishima Islands, Daito Islands, Okinawa Islands, Tokara Islands and Osumi Islands.... (*Liuqiu qundaosan zhan zai woguo Taiwan dongbei he Riben Jiuzhoudao xinan zhijian de haimianshang, baokuo Senkaku zhudao, Xiandao zhudao, Dadong zhudao, Chongsheng zhudao, Dadao zhudao, Tugala zhudao, Dawei zhudao deng qizu daoyu...*) (Emphasis added).

For the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China to publish an article listing the Senkaku Islands as the first part of the Ryukyu Islands, and moreover to use the Japanese name Senkaku Islands instead of the Chinese designation of "Diaoyu", is tangible proof that the government in Beijing recognized them as Japanese territory at that time.

Despite these objective facts, China has been intensifying their attempts to pressure Japan to change the status quo of the Senkakus by their power. Particularly since 2008, Chinese patrol vessels, military aircraft, as well as fishing boats, have appeared in the waters off the islands on a continuous basis. Ships of China Coast Guard even intrude Japan's territorial waters near the islands very frequently — for example, in 2017, 108 vessels intruded Japan's territorial waters around the Senkakus over 29 days.

For Japan, more than anything else, the "Senkaku boat collision incident" of September 2010 was a profoundly shocking event. It was originally a minor incident. When the Japan Coast Guard Vessel tried to inspect a Chinese fishing boat illegally conducting fishing near

the Senkaku Islands, the captain of the Chinese boat intentionally rammed into the Japan Coast Guard Vessel. The captain was arrested and indicted according to Japan's criminal law. China however demanded to the Japanese government that the captain should be released because the Senkaku Islands are the territories of China, and did not refrain from bold and unrestrained ways of exercising power to pressure Japan, such as virtually banning rare earth metal exports to Japan and detaining the employees of Fujita Corporation, a Japanese company, as a retaliatory measure.

China's power-based approach to change the status quo of the Senkakus has been in sharp contrast with Japan's rules-based approach to the territorial dispute the country has with South Korea, i.e., the Takeshima issue<sup>1</sup>.

## **Japan and the United States — Determined to Protect the Existing Order in East Asia**

It is of course not realistic to believe that the existing international order can be maintained as it is without any changes. The order has to accommodate China's growing presence. Understanding this reality, however, Japan and the United States, together with many other countries in East Asia and globally, have a strong desire to preserve the essential characteristics of the existing order, i.e., its liberal, open, and rules-based character. Japan and the United States, even in the Trump era, are determined to protect such essential characteristics of the existing order toward the future.

Since his return to power in December 2012, Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has consistently made it clear that the protection of the liberal, rules-based order in East Asia and beyond represents Japan's top priority foreign policy goal. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 20, 2017, Abe declared: “[W]hat Japan wants to

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<sup>1</sup>Takeshima, once a group of uninhabited islands, was incorporated into Shimane Prefecture and became Japanese territory in 1905, but illegal occupation of the islands by South Korea has continued from 1952 to the present. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed in September 1951, stipulated that Japan should renounce all rights, titles and claims to “Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.” In July 1951, the South Korean government, which had learned that the United States and Great Britain were preparing such a draft treaty, sent a letter under the name of South Korea's Ambassador to the United States Yu Chan Yang to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, requesting the addition of “Dokdo” (Koreans call Takeshima this way) to the list of islands that Japan should renounce. The U.S. government, however, explicitly rejected South Korea's claim in its reply under the name of Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, in August of that year, making clear its recognition that “Dokdo” had historically never been a territory of Korea, but rather the sovereignty of the island belonged to Japan. “. . . As regards the islands of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks, this normally uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never treated as part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. *The island does not appear ever before to have been claimed by Korea.*” (Emphasis added)

safeguard in every respect is the free, liberal, open international order and multilateral frameworks.”

As for U.S. President Donald Trump, many in the world — including this author — wonder to what extent he understands the significance of the maintenance of the existing liberal, open, rules-based international order in East Asia and beyond for the national interest of the United States. Observing his decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), many are worried if Trump understands the fact that significant benefits accrue to those who define the “playing field” and the “rules of the game” in international politics and economics.

President Trump and members of his cabinet, however, have repeatedly expressed their intention to maintain the U.S. commitment to the maintenance of the existing rules-based order in East Asia and beyond. In the Joint Statement President Trump and Prime Minister Abe issued after their first summit meeting in Washington, D.C. on February 10, 2017, the two leaders “underscored the importance of maintaining international order based upon the rule of law.”

On June 3, 2017, in his address at the Shagri-la dialogue, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis emphasized that the United States, “cannot accept Chinese actions that impinge on the interests of the international community, undermining the rules-based order that has benefitted all countries represented here today, including and especially China.”

On October 18, 2017, in his address at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. titled “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century,” U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said as follows:

*As we look to the next 100 years, it is vital that the Indo-Pacific, a region so central to our shared history, continued to be free and open...*

*And the very international order that has benefited India’s rise, and that of many others, is increasingly under strain. China, while rising alongside India, has done so less responsibly, at times undermining the international rules-based order...China’s provocative actions in the South China Sea directly challenge the international law and norms that the United States and India both stand for. The United States seeks constructive relations with China, but we will not shrink from China’s challenges to the rules-based order and where China subverts the sovereignty of neighboring countries and disadvantages the U.S. and our friends...*

*We ought to welcome those who want to strengthen the rule of law and further prosperity and security in the region. In particular, our starting point should continue to be greater engagement and cooperation with Indo-Pacific democracies. We are already capturing the benefits of our important trilateral engagement between the U.S., India, and Japan. As we look ahead, there’s room to invite others, including Australia, to build on the shared objectives and initiatives...*

And on November 6, 2017, in their summit meeting in Tokyo, Trump and Abe agreed to align the two countries' strategic priorities toward a "shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific."

### **In Lieu of Conclusion**

Japan and the United States confront a demanding paradox: China represents the country they most want to cooperate with, but it also represents the most serious source of security challenges for them. Whether the three great powers, who share a variety of incentives to cooperate with each other, can find a way to soothe the rivalries among them, we will have to wait and see. Tokyo and Washington clearly understand that cooperation from the second largest economy in the world is significant and desirable to tackle various international problems and challenges. As long as China challenges to the existing liberal, open, rules-based international order which the United States and Japan wants to maintain, however, the three great powers cannot easily become true friends.

Nevertheless, South Korean President Syngman Rhee ignored this objective understanding and occupied Takeshima by unilaterally establishing the so-called Syngman Rhee Line through the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea in January 1952, immediately before the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect.

Maintaining that there are no grounds for South Korea's claim on Takeshima, Japan has never resorted to force in any way to regain the sovereignty of Takeshima. In fact, Japan has never applied pressure on South Korea utilizing its power. Japan suggested South Korea seek judgment on the sovereignty issue over Takeshima at the International Court of Justice in 1954, 1962 and 2012, but South Korea rejected all these proposals.

## 4. Security Challenges in East Asia: A European Perspective

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### Introduction

The latest developments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) ballistic missile programme represent a new type of threat for Europe. There are doubts in regard to the actual ability of the North Korean army to control the re-entry phase of these missiles. However, and even considering the less generous estimates, these missiles would potentially be able to hit the entire territory of the United States (US) and large parts of the European soil. The escalation of tensions on the Korean peninsula — coupled with China's increasing assertiveness in the East and South China Sea — put at risk Europe's growing economic interests in the area. The EU is China's biggest trading partner, the third largest for Japan; and the fourth most important export destination for South Korea. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a whole represents the EU's third largest trading partner outside Europe (after the US and China). In East Asia, the EU is as much important — economically speaking — as the United States.

The EU is not a security provider in the region where it is mainly perceived as a trading bloc endowed with a formidable array of soft power capabilities<sup>1</sup>. Together with Japan, the Union and its member states are the biggest donors of development and humanitarian aid in the region and have recently adopted harsher sanctions against Pyongyang to increase pressure on the regime hoping that this will convince Kim Jong-un to return to the negotiating table and discuss the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

The EU is also a staunch supporter of diplomatic initiatives aimed at promoting regional cooperation, multilateralism and trust building, in stark contrast to the Trump administration which shows contempt for multilateralism and institutions, preferring bilateral bargaining and power relations instead. The EU's backing for regional integration and reconciliation is very much part of Europe's "DNA," while also being one of its foreign

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<sup>1</sup> Nicola Casarini, "How Can Europe Contribute to Northeast Asia's Security?", *The Diplomat*, 11 September 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/how-can-europe-contribute-to-northeast-asias-security/>

policy objectives, as stated in the *EU Global Strategy*<sup>2</sup>.

This paper examines the distinctive approach developed by the EU towards East Asia's two main security challenges, namely: (i) North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear programmes; (ii) China's growing assertiveness in the East and South China Sea. It argues that Europe has succeeded — albeit inadvertently and without a clear strategy — in engaging the region in a comprehensive way, i.e. one that includes harsher sanctions vis-a-vis the DPRK; support for regional initiatives aimed at cooperation and reconciliation among China, Japan and South Korea; and political declarations in favour of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Such an approach — too often overlooked — deserves instead serious consideration, since it could help the region's policymakers to address not only the DPRK's threat but also mounting nationalism which put at risk both North and Southeast Asia's peace and stability.

