INDIA’S POLICY ON TERRORISM SINCE 9/11

On 16 December 2002, RIPS had the fortunate opportunity to host a presentation given by Professor Kanti Bajpai, of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, on India's policy toward terrorism since the September 11 simultaneous attacks on the United States of America. The following article is a summation of his presentation.

Ever since the terrorist attacks on the United States of America, two major changes have affected India's policy toward terrorism. Firstly, the change in Pakistan's strategic position was profound. Given Pakistan's involvement with Afghanistan, and therefore al Qaeda, it would seem that after the September 11 attacks, for which al Qaeda is suspected to hold responsibility, Pakistan's position would be jeopardized. However, the dismantling of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan worked to President Musharraf's advantage, as they were increasingly becoming a liability for Pakistan. Certainly, after 9/11, Pakistan bounced into a new frontline status, therefore gaining respectability from the international community. This strengthened relationship between Pakistan and the United States created greater confidence for Musharraf. Albeit, Musharraf's new stance attracted some domestic criticism, but this should not be over estimated, and economic aid from the United States was rather less dramatic than one might have thought. Nonetheless, Pakistan had undoubtedly grown in strategic strength.

Secondly, the changes in tactics of different terrorist organizations had a considerable effect on India's terrorism policy. As a result of 9/11, terrorist groups grew more provocative than ever before, and with the US operations in Pakistan, bolder terrorist attacks took place in Kashmir. Terrorism was now aimed at the vulnerable (for example, attacks on temples and pilgrims) and high level targets (for instance, the attempted attack on the Indian Parliament in December). Also, attacks are now occurring outside of Kashmir and they have a distinctive communal flavor, such as assailments on sacred Hindu sights.

While a new Indian Policy had already been brewing, the above-mentioned changes served as a turning point towards a more proactive policy in reaction to the escalation of terrorist attacks. India threatened to aggregate the Indus River Water Treaty*, thereby barring Pakistan's access to the water resources of the river, threatened to take away Pakistan's Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, cut off communication and transport to Pakistan and expedited Pakistani delegates. Indeed, after the terrorist attacks in January and May 2002, India did in fact seriously consider going to war with Pakistan. India has followed President Bush's policy toward terrorism by way of denouncing any nations that harbor terrorists as responsible parties. Of course, this stance is directed primarily toward Pakistan, but also toward the international community as a whole. More recently, India has also spoken of ‘pre-empting’ terrorist attacks.

India even went so far as to threaten nuclear war. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States, a “mini nuclear revolution” in Indian thinking has evolved. India's nuclear calculations include the consideration that with Americans on the ground, there is no question that Pakistan will be willing to use Nuclear force. Moreover, Professor Bajpai contends that the United States will not tolerate a Muslim country using nuclear weapons. Plus the ‘nuclear taboo’ (in other words, larger powers will not tolerate smaller powers using nuclear weapons) also comes into effect. Evidently, the escalation and dominance argument, characteristic of Cold War strategic thinking, has been reopened.

In considering actions to take against Pakistan, the following options were considered:

Of all of these options, the latter was the most likely, however, the Government realized that neither of the options was appropriate. India thus began a game to frighten the international community into taking action against Pakistan. The subsequent travel advisories from Western powers came as a shock to India and signified that the international community would no longer stand for the fracas in that region. Consequently, India ceased barking at Pakistan over some episodes that came after the travel advisory. India's main consideration at this point in time was the looming elections (mandated by law) in Kashmir. If India was to expect Pakistan's cooperation as well as support and understanding from the international community, then military options (or even threatening war) was not a plausible option. Ultimately, the election allowed the Indian government to declare victory. Although the elections were not trouble free ? 800 lives were lost by way of terrorist acts and Indian policing operations.

Professor Bajpai also reported that during the period following the September 11 attacks, a miniature crisis in Indian-US relations occurred. Immediately after 9/11 India, in an unprecedented gesture, offered all facilities to the United States, although India never had any expectations that that the US would seriously accept. In response to the offer, the United States fell silent. Considering the nature of the situation, it would have been imprudent for the United States to have both Israel and India as two primary allies. The United States recovered from this glitch in relations by sending extremely high-level visitors to India, enhancing the level of intelligence, and lifting sanctions. However, since the summer, relations have become more problematic, in particular as a result of pro-Pakistan and Kashmir statements by Colin Powell as well as pressure on India from the United States to curtail the number of embassies opened in Afghanistan in light of Pakistani discontentment. In accord with the most recent souring of the relationship, India has been flirting with the idea of an India-China-Russian alliance or relationship to ensure Washington does not take India for granted.

Presently, India's weapons are largely Russian made but India is keen to import weapons from America, yet is also wary of unreliable and irregular supplies. India is also uncomfortable with a relationship with the department of defense due to domestic resistance. For the United States, arms sales to India would not only be good commercial business, but it would also allow the US to develop strategic links through military ties and defense sales.

According to Professor Bajpai, India has few options left. The Government is hoping that there will be progress on the Indian side of Kashmir, as there are no more cards left vis-a-vis Pakistan. Hopefully, the autonomy card plays out, leading to dialogue and Track II initiatives with Pakistan.

 

*Indus River Water Treaty - The treaty was signed in 1960 by India and Pakistan and assigns the water of the three eastern tributaries of the river to India and the water of three western tributaries to Pakistan.

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