## **Europe and the DPRK**

The DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs continue to be a threat to regional peace and international stability. Since the beginning of Trump's presidency, a harsh confrontation between Pyongyang and Washington has monopolised the debate over North Korea's nuclear ambition. Along with the numerous provocation coming from Kim's regime, the White House has repeatedly threatened to use pre-emptive strikes or bloody nose attacks against North Korea's military installations.

The new administration in Washington has also pushed forward the deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea, straining relations with China, as it sees the missile shield as a game-changer for the region's strategic balance and its own military capabilities. Under retaliation by Beijing, Seoul has recently assured China that it will not make any more THAAD deployments beyond the initial system laid out in September 2016.

North Korea's provocations have also played a role in Shinzo Abe's victory in the parliamentary snap elections in October 2017. Exploiting the growing concern over national security, Abe has pushed forward his plans to revise the pacifist Article 9, enshrined in the Japanese Constitution. On December 19, the Cabinet in Tokyo approved a \$46 billion record defense budget, with an increase of 1.3% compared to the previous year, allowing among others the acquisition and deployment of two US-made Aegis Ashore missile defense

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<sup>2</sup> European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*, Brussels: EU Publications, June 2016.  
[https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs\\_review\\_web\\_13.pdf](https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf)

systems<sup>3</sup>.

While the region is on the brink of war, there is still the possibility that dialogue will prevail over the use of force and that harsher sanctions will convince Pyongyang to sit at the negotiating table. Considering its 20 years of experience, these circumstances represent an opportunity for the European Union to intervene as a desirable mediator and facilitator.

#### Direct and Indirect Threat to the EU

The military achievements reached by North Korea in the last five years has discredited any prediction made thus far about the actual stage and the progression pace of its nuclear and missile program, forcing the American intelligence agencies to admit to have dangerously underestimated the regime's efficiency and boldness<sup>4</sup>.

In September 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test, the largest so far, declaring it had tested a thermonuclear weapon. Even if the scientific community expressed several doubts over the claim – suggesting the plausible use of hydrogen and tritium isotopes to “boost” the detonation – this technological display centred the regime's long-term objective of demonstrating the advanced status of the transition from a primitive nuclear program to a nuclear deterrent that will help to safeguard the country's national security and thus the survival of the Kim's dynasty<sup>5</sup>. Set aside the nuclear card, major concerns arouse also in regards of the progress made by North Korea in terms of ballistic capabilities. To date, Kim Jong-un can rely on three operational intercontinental missiles: the Taepodong-2, with an estimated range of 12,000 km; the *Hwasong-14*, which can travel between 7,500 and 9,500 km; the *Hwasong-15*, whose capacity could reach 13,000 km. There are still significant doubts in regard to the actual ability of the North Korean army to control the re-entry phase of these missiles. Yet, even considering the less generous estimates, these missiles would potentially be able to hit the entire territory of the United States and even large parts of the European soil.

Although Europe has never been directly threatened, there are three scenarios under which its national security and economic interests could be put at risk from a sudden escalation of the conflict:

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<sup>3</sup> Daisuke Kikuchi, “Japan approves introduction of Aegis Ashore missile defense system amid North Korea threat”, *The Japan Times*, 19 December 2017.

<sup>4</sup> David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “How U.S. Intelligence Agencies Underestimated North Korea”, *The New York Times*, 6 January 2018.

<sup>5</sup> Elisabeth Eaves, “North Korean nuclear test shows steady advance: interview with Siegfried Hecker”, *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 9 July 2017.  
<https://thebulletin.org/north-korean-nuclear-test-shows-steady-advance-interview-siegfried-hecker11091>



1. Although unlikely, the chance of a direct aggression cannot arbitrarily be excluded. First of all, we don't know how the regime will react to direct and imminent threat to its own. Second, the lack of an advanced control system of missile trajectories makes the occurrence of involuntary accidents a plausible event.
2. In case of a direct attack on the US territory, Washington could invoke NATO's Article 5. If this were to take place, then the US would be calling upon Europe's military and strategic contribution.
3. The eruption of a war in Northeast Asia could have serious consequences for the European economy since some of its major trading partners would be affected. This is the greatest danger and most realistic scenario.

### The European Response

For the EU — and the rest of the international community — the short-term objective is to contain and deter North Korea, while in the long term the ultimate goal is the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and the creation of a peaceful regional environment. Of the three elements which can be used to put pressure on the DPRK regime, namely military force, economic sanctions, and dialogue, the EU and its member states have traditionally adopted the last two.

The EU and its member states have adopted sanctions against Pyongyang following the country's 2003 decision to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 without, however, closing the door to dialogue. Since 2016, due to North Korea's increased provocations and the escalation of tensions in Northeast Asia, the Union has given priority to economic sanctions over dialogue. Today, the EU has put into force two provisions: the first one is the Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 of the 28th of May 2016, of which the last amendment has been approved on the 1st of October 2017; the second is the Council Regulation (EU) 2017/ 1509, which has been amended in November last year.

At the end of 2017 the Council of the EU adopted new autonomous measures – which complement and reinforce the UN Security Council sanctions - to further increase the pressure on Pyongyang to comply with its obligations. The new measures include:

- A total ban on EU investment in the DPRK, in all sectors.
- A total ban on the sale of refined petroleum products and crude oil to the DPRK.

- Lowering the amount of personal remittances transferred to the DPRK from €15,000 to €5,000<sup>6</sup>.

Moreover, all EU member states agreed not to renew the work authorizations for DPRK nationals present in their territory, except for refugees and other persons benefiting from international protection. The EU also added three persons and six entities supporting the illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programs to the lists of those subject to an asset freeze and travel restrictions, bringing the total number under restrictive measures against the DPRK as designated by the EU autonomously to 41 individuals and 10 entities. In addition, 63 individuals and 53 entities are listed by the UN. The hardening of position vis-à-vis the DPRK is more evident in Southern Europe. In October 2017, Italy and Spain decided to send back the DPRK ambassadors to increase pressure on Pyongyang — and convey a message of firmness to Washington and Tokyo.

Alongside harsher sanctions and the hardening of positions of some EU member states, Federica Mogherini — the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy — has left the door open for dialogue with Pyongyang. In the last years, the EU has developed a strategy for non-proliferation and disarmament, and acquired first-hand experience in negotiating with Iran and in convening the group of the P5 + 1 countries — a format that has many similarities with the Six-Party Talks. The framework agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue reached by the P5 + 1 — i.e. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States plus Germany — with Tehran in July 2015, and the role played by the EU in the negotiations, have given Brussels — in particular the office of the EU High Representative — the confidence, and ability, to eventually play a role in resuming talks on the North Korean nuclear dossier — if the concerned parties so wished. The Europeans could bring to the table the European Commission's previous involvement in the KEDO project. Europe's experience of the joint, and safe, management of nuclear resources, as in the case of EURATOM, could also provide useful tools.

The EU member states are, however, currently divided as to whether negotiations with the North Korean regime could produce meaningful results. France, for instance, continues to express reservations and veto any engagement policy by the EU vis-à-vis the DPRK, while other EU members, most notably Sweden, continue to hold unofficial meetings with North Korean delegations hoping that this could lead to a diplomatic breakthrough. This policy of firmness towards Pyongyang — coupled with critical engagement by some EU

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<sup>6</sup> Council of the EU, *North Korea: EU Adopts New Sanctions*, Brussels, 16 October 2017.  
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/10/16/north-korea-sanctions/>

member states — takes place within closer relations developed by the EU with its strategic partners in the region.

Besides Japan and South Korea — both like-minded partners of the EU in East Asia — China has also emerged as a partner for dealing with the North Korean issue. Brussels and Beijing advocate for a peaceful resolution through increased dialogue at the multilateral level. The statement of the last China-EU Strategic Dialogue held in April 2017 was in direct contrast to Trump, who has responded to Pyongyang's recent missile launches with belligerence, an attitude that both China and the EU see as troubling for regional peace. While China may be part of the solution to the North Korea's threat, Beijing remains part of the problem when it comes to security challenges in the East and South China Sea.

### **Chinese Assertiveness in the East and South China Sea — the European Response**

China's growing assertiveness in East Asia concerns in particular two security flashpoints: (i) the uninhabited Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea — administered by Japan, but claimed by Beijing as Diaoyu; and, (ii) China's militarization of outposts in the contested South China Sea.

#### East China Sea and China-Japan Relations

In August 2016, tensions around the Senkaku Islands were heightened by the arrival of more than 20 Chinese coast guard vessels, some of them armed — a larger than usual presence in the disputed area. China has regularly sent its ships around the Senkakus since the Japanese government purchased some of the islands from a private Japanese owner in 2012, bringing them under state control. Tokyo and Beijing are currently finalizing details on a hotline aimed at averting unintended clashes in the East China Sea between their coast guard vessels or the airspace above. This could happen in 2018 which marks the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of a peace and friendship treaty between the two countries.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed in November 2017, on the margins of the East Asian Summit, to make a 'new start' in bilateral relations, airing the idea of the two leaders swapping visits in 2018 for the first time in a decade. However, Japanese participation in US-led freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea has drawn criticism from China. It means that if those exercises are stepped up, there could be problems for a thaw in Sino-Japanese relations. At the same time, the success of a long-delayed trilateral summit in Japan involving Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and South Korean President Moon Jae-in could help in reducing tensions in the region.

Relations between China, Japan and South Korea are strained due to a variety of issues, ranging from World War II apologies and the interpretation of history to territorial disputes between the three nations. The EU has thus welcomed the announcement of a Trilateral Summit in 2018.

### The European Response

The EU is possibly the staunchest supporter of the process of trilateral cooperation which is based on the annual Trilateral Summit of the heads of state and government of China, Japan and South Korea. The Trilateral Summit was first proposed by the ROK in 2004, as a meeting outside the framework of the ASEAN + 3 (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan and South Korea) – itself a by-product of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) – with the three major economies of Northeast Asia having a separate forum to themselves. The first summit took place in Fukuoka (Japan) in December 2008 when the three countries met to discuss regional cooperation, the global economy and disaster relief. Since then, they have established more than 60 trilateral consultative mechanisms, including almost 20 ministerial meetings and over 100 cooperative projects. In September 2011, the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) was launched: based in Seoul, the TCS is an international organization whose goal is to promote peace and prosperity between China, Japan and South Korea. On the basis of equal participation, each government covers one third of the overall operational budget.

From 2012 to 2015, however, no Trilateral Summit took place due to separate disputes over historical grievances as well as maritime territorial claims. Nevertheless, the process has continued at the ministerial, business and civil-society levels, indicating that important sections of the three societies remain committed to regional cooperation and trust building. On 1 November 2015, the sixth Trilateral Summit was held in Seoul, during which Chinese premier Li Keqiang, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and ROK President Park Geun-hye agreed to meet annually in order to work towards deepening trade relations and to pursue the Six-Party Talks (SPT) over the DPRK's nuclear-weapons programme<sup>7</sup>. Since then, however, no further summits has taken place.

Various US Administration have given lukewarm support to the trilateral process. Washington continues to rely on its military alliances with Japan and South Korea, while seeking to keep China in check. This position has been reinforced by the Trump Administration. The US President has made clear his preference for bilateral relations, as well as his distrust for multilateralism and regional integration, a stance reiterated during

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<sup>7</sup> See the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *The Sixth Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit*, 2 November 2015. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/a\\_o/tp/page3e\\_000409.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/tp/page3e_000409.html)

his first meeting with the ROK President on 30 June 2017<sup>8</sup>.

The European Union, on the other hand, has invested considerably, both politically and financially, to keep the trilateral process rolling — a move made easier by the fact that the EU is untrammled by binding military alliances in Northeast Asia. On 2 August 2017, for instance, the EU Delegation in Seoul invited young students who were participating in the Young Ambassadors Program organized by the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat to a workshop (funded by the EU) with the aim to promote mutual understanding and the sense of friendship among future leaders of South Korea, Japan and China. The long-delayed Trilateral Summit in Japan in 2018 is thus good news for the EU who is hoping that diplomacy would help ease tensions in Northeast Asia and possibly have positive spill-over effects for the security situation in the South China Sea.

### South China Sea

Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has increased after President Xi Jinping's accession to power in 2012. Beijing's territorial and maritime claims over large swaths of the Sea are not only based on economic and security considerations, but also on national identity making and the renewal of China's past *grandeur*, which today is taking the form of President Xi Jinping's vision of the 'China dream', a term which, since 2013, has been related to the rejuvenation of the country, including restoring the glory of the ancient times, when China presided over a Sino-centric order in East Asia.

Beijing is currently building artificial islands, installing military facilities, drilling for oil and gas, and chasing off the boats of its Southeast Asian neighbors from waters UNCLOS — and the Hague Tribunal — says they can operate in. In July 2016, after more than three years of deliberation, the tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague rendered the Award in the Arbitration between the Philippines and China, making it clear that China's extensive historical rights claims to maritime areas within the so-called 'nine-dash line' are incompatible with UNCLOS and therefore illegitimate. The tribunal also underscored that none of the land features claimed by China qualify as an 'island' — something that would in turn warrant the claiming of an exclusive economic zone under UNCLOS.

China strongly condemned the verdict, declaring it null and void, and questioned the legality of the tribunal itself, prompting other claimants to reinforce their actions and the

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<sup>8</sup> The White House, *Remarks by President Trump and President Moon of the Republic of Korea Before Bilateral Meeting*, Washington, 30 June 2017.  
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/30/remarks-president-trump-and-president-moon-republic-korea-bilateral>

US to intensify its freedom of navigation operations to deter Beijing to adopt even more confrontational policies in the future, such as declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). At the 31<sup>st</sup> ASEAN summit in Manila in November 2017, China agreed to begin talks with the regional body on details of a code of conduct for the South China Sea. Yet, no timeframe has been given so far for an agreement on the code's details and many in the region are skeptical about China's declarations and intentions.

### The European Response

Following the ruling by the Hague Tribunal, Federica Mogherini, the EU's High Representative, issued a declaration stating the need for the parties to the dispute to resolve it in accordance with international law<sup>9</sup>. The declaration took Chinese leaders by surprise as they did not expect the EU to be able to find the necessary cohesion to issue such declaration. Beijing had tried to block the initiative by putting pressure on some EU member states which were receiving significant Chinese investments into their territories. In the end, the declaration's final version was watered down by Greece, Hungary and Croatia who did not want to send too strong a message to Beijing at a time of growing economic ties with the Asian giant.

On the other hand of the spectrum France, which is the only European nation with an Asian-Pacific military projection, has expressed an interest in leading EU patrols to sustain freedom of navigation in the South China Sea — an eventuality that is being considered by other European maritime powers such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands.

### **Conclusion**

The EU is mainly a civilian power in East Asia. However, recent European initiatives aimed at tackling North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and in support of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea show a willingness by the EU and its member states to play a role in dealing with East Asia's security challenges. This opens up new prospects for EU-Japan cooperation. The July 2017 EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and a general understanding on the need to sign a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) imply that the time is ripe for a new stage of EU-Japan political and security relations which would allow the two partners to step up their collaboration in addressing rising tensions in East Asia.

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<sup>9</sup> *Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the Award rendered in the Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China*, Brussels, 15 July 2016.  
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/15-south-china-sea-arbitration/>

## 5. Japan's Response to Rising Tension in East Asia: What are the Long and Short-Term Options?

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East Asia has become the leading region in terms of worldwide economic growth. In addition to the immense amount of trade and investment taking place in recent years among the region's three major economies — China, Japan and South Korea — there is a high degree of economic interaction between each of these three powers and the ASEAN countries, as well as within ASEAN. At the same time East Asia has become one of the most militarized regions in the world, signaling a high level of intra-regional distrust. Furthermore, in addition to competition over energy resources, non-traditional environmental and climate issues have arisen in the wake of the economic, social and environmental transformations of recent decades, giving rise to complex approaches to the problem of regional security. A fundamental issue causing increased tension in the area is of course the rise of China from an economic as well as a political and military perspective.

The Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, has become increasingly assertive as he approaches the end of his first term in office, and pronounced at the 19th CCP Party Congress late last year, that it was time for his nation to transform itself into “a mighty force” that could lead the world with respect to political, economic, military and environmental issues. “This is a new historic juncture in China's development,” he said. “The Chinese nation...has stood up, grown rich, and become strong, and now embraces the brilliant prospects of rejuvenation... This will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind.”

These remarks may have sounded reassuring to the Chinese population but certainly did not do so in Japan, nor with its ally the United States, the nation which has been occupying the center stage since the end of the cold war. Japan is concerned about a more assertive China with which it has territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands. It is also concerned about developments in the South China Sea, where China has territorial disputes with a number of ASEAN countries and is strengthening its position. In recent years, China has vigorously pressed its claims with respect to large areas in the South China Sea and constructed artificial islands and infrastructure such as runways, loading piers and satellite communication equipment. This has profound security implications and

vastly boosts China's power projection capabilities in this vital area.

Another and perhaps most imminent security threat in Northeast Asia is of course the development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles in North Korea. Since the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, the level of mutual verbal threats and abuse have been stepped up between that country and the US, with Trump threatening to totally destroy North Korea, and Kim Jung-un proclaiming in his New Year speech that he has a button on his table with which he could launch a nuclear attack on the mainland US land, with Donald Trump replying on Twitter that his nuclear bottom was much bigger and more effective.

North Korea has in fact conducted a number of successful nuclear tests, most strikingly that of September 3, which was said to be seven times stronger than the bomb dropped on Nagasaki at the end of WWII. Around 20 successful missile launches have also been conducted, some of which travelled over Japanese territory. The UN Security Council has adopted various sanctions in an effort to get North Korea to return to the negotiating table and pressuring it to give up its nuclear program. UN Resolution 2397, if properly implemented, would cut the export of gasoline, diesel and other refined oil products to North Korea by circa 89%. The resolution also bans exports of industrial equipment, machinery, transportation vehicles and industrial metals to North Korea, and requires countries employing North Korean laborers to send them home no later than 24 months from the adoption of the resolution. It also requires countries to stop ships from illegally providing oil to North Korea via ship-to-ship transfers and prohibits the smuggling of North Korean coal exports and other prohibited commodities by sea. Some countries took the opportunity to direct apparent digs at the US, with China calling for an "immediate end" to what it characterized as overheated rhetoric — a charge that could be applied to Trump as easily as to Kim.

Japan on the other hand, the country that had experienced North Korean missiles passing over its territory and possessing a seat in the Security Council until the end of 2017, advocated even stronger sanctions and actually adopted some of these on a bilateral level. The Japanese government has maintained a hardline position vis-a-vis North Korea. Prime Minister Abe was the first foreign head of state to pay a courtesy call on Donald Trump after the latter was elected president, thus emphasizing that the US-Japan alliance stood firm and reassuring President Trump that Japan would stand by his side. President Trump confirmed that Senkaku issues was included among the United States' security commitments to Japan, and a joint US-Japanese statement in February 2017 averred that the US commitments to defend Japan through nuclear and conventional military capabilities is unwavering. This did however not affect North Korea's continued development of nuclear weapons; The Leader Kim Jong-un recently proclaimed that its nuclear force now is



complete and that he will not give it up.

These developments have severe implications for Japan and raise questions about core assumptions concerning stability in the region. Since the end of the WWII nuclear deterrence has been regarded as guaranteeing strategic stability. The threat of mutual nuclear destruction was enough to prevent Washington, Moscow and Beijing from attacking one another. And Japan has been shielded by the US nuclear umbrella. Now, with the emergence of a nuclear-capable North Korea, resolutely independent and beholden to no one, this strategic balance seems to have shifted. Japan, close by and well aware that North Korea's anti-leaders, feels the threat. The Great Leader Kim Jong-un's grandfather, made much of the fact that he had fought the Japanese occupiers.

Article 9 of the Japanese post-war constitution prevented Japan from endeavoring to solve international disputes by military means. With the assurance of American military protection provided through its 1951 alliance with the US, Japan has instead focused on economic development. The United States also had an alliance partnership with South Korea (1953) but there was no element of triangular cooperation and it was not until 1965 that Japan established relations with South Korea in an agreement containing a large package of aid as well as various mixed credits to build up the South Korean economy. After the Cold War period Japan has gradually been building up its military capabilities, especially since Prime Minister Abe came to power and inaugurated a National Security Council with a newly established secretariat in charge of planning and coordinating security issues.

Japan announced a New Security Strategy in December 2013. According to this document Japan should step up its activities and, in the future, make 'a proactive contribution to peace'. Via a reinterpretation of the constitution Japan can now also participate in collective defense activities together with other nations if Japanese vital interests are at stake. Japan's Security Strategy puts emphasis on strengthening the US-Japan alliance, and Official Development Assistance (ODA) has for a long time played a role in this. From the 1980s on there was talk of burden sharing (*yakuwari buntan*) wherein the US was to assume military responsibility in case of war, with Japan assisting in peace-building by providing ODA.

It was not until 1990 following the high level Seoul-Pyongyang talks, that Japan sent a 40-member parliamentary delegation to hold direct talks with representatives of the Korean Workers' Party. Eight rounds of normalization talks were subsequently held, but these ran into a number of troubled issues, such as the Korean side's demands for an official apology and a monetary settlement for war atrocities, and the Japanese side's for the repatriation of Japanese-born spouses of North Korean citizens. Japan also urged North Korea to provide

reassurance concerning the safety of a Japanese citizen thought to have been abducted in the 1970s.

Following the first North Korean nuclear crises of 1993-94 Japan engaged itself in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). When the North Koreans launched a missile over Japan in 1998 relations soured again and it was not until 2002, when the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi met with the North Korean leader Kim Jong- Il in Pyongyang that normalization talks resumed. This meeting was sensational in three ways: First, it occurred at a time when Japan's ally the US under President George W. Bush was moving towards a strategy of containment of North Korea. Second, Pyongyang suddenly admitted and apologized for the abduction of 13 Japanese citizens. And third, in the so-called Pyongyang declaration the Japanese side, expressed "deep remorse and heartfelt apology" for the damage visited upon Koreans during the colonial period. The North Korean demand for war reparations was dropped and replaced by "economic cooperation", the formula preferred by Tokyo.

Japanese negotiators also extracted pledges that that North Korea would maintain its freeze on the nuclear program and continue to observe a moratorium on missile testing. Within a month of the Koizumi-Kim meeting, a US delegation visited Pyongyang and confronted the regime with the suspicion that it had begun a secret nuclear program. The US and its allies in KEDO (including Japan) retaliated by halting oil deliveries. In retaliation Pyongyang declared the Agreed Framework dead and once more decided to leave the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To manage this second nuclear crisis multilateral talks (the so-called Six Party Talks) were set up but were without results.

A second reason for the deterioration of Japanese-Korean relations was the abduction issue. This in fact became the dominant concern for Japan at that time, at least in the media and among the general public. In 2006 both sides raised the stakes: Japan imposed sanctions on North Korea for not making progress in addressing human right issues, while Pyongyang test-fired seven missiles, causing Tokyo to impose further economic sanctions. Japan also lobbied for and achieved a UN resolution imposing limited sanctions on North Korea.

Thus the governments of the two nations became trapped in a vicious circle of continually stepped-up retaliatory measures, resulting in the current situation in which North Korea has declared itself a nuclear power. After conducting at least 20 successful missile tests during past year, Pyongyang now claims that it has the capability of attacking the US mainland. In this situation Japan has promoted the strengthening of multilateral sanctions against North Korea in the UN, and has further strengthened its own sanctions.

What is new under President Trump is the resort to verbal abuse and Washington's

inflexible, uncompromising positioning vis-a-vis North Korea. In the shadow of this the current US National Security Strategy, as cited below, also indicates a stance against China which is firmer than before.

*“For decades, US policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China. Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of surveillance. It is building the most capable and well-funded military in the world, after our own. Its nuclear arsenal is growing and diversifying. Part of China’s military modernization and economic expansion is due to its access to the US innovation economy, including America’s world-class universities.”*

Fears of Chinese “assertiveness” is something that is shared by Japan and South Korea, but stepped-up US military deployments, such as that of THAAD missiles to South Korea, do come at a price. Although these were said to be aimed at North Korea, China expressed its opposition to the installation of the powerful radar system that accompanied them, and felt that they degraded the PLA rocket forces’ ability to carry out a second nuclear strike in a war against the US. This deployment led China to apply unofficial sanctions against South Korea: Chinese tour groups to South Korea were banned, sales at the Lotte department stores were cut by 95 per cent and the combined sales of Hyundai and Kia were halved, to name a few. South Korean President Moon Jae-in faced strong pressure from the business society, and felt obliged to strike a deal with China concerning certain military constraints. On October 31, 2017 President Moon agreed to “three no’s”, that Seoul agrees there will be no further anti-ballistic missile systems in Korea, no participation in a region-wide US missile defense system, and no military alliance involving Korea, the US and Japan. This is an enormous sacrifice but for reasons, both economic and political, Moon had few other options.

China’s linking of economics to political and national security has its precedents, for instance in the case of the Philippines and territorial issues in the South China Sea. The tactic has also been used against Japan in 2010 when China warned tourists not to travel to Japan at a time when a number of incidents had occurred in the vicinity of the Senkaku islands.

Kim Jong-un’s New Year speech 2018 did contain a number of positive remarks, the first being that he would not make use of his nuclear weapons if North Korea’s security were not threatened. The most diplomatically significant remark concerned inter-Korean relations. Here Kim appeared open to the prospect of sending a North Korean delegation to the up-coming Winter Olympics hosted by South Korea at Pyeongchang in February 2018. South Korean President Moon immediately extended a personal invitation and stated that

this would provide a very good opportunity to advance inter-Korean peace and reconciliation. The hotline between North Korean and South Korea has once again been opened up and Kim Jong-un has stated that he is open to a dialogue to ease tensions along the border.

President Moon has requested that the United States consider delaying the start of the annual springtime Foal Eagle/Key Resolve exercises until after the conclusion of Paralympics in March. Recently it was also announced that the exercise will be postponed in spite of the Trump administration's so-called maximum pressure campaign against North Korea.

### **Long and Short-Term Options Open to Japan**

It seems quite clear that the severe sanctions policy Japan is promoting is not going to make Kim Jong-un give up his policy on nuclear weapons (leaving aside whether North Korea already has such weapons or will soon have them). Economic sanctions are more likely to lead to malnutrition among children and starvation in the countryside than having any effect on Kim Jong-un and the people around him. A popular uprising and overthrow of the present regime seems highly unlikely. On the contrary Kim Jung-un seems to have consolidated his power. The sanctions are already of a sort that leave very little else in the tool box. There is at present very little trade with North Korea and listing a few more people for sanctions will not have that big of an impact.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that Japan and the rest of the international community should give up the sanctions policy without obtaining positive reassurances of one type or another from North Korea regarding the nuclear issue — To imagine that Kim Jong-un would give up his nuclear weapons is unrealistic. The options open to Japan and the international community at this stage is rather to prevent further development of nuclear weapons and to promote a de-escalation of tension. This should be done through negotiations and keeping an open dialogue with North Korea, preferably on the multilateral level. What Japan can contribute with in this field is unclear. It may have to give up the abduction issue, or if this is impossible for domestic political reasons, at least tone it down considerably. What North Korea is looking for in the first place is negotiations and security assurances from the US and here Japan can at present only play a subsidiary role. The Pyongyang declaration of 2002 was an independent Japanese initiative to establish relations with North Korea but it failed, and it is now very difficult to get back to something similar and for that matter, for Japan at present to act at all without the consent of the US government.

Some analysts claim that once North Korea believe that their nuclear force is in effect

operational or at least strong enough to have a deterrent effect, Kim Jong-un may turn to focus on the other part of his so called *byungjin* line, promising simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development. The creation of a market system in North Korea (or what Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland call a “marketization from below”, i.e., a spontaneous development of market activities not driven by the government but by private initiatives) seems to be thriving despite the sanctions imposed. The regime has various strategies to get around these, and it is not only following Chinese policy models but also progressing simply by allowing private actors to make money.

Development assistance for the market economy in North Korea, or “economic cooperation” as it was called in the Pyongyang declaration, is an area in which Japan would be well suited to play a significant role. Such assistance is what Japan has provided to other countries in Asia. It is also an area in which North Korea may be inclined to welcome Japanese initiatives. Such initiatives will however not lead to the prevention of further developments in the area of nuclear weapons and would seem to be premature at the moment.

South Korea’s debacle with China concerning the THAAD deployments should serve as a lesson to Japan regarding how politics are likely to play out in Asia in the future, that is, with a strong connection between economics, politics and security. One option in becoming less vulnerable is to globalize the economy even further and to seek cooperation (including investments and trade) with other like-minded countries.

The development of nuclear weapons in North Korea also raises some doubts about the long term sustainability of the US-Japan security alliance. Can the US really protect Japan? Or should Japan work on further developing its own defensive capacity and cooperate more with like-minded countries on a multilateral basis?

In Japan’s Basic Policy of National Defense adopted in 1957 four principles are outlined.

1. To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.
2. To promote the public welfare and enhance the people’s love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan’s security.
3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation’s resources and prevailing domestic situation.
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of Japan-US security arrangements, pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.

More effective functioning of the United Nations in deterring and repelling aggression does not seem plausible at the moment but there other multilateral options ought urgently to be explored.

## 6. Japan's Response and its Alliance Partner

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### Introduction

The Cold War has also been described as the “long peace.” This expression may apply to Europe, but certainly not to Asia. Indeed, while the Cold War may have ended a quarter century ago in Europe, many of the features of it continue to exist in Asia, especially with the division of the Korean Peninsula, Russia's continued occupation of the Northern Territories, and the pressure Taiwan faces from China.

Tensions also exist in some of the other territorial disputes, especially those in Northeast Asia, such as Takeshima and the Senkakus. One of the common threads is that Japan is one of the key actors in these disputes — between it and Russia, it and South Korea, and it and China and Taiwan. Another one is that Japan's alliance partner, the United States, was and remains intimately connected with how the territorial problems emerged due to its authorship of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty after World War II, its inconsistencies in policy (what I call its “policy of neutrality”) in the later two disputes, and failure to play a pro-active role, is in part to blame for the state of affairs

International attention, however, is currently focused on the North Korean missile and nuclear development program. This is indeed serious for a lot of reasons, including its ability to directly threaten the United States mainland (not to mention, previously its territories and allies). Japan, in particular, is showing its concern by its harder line diplomatic stance, its more productive domestic political discussions on security legislation and constitutional revision, and its increased defense budget and scope of acquisitions.

However, I would argue that China represents the greater threat to Japan, and to the United States. In the case of the former, China's ultimate goal is to seize Japanese territory in the Nansei Islands, including but not limited to the Senkakus, neutralize Okinawa, and subjugate Japan. Hopefully none of us here will be alive to see that, and ideally it won't happen at all, but the reality is that is the course in which China is promoting. In the case of the United States, China seeks to replace the United States as the regional hegemon or leader, if not the world, and is well on its way to do it. We are, in the words of political theorist Hayashi Hideomi and others, in a new 500-year cycle to be led, for better or worse, by China. I happen to think for the worse.

This paper will briefly explore these and other concerns.

## **The North Korea Issue**

Twenty-five years ago, when concerns about NK's nuclear program first began to flare, an imminent contingency on the Korean peninsula almost divided the US-Japan alliance. Today, and in the interim years, it is bringing Japan and the United States together.

I write that it almost divided the two because it highlighted how far apart the two countries were on the question of the use of force and the results of that use. Specifically, in the wake of the peak of US-Japan bilateral trade friction in the 1980s and early 1990s and the ongoing trade negotiations at the time, the perspective (and not-incorrect) view of Japan as unprepared and unwilling to assume the costs of a bloody war next to Japan but which would help to protect Japan caused many U.S. officials and politicians to become highly upset. This issue, more than most, symbolized the trade/security, economy/defense interconnectedness of the US-Japan relationship, and Japan's dependence on the "goodwill" of the United States. It also highlighted the need for Japan to play a larger role through greater burden sharing and the need for a clarification of the roles and missions of the two countries' militaries vis-à-vis their common defense. The result was the 1997 New Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, greatly updating the 1978 Guidelines<sup>1</sup>. (Similarly, increased bilateral concerns about China's maritime activities, particularly near the Senkakus, necessitated a revising of the 1997 Guidelines leading to their 2015 revision).

North Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens in previous decades and failure to return almost all of them, its incursions into Japanese waters and on its territory with spy ships and potential saboteurs, including most recently the dozens of fishing boats that approached Japanese shores in November and December, its illegal fishing in Japanese waters, and of course its launching of missiles over and near Japan have greatly helped to strengthen Japanese concerns about the country and hardened its stance vis-à-vis the North. In fact, last year's most "popular" word in Japan was "北," read as *kita*, which means north for North Korea.

As a result, Japan, under the Abe Shinzō administration, which began (again) in December 2012, has increased the defense budget to accommodate new technologies to defend against a North Korean missile attack, including the decision to purchase two Aegis

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<sup>1</sup> For a new book on the period leading up to the 1978 Guidelines, see Sase Masamori (translated by Robert D. Eldridge), *Changing Security Policies in Postwar Japan: The Political Biography of Japanese Defense Minister Sakata Michita* (Lexington, 2017).



Ashore batteries which it had discussed with U.S. President Trump during his recent visit. Japan's Ministry of Defense is also considering the acquisition of six Terminal High Altitude Area Defense batteries. In response to the "severe national security situation," Japan is also planning to mount the Joint Strike Missile on the F-35A stealth fighter as "'stand-off' missiles that can be fired beyond the range of enemy threats," according to Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori. The second-time defense minister also said the ministry was going to study arming its F-15Js with the U.S.-manufactured Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile Extended-Range<sup>2</sup>.

However, living in Japan as I do, I could not help but be worried about a few things, two of which I will share here. The first concerned the results of a recent poll (conducted in late November and early December 2017 and released in early January 2018 by the national broadcasting company, NHK) in which people from the United States and Japan saw the North Korea situation. Fortunately, there was a high degree of convergence, but unfortunately, not enough for entirely united action.

Regarding North Korea threat perceptions, it is nearly identical, 50 percent of Americans think NK is a major threat, and 33 percent think it as somewhat of a threat. 11 percent do not think it really a threat, and 5 percent not at all. For Japanese, 48 percent view NK as a serious threat, 33 percent as somewhat, 9 not really, and 3 not at all. Yes, these extremely close figures, with one explanation being for the rise in American opinion having to do with the likely ability of NK's missiles, armed with a nuclear warhead (or WMD), to reach population centers on CONUS including the nation's capital of Washington, D.C. (Another reason is Trump's Twitter-savvy rhetoric — his regular references to NK and "Rocket Man," which has certainly raised interest in the issue among a population that otherwise could not locate NK on a map.)

Where it differs is regarding NK policy: 18 percent of Americans want military ACTION, 17 percent want military PRESSURE, 24 percent want economic pressure, and 36 call for dialogue. In Japan, the largest figure is for economic pressure (35 percent), followed by dialogue (31 percent). Military pressure is *similar* to U.S. opinion, at 15 percent, but military action is *just* 8 percent.

In recent days, there has been a flurry of diplomatic activity between North Korea and South Korea regarding the restoration of talks and North Korea's participation in the Winter Olympics to be held in Pyeongchang, South Korea, which President Trump and the White House have commented on. Many see North Korea's outreach as a way to divide

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<sup>2</sup> Franz-Stefan Gady, "Japan's Defense Ministry Confirms Plans to Buy Long-Range Stand-off Missiles," *The Diplomat*, December 11, 2017.

South Korea and the United States, an approach that has been used multiple times in the past. The Japanese government similarly — and correctly — expressed concern about the possible weakening of military and economic sanctions on NK, but it is unclear how Japan views a reference to Trump having a direct phone call with DPRK leader Kim Jong-un. While this might be welcomed by some in South Korea, it will be opposed by others. The same can be said of those in Japan. Furthermore, relations between Japan and South Korea remain far from good, and these relations and cooperation on the North Korean issue are only made more difficult, as Professor Michishita noted in his keynote address, by the existence of the Takeshima Dispute, in which South Korea has occupied by force internationally recognized Japanese territory since 1954.

Another thing that is not clear from this poll or others is what sort of future Japan and the United States wish to see for the Korean Peninsula. I wonder if those in favor of war realize that the postwar — or post-conflict — situation, may be even more challenging and will likely lead to a worsening of the situation for Japan and the United States. Namely, China will come to dominate whatever remains of the North if not the entire Korean Peninsula. In other words, as has happened throughout history, the biggest winner in a war will be the non-participant, in this case China.

My second concern is related to this point. Namely, no serious study has been conducted by Japan on a conflict or crisis on the Korean Peninsula. What is worse, the Japanese government and its Self-Defense Forces currently would not have a serious role on the peninsula due in part to self-imposed restrictions as well as to the poor relationship it has with South Korea (which is largely the latter's fault, in my opinion). In other words, the administration in South Korea, which refuses to even acknowledge the possibility of a contingency situation arising, would likely refuse Japanese participation even if it goes against its best interests. Similarly, China will not welcome and may seek to prevent a Japanese role on the Korean peninsula, and poor relations between the two (which have admittedly improved — or, better said, not worsened significantly — over the past half year), particularly over the Senkaku Islands dispute, further limit any role Japan may have.

Of course there are things that Japan can and must do. There are approximately 60,000 Japanese citizens said to be living in the South who would likely need to get evacuated. This number does not include the thousands of Japanese tourists or businessmen visiting Korea on any given day. It also does not include the citizens of other countries who would look to Japan, as the closest developed, responsible, and safe country, to help evacuate them. There are more than two million foreigners living in the South now. Furthermore, there will be South Koreans who will want or need to evacuate, and Japan will be, from a humanitarian perspective, obligated to provide assistance although it will be logistically challenging to do so. Moreover, many of them have family members living in Japan, as do

North Koreans. Japan may find itself morally or legally obligated to accommodate them. Still more are dual citizens of the United States, and Japan will be politically obligated to assist its ally by evacuating its citizens as the latter conducts the military operations. What's more, there are many other Americans living in South Korea, many of whom are affiliated with the U.S. military as dependents and contractors, and thus Japan may be expected to help shuttle them back and forth perhaps from Busan or Cheju, if not provide temporary housing and care for them in Japan. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations is complex beyond description.

This complex situation, nevertheless, would be considered relatively "orderly." It does not even begin to address what would happen if refugees, some ill and with diseases, or others armed and dangerous, begin flowing to Japan on boats and rafts, etc., or worse, if combat is on going in the area.

For this and other reasons (such as the assumption that the GOJ and SDF will not be able to be fully or directly involved), I recently proposed an international conference which will be held later this year in Tokyo on a Korean contingency and the role of the private sector, including NGOs and NPOs, through which the Japanese government will likely have to work. Japan has a robust civil society and strong links throughout the region, which will pay off were a humanitarian crisis befell North Korea following a war, implosion, coup d'état, assassination, or other event.

Hopefully, however, this scenario will never come to realization and the situation will resolve itself peacefully.

## **Territorial Disputes and the Future of the Region**

Unfortunately, as alluded to above, the territorial disputes it has in the region will make it hard for bilateral relations to improve dramatically between Japan and its neighbors.

South Korea's claims to the Takeshima Islands are weak at best (and were not recognized at the time of the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty), but its forceful actions to arrest Japanese fishermen beginning in 1952, seize the islands and subsequent stationing of well-armed Coast Guard personnel on the island since 1954, its presidential visits to the islands, and its conducting of military drills in the area have, of course, strengthened its tactical position but have simultaneously worked to undermine its diplomatic legitimacy. The fact that Korea has not agreed to numerous requests by Japan (in 1954, 1962, and 2012) to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice is further evidence of South Korea's tenuous claims.

The same is true for China and the Senkaku Islands, whose claims are non-existent. The fact that it has, on numerous occasions in the past admitted and recognized Japan's sovereignty and administration over the islands makes it even more preposterous that it would seek to pursue its claims in recent decades were it not for strategic and economic reasons, not to mention playing the two-sided card of irredentism and nationalism to bolster the Communist Party's domestic legitimacy.

What has made these two disputes worse is the neutrality policy of the United States, who is an ally to both South Korea and to Taiwan, which has also claimed the Senkakus. Had the U.S. government been more forthright in the early 1950s with regard to Takeshima, and in the early 1970s with regard to the Senkakus, we would not be in the situation today. I blame my own government for its inconsistent policies with regard to these two disputes, when the declassified documents show that the U.S. government has in both cases recognized Japanese sovereignty over the islands.

I support Japan's diplomatic efforts in the case of Takeshima, particularly its request to bring the issue before the International Court of Justice on three occasions. However, in the case of the Senkakus, I do not feel Japan is doing enough, and should learn the lessons of Takeshima by placing a presence, before China does, on the islands Japan has administrative rights, which were internationally sanctioned in a treaty, over. And yet it hesitates, hoping that China will come around. This "policy of hope" (as I have called it) clearly has not worked over the past four decades. As we all know, hope is not a plan, and while Japan has an approach ("don't offend China"), it has in fact been without a policy on the Senkakus for decades.

Japan immediately needs to demonstrate its administrative control over the islands by stationing personnel (perhaps officials from the meteorological agency, fisheries or land and transportation ministry, or even the police or Self-Defense Force), and building a port (for fishing or other vessels in distress, a heliport (to fly anyone in need of medical care), a weather station, and a lighthouse<sup>3</sup>. These are all international public goods, on Japanese territory. I call this a policy of "administrative deterrence." Japan has a national, and international, obligation to help stand up to Chinese provocation, intimidation, and aggression. The situation in the South China Seas should be ample evidence of what China's behavior will be like as it turns its attention more fully to the East China Sea. The U.S. government has a moral obligation to publicly support Japan in this, which might begin to make up for America's decades of inept policies.

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<sup>3</sup> These recommendations are explained in detail in my paper "East Asia, Territorial Issues and Regional Security Developments: The View from Japan's Alliance Partner, With a Focus on the Senkaku Islands Dispute," in *Restless Rivals: Trump, China and the Implications for Japan and East Asia* (RIPS Perspective No. 25, May 2017), 22-50.

If Japan (and the United States) do not do this, and continue to leave a vacuum, administratively, politically, or militarily, it only means war, and that will be more costly for all than anything undertaken today. Moreover, both countries, too, should strengthen their ties with fellow democracy, Taiwan, and do so quickly for the sake of all three and the region as a whole<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> For a related commentary, see Robert D. Eldridge, "A U.S.-Japan-Taiwan Grand Bargain for Senkakus," *Japan Times*, June 10, 2016.

# 日本語要旨

## 1. Rising Tensions in East Asia and the Japanese Response

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### 北朝鮮

北朝鮮は昨年9月29日にICBMの発射実験を行ったが、同月第6回目の核実験を実施した。北が核・ミサイルを開発する目的は4つあると考える。米国の核による予防攻撃を抑止すること、日米が戦時において韓国を支援しにくくすること、北が限定的に武力の使用ができる状況を創ること、そして瀬戸際外交を再び可能にすること、である。

北朝鮮は1994年、米国との協定で8年間核施設の活動を停止した。さらに2007年の協定で61-7年間の活動を停止した。その見返りとして、北は核関連で25億ドル、ミサイル関連で4億3千万ドルの援助を受け取った。次回ICBM開発中止に際しては、さらに多額の支援を要求するであろう。

日本は北の核に対して海上にSM-3ミサイルと陸上にPAC-3を配備し、そのために米国に180億ドルを支払った。また民間防衛としてEM-NETやJ-Alertを導入した。しかし日本は北の集中攻撃には対処できない。また日本のレーダーは水平線を越えるところは把握できないので、韓国との協力が必要になり、日米韓の協力は重要である。したがって北の脅威に対しては韓国を防衛することが重要になる。

竹島をめぐる日韓の対立は不幸である。昨年11月のトランプ大統領の訪韓の際、文在寅大統領は「独島」(竹島)産のエビを振る舞ったが、これはいかにも非礼であったばかりか、日韓協力を困難にさせている。この問題は国際司法裁判所を通して決着をつけるのが最善であるが、韓国は拒否している。

### 中国

最も深刻な中国の脅威に対しては、中国の台頭が平和的、協力的となるような環境を創ること、そして戦略的には、勢力均衡を保持しながら危機抑止メカニズムを創ることである。

この目的を達成するために、政府は3つの防衛政策改革を進めている。第一に、防衛力の強化、とくに防衛費の大幅な増額をすることなく政策の効率の向上をめざすことである。第二に、米国との安全保障関係強化である。この関連で日本は琉球列島の防衛に注目している。米国の防衛費は中国のそれよりも大きい。過去10年間では米国は4.8%の削減、日本は2.5%の増加、そして中国は118%の増額である。日米は中国と軍事費で競争することは困難になりそうだ。

第三に、日本は地域内の他国との安全保障協力を推進して、地域に幅広いネットワークを作りつつある。韓国、オーストラリア、東南アジア諸国、インドなどの戦略的パートナーが必要である。冷戦時代と異なり、インド、韓国、オーストラリアなどが防衛費を伸ばし、軍事力を強化している。日本は

集団的自衛権の行使が可能になっているので、パトロール、監視、情報収集に参加できる。そうすれば中国の一方的行動を牽制することができる。

日中間の領土問題は未解決のままである。領土の帰属が日本にあるのは明白である。米軍は1940年代から1978年まで尖閣諸島の2つに島を使用したし、今日でも使用する権利を持っている。中国の領有権主張は1971年以降である。この解決は容易ではないが、日本は中国に不当な要求を取り下げるべく、法の支配による解決を主張し続けるべきである。

幸い、昨年日中間で海上および空中の事故を防止するホットラインに関する原則的合意ができた。また日本は条件付きであるが、中国の一帶一路構想を支持する姿勢をとった。さらに昨年行われた、中国の6つの主要都市に住む中国人成人の意識調査によれば、最も訪れたい外国は日本であった。両国間の協力関係の増進を期待したい。

## 2. Security Challenges in East Asia

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### 北朝鮮の脅威と米国の国家安全保障戦略

米国および東アジア諸国にとって最も差し迫った安全保障上の挑戦は、北朝鮮の核と長距離ミサイルの脅威、およびこの脅威に対する米国の(過剰)反応である。トランプ政権から見れば、問題の源は平壤および成果を挙げてこなかったこれまでの米政権にある。このことでトランプ政権の、北に対する「最大限の圧力」政策となったのであるが、これはじつはオバマ大統領の「戦略的忍耐」アプローチと類似している。

去る 11 月にトランプ大統領が初めてのアジア訪問を行ったが、訪問先では一貫して北朝鮮を最優先して取り上げた。アジア訪問の目的は北の核に反対して世界を団結させることにあったとすれば、成功したようである。金正恩は核およびミサイルの実験が一巡したからか、新年のメッセージで韓国に融和姿勢を贈った。オリンピックでの開会式で南北合同チームが行進するとしても、政治的難関を突破することにはならないであろう。北が望むのは制裁の解除であるが、文大統領は同意しないだろう。

トランプ政権が発表した最初の国家安全保障戦略は、北朝鮮を越えてより広い見地から米国への挑戦を述べている。同文書は3種類の脅威について述べた。第一のカテゴリは、北朝鮮およびイランのような、周辺国に恐怖を及ぼす地域独裁者、第二はジハード集団のような越境犯罪集団、第三は中露のような修正主義国であるとした。トランプはこの脅威について述べながら、中露との友好を説くなど混乱があるが、私はトランプよりもこの文書に同意する。

文書は、ロシアは米国のヨーロッパへの防衛公約を破壊しようとしているとしており、またロシアは秘密情報作戦と政府資金を得るメディアの偽情報によって、米国などの世論に影響を与え、民主主義国を攻撃しているとしている。中国の脅威については言うまでもないことであるが、トランプと習近平との友好は終わりに近づいている。日本は安心してよい。しかし、これに代わるものは米中貿易戦争であり、日欧はじめ世界一般に否定的インパクトを与える。

中国は南シナ海、東シナ海、および台湾に対して攻勢的態度をとっており、新年には米中関係が緊張するのは避けられない。このため日米関係は強化されるかもしれないが、大西洋関係にとっては難しい。米中首脳は将来の国際秩序に関して対面してきたが、これは地域安定を構築してきた安倍首相にとっては不公平である。安倍首相は TPP を救ったし、英国も TPP に加盟することを検討しているのだから。また安倍首相の下で、日本と EU は世界生産の 3 割を占める両経済間の貿易協定を締結した。安倍首相は「自由で法の支配に基づく経済圏は 21 世紀の経済秩序のモデルになる」と言っている。

同時に安倍首相はトランプとの良好な関係を築いたが、トランプは対米貿易黒字国に対しては厳しく当たるつもりであるから、慎重なかじ取りが必要になる。



## どの国が本当の脅威か

先述の戦略文書で述べる脅威に関しては同意できるとしても、どれが最も差し迫った、大きな脅威かを決めるのは難しい。ロシアの脅威は「存亡に関わるもの(existential threat)」と言うかもしれないが、ロシアの意図から見れば、ロシアが全面核戦争をする可能性は低い。意図から見れば、ISIS は差し迫った最大の脅威であるが、しかし存亡に関わる脅威ではない。意図と能力という点では、北朝鮮が最上位に来る。そしてこれに対処するためには、中露との協力が必要になる。

しかしトランプのように、中国が最大の脅威というのであれば、米国は北朝鮮の核と共生することを学ばなければならない。また中国が問題であるというのなら、ロシアをどう位置付けるのか。中露はお互いに「戦略的パートナー」であるというものの、いずれも心底では米国との関係が重要であると考えている。キッシンジャーがかつて中国カードでソ連を牽制したように、トランプとティラーソンはロシア・カードを使って中国の長期的脅威に対処するかもしれない。

米国の対ロシア政策は失敗であった。その原因の一つは、プーチンが敵性国としての米国を必要としていたからである。米国がロシアのクリミア併合を既成事実として受け入れ、ロシアとのデタントを進めれば、ロシアは拡張主義に向かうかもしれない。

### 3. Return of Great Power Politics and Future of Regional Order in East Asia

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#### パワーポリティクスの復帰

冷戦の終結とともに、大国間のパワーポリティクス(権力政治)は終わったと思われた。そして伝統的な大国間の競合は相互依存とグローバリゼーションの論理に基づく大国間協力に次第に代替されるだろうと考えられ、ソ連の崩壊と自由民主主義国家群の優勢で、米国中心の世界が続くとの幻想が生まれた。

しかし、新興国の出現や現状維持国、修正主義国との競合が著しくなり、伝統的な意味でのパワーポリティクスの復帰を見ることになった。2009年頃の中国による南シナ海および東シナ海での攻勢的進出が契機となっているが、同時に、日米を始め多くの国が世界第2の経済大国中国との協力を推進しようとしている。その最も明白な例は北朝鮮である。北の核・ミサイル計画を放棄させるには日米中の協力が必要であり、中国の大気汚染の解決にも日米の協力が必要である。

#### 中国の地戦略的挑戦

21世紀の初め以来、日米を始め国際社会は中国が現存の国際秩序を支持するように促してきた。国際社会の支配的見解も、中国への「関与」政策と「牽制」政策を同時に取るべきであるとするものである。にも拘わらず、中国は日米に対して著しく地戦略的挑戦となっている。また一帯一路構想やそれを支えるアジア・インフラ投資銀行の挑戦もそうである。中国が国際ルールに従い、自由で開放的な国際秩序を乱すものでなければ歓迎すべきであるが、実際には中国はますます自己主張を強めて、東シナ海や南シナ海で現状を武力で変更する動きに出ている。南シナ海における岩礁の人工島化および軍事基地化は深刻な問題で、すでに戦闘機や対空ミサイルが配備されている。そして中国はハーグの常設仲裁裁判所の裁定を「紙くずだ」として無視してしまっている。

中国による尖閣諸島に対する現状変更の挑発的な行動に直面しているのは日本である。尖閣諸島は歴史的に日本が支配していたもので、ピーク時には250人の日本人が居住していた。1953年1月8日付の人民日報が沖縄の人たちの米軍占領に反対している記事を書いた際、尖閣諸島を沖縄県の一部として扱っていた。こうした客観的な事実にも拘わらず、中国の公船が頻りに尖閣諸島の領海に侵入してきている。2010年9月に中国の漁船が海上保安庁の船に体当たりして起こした事件に続いた中国政府の高圧的反応は日中間に大きな緊張をもたらした。

#### 東アジアの秩序を固守する日米

日米は東アジアに現存する、自由で開かれた秩序を維持することに強い意志を示している。2017年2月の日米首脳会談での確認、6月のシャングリラ会議でのマティス国防長官の演説、10月のティラーソン国務長官のワシントンでの演説などはこの線に沿ったものであり、中国を牽制したものであった。日米は中国との協力を必要としているが、中国が自由で開かれた秩序に挑戦する限りは、真の友好国になれないであろう。

## 4. Security Challenges in East Asia: A European Perspective

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北朝鮮の弾道ミサイルの開発はヨーロッパにとって新しいタイプの脅威である。朝鮮半島の緊張の高まりは、中国の東シナ海、南シナ海における攻勢的姿勢と併せてヨーロッパの東アジアにおける経済的利害を危険にさらしている。ヨーロッパは中国の最大の貿易相手国、日本の3番目に大きい貿易相手国、韓国の4番目に大きい輸出国である。またASEAN諸国は、米中に次いでEUの3番目に大きい貿易相手国である。

### ヨーロッパと北朝鮮

EUは東アジアの安全保障に対する役割は果たしていないが、北朝鮮に対する制裁強化には参加している。EUはまた地域協力、多国間主義、信頼構築の点での外交的イニシアティブを標榜している。この点ではトランプ政権と異にしている。厳格な対北制裁によって、北が交渉のテーブルに着く可能性はあり、そうなれば過去20年の経験からヨーロッパが調停役を果たす機会もありそうである。

ヨーロッパはこれまで直接的脅威を受けることはなかったが、対立が突然エスカレートすれば、国家安全保障および経済の面での利益が危険にさらされることになる。その場合のシナリオとして、北朝鮮が直接侵略をする可能性は否定できないし、また米国領への直接攻撃があれば、米国はNATO条約第5条により、ヨーロッパ加盟国の支援を求めるだろう。しかし北東アジアで戦闘が起これば、経済的被害は避けられない。これが最も大きな、現実的なシナリオである。

EUの対応は、伝統的には制裁と対話であるが、2016年以降北朝鮮の挑発が激化したため制裁を採用している。2017年末EUは新たな独自制裁を追加した。さらにEUは北朝鮮人に対する労働許可の更新中止、違法な核・ミサイル物資取扱者の資産凍結および旅行制限を決めた。またイタリアとスペインは北朝鮮大使を追放した。

EUは将来、6カ国協議にならった形式でイランの核交渉をした経験およびKEDOやEURATOMの経験を提供できると考えている。ただEU内では、北朝鮮に対するEUの関与を拒否するフランスや、非公式接触を続けるスウェーデンのように見解が割れている。さらに日韓に加えて、中国がEUとの政治協議に加わって来た。2017年4月の中EU戦略対話は半島の平和的解決を支持する声明を出したが、トランプの好戦的姿勢を解決への妨げだとした。他方中国の南シナ海での行動を考えると、中国も問題国である。

### ヨーロッパと中国

東アジアにおける中国の攻勢的姿勢は尖閣諸島と南シナ海に対してである。中国と日本は目下東シナ海で海洋と空域における不慮の衝突を避ける協定の潔を協議中で、両国の平和友好条約締結の40周年に当たる2018年に締結するかもしれない。日中韓3か国の間には歴史問題や領土

問題でぎくしゃくしている。

EUは2018年の日中韓首脳会議を歓迎する。EUは恐らく三か国の定例サミットの最も強い支持者だろう。米国の政権はこれまで日中韓サミットには冷ややかであった。トランプ政権はとくに多国間協議に冷たく、日本や韓国との二国間協議に関心を持っている。EUは北東アジアの軍事同盟に拘束されることなく、日中韓三国協力事務局が主催しているYoung Ambassadors Programの参加者をヨーロッパに招いてワークショップを開催した。

南シナ海における中国の攻勢的姿勢は、2012年の習近平の登場以降厳しくなった。習近平のいう「中国の夢」の実現に向かっている。ハーグの常設仲裁裁判所の裁定にも拘らず、中国は岩礁の人工島化を進めている。その後、中国はASEANとの行動規範に関する協議を始めることに同意したが、期限は設定されていない。

EU外務安全保障担当上級代表のフェデリカ・モゲリーニが当事国が国際法に従って解決すべきことを謳った宣言を発出したことに対して、中国は驚き、中国の相当の投資を得ている国に圧力を加えた。その結果宣言文は厳しさを薄めた内容になった。その反面、アジア太平洋地域に軍事投影響力をもつ唯一の国であるフランスは、南シナ海での航行の自由を維持することでヨーロッパ・パトロール部隊を率いることに関心を表明し、その後英国、イタリア、スペイン、オランダなどの海洋国が検討に加わっている。

EUの東アジアの安全保障への関心が高まり、2017年のEU日本間の経済パートナーシップ協定に続いて、戦略パートナーシップ協定により政治・安全保障協力も進めるべきとの機運が強まっている。

## 5. Japan's Response to Rising Tension in East Asia: What are the Long and Short-Term Options?

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### 東アジアの高まる緊張

東アジアは、日中韓を中心に ASEAN 諸国も加えて経済成長の点で画期的な地域になった。同時に同地域は域内の相互不信が助長し、もっとも軍事化の進んだ地域の一つになった。さらにエネルギー資源をめぐる競争に加えて非伝統的な環境、気候問題を生んでいる。また地域安全保障問題に対して複雑なアプローチが生じている。この中で、地域の緊張を高めている根本的な問題はもちろん中国の台頭である。

習近平は第 19 回党大会の演説でいまや中国は強国になる時であり、舞台の中央にあって人類に貢献する時代であると宣言した。これは中国人には励みとなる言辞であったが、日米の国民にはそうではなかった。日本は中国が尖閣諸島問題で自己主張を強めていること、南シナ海で自国の立場を強化していることに懸念を抱いている。

もう一つの安全保障問題は北朝鮮の核・ミサイルの進展である。北朝鮮のミサイルは日本の上空を何回か飛び越えたこともあり、日本は強硬な対北政策を採っている。トランプ大統領は米国による揺るぎのない日本の防衛を確約したが、金正恩は核を放棄することはないと言明している。こうした展開は日本にとって深刻な意味をもち、地域の安定に関しての基本的想定に疑問を投げかけている。

日朝関係は、KEDO の失敗、日本の上空を越すミサイル発射、秘密裏の核開発の露呈、拉致問題、今日の核保有などで悪化したままである。

トランプ大統領下では新たに起きていることは、言葉の濫用と北朝鮮に対する柔軟性を欠く、非妥協的な態度である。金正恩の新年の演説は多くの肯定的な点に触れた。なかでも平昌オリンピックへの参加に触れたことであった。文大統領はこれに飛びつき、南北のホットラインが再開された。しかし北朝鮮のオリンピック参加は当然視することはできない。北は参加条件としてオリンピック開催中の米韓軍事演習の延期を要求したからだ。

### 日本にとっての短期的、長期的オプション

日本が採っている厳しい対北制裁措置が金正恩の核政策を放棄させることにはならないことは明白のようである。経済制裁は子供たちの栄養失調と地方住民の飢餓を生むだろう。住民の反乱や現政権の転覆はありそうにない。逆に金正恩は自己の権力を集中している。だからといって、日本や国際社会が制裁を放棄すべきだということではない。今の段階での日本や国際社会にとってのオプションは核兵器のこれ以上の開発を阻止し、緊張の緩和を図ることである。これは多角的なレベルでの交渉と開かれた対話によるべきである。日本がここで何ができるかは分からないが、拉致問題を放棄するか、それが難しければトーンを下げることである。2002 年の平壤宣言が失敗した

ことを考えれば、その線で再度進めることは無理である。

北朝鮮が核の抑止力を達成したならば、その後は核兵器と経済開発を同時に追求するとする分析がある。すでに制裁下でも市場が出来つつあると言われる。市場経済のための開発援助(日朝平壤宣言では「経済協力」といわれた)は日本が意義ある役割を果たすのに向いた分野である。

北朝鮮の核開発は日米同盟体制の長期的持続に関しても疑問を投げかけている。米国は本当に日本を守ることができるのか。それとも日本は自らの防衛力を開発して多国間ベースで友好国との一層の協力をすべきなのか。

日本は 1957 年の「国防の基本方針」の中で、4 つの方針を掲げたが、4 番目には、「外部からの侵略に対しては、将来国連が有効にそれを阻止する機能を果たし得るに至るまでは、米国との安保体制を基調とする」となっている。しかし国連が外部からの侵略を阻止し、反撃する上での効果的機能を持つとは思えない。多国間(協力)のオプションが迫及されるべきである。

## 6. Japan's Response and its Alliance Partner

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冷戦は四半世紀前に終結したが、アジアでは冷戦の表立った様相は続いている。朝鮮半島の分断、ロシアの北方領土占領、中国の圧力下の台湾などがそうで、それ以外にも竹島、尖閣諸島などの領土問題がある。そして当面は、北朝鮮の核・ミサイルの脅威がある。

ただ私自身は、北朝鮮よりも長期的に見て、中国が日本や米国に与える脅威が深刻であると見ている。中国の長期目標は、尖閣諸島だけでなく南西諸島を日本から奪い、沖縄を中立化し、米国に代わって地域覇権を達成することにあると考えている。

### 北朝鮮問題

北朝鮮が核開発を始めた25年前は、朝鮮半島の不測の事態をめぐって日米の対応が違ったので、日米同盟は分解しそうであった。1980年代と90年代初めは日米貿易摩擦が厳しい時で、日本は朝鮮半島で戦争があってもそのコストを分担する準備ができていなかった。しかしその後の展開で両国は結びつきを強めることになった。

北朝鮮による日本人の拉致と送還拒否、昨年11、12月の漁船による日本の領海内での違法漁業、そして日本上空を越えるミサイルの発射などは、日本人の対北姿勢を硬化させた。

日本は防衛費の増額、最新武器の購入を進めてきた。しかし日本に住んでいる私にとって、懸念されることがいくつかある。第一に、NHKが行った日米の意識調査の結果である。日米いずれも北朝鮮の脅威に対する見方には相違はないが、対北政策に関しては相違がある。米国人の18%は対北軍事行動を支持するが、日本人は8%しか支持していない。

平昌オリンピックを前にして、北が韓国に対して融和姿勢をとり始めたが、多くはこれが北による米韓間の分断策ではないかと懸念している。日本政府はこれが対北軍事政策および経済制裁を弱めることに懸念を表明した。しかしトランプが金正恩に直通電話をすることに対しては、日本は明確な態度を示していない。加えるに、日韓は良好な関係にない。またこの意識調査からははっきりしないが、日米は将来をどのように考えているかという点も懸念される。戦争を望む人たちは、戦後の状況がもっと困難になるかもしれないことを認識しているのかどうかである。戦争に関わらない中国が有利に立つであろう。

第二に、日本では朝鮮半島の危機の対応策が真剣に研究されていない点である。これには日本の役割を拒否する韓国側の責任が大きい。また尖閣諸島問題で対立する中国も日本の役割を阻害するかもしれない。日本ができることは、韓国居住の日本人、日本人訪問者、日本に避難を希望する外国人、二重国籍の米国市民、米軍の家族、米軍属、請負業者など200万人以上の外国人の救出を行うことである。おそらく船や航空機が釜山や済州島と日本の間を往復して救出し、仮住宅とまではいかないにしても面倒をみる必要がある。非戦闘員救出作戦(NEO)は極めて複雑である。しかし戦闘継続中に武装難民を含む難民が船で日本に押し寄せてきた場合は、それよりもはるかに複雑である。

こうしたことから、私は今年東京でそうした朝鮮半島の不測事態と民間機関の役割を話し合う国際会議の開催を提案している。

## 領土紛争と地域の将来

領土紛争は残念ながら日本と近隣諸国の関係を難しくしている。竹島に対する韓国の主張の根拠はよく言っても薄弱である。これまで韓国がしてきたことは戦術的には立場を強化したが、外交的正当性の土台を崩している。日本側のICJに持ち込もうとの要請を韓国が同意して来なかったことが韓国の主張の弱さの証拠となっている。尖閣諸島についても同様のことが言える。中国の主張は根拠がない。中国は戦略的および経済的理由以外の理由で主張するのはばかげている。

この二つの紛争を悪化させたのは米国の中立政策である。機密扱いから外された資料は、米国政府が内部ではこれらの島が日本領であることと認めていたのである。私は日本が竹島に関してICJに持ち込む政策を支持するものであるが、尖閣諸島に関する政策は支持しない。中国が尖閣諸島を奪わないうちに日本が存在を固めるのでなければ、尖閣諸島は日本のものにならない。米国は日本を支持する道義的義務がある。また日米両国は地域のためにも台湾を含めた民主主義国の連携を強化すべきである。





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