Summary of the Report:
Strategic Implications for Japan of the Buildup of U.S. Bases in Guam September 2007

Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS)

  1. The planned relocation of approximately eight thousand U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam has great significance for the security of Japan. Therefore, it is not enough for the Japanese to discuss this issue merely as a matter of reducing the burden on local communities in Okinawa and determining the cost of the relocation that Japan will assume. Instead, Japan needs to explore thoroughly the relocation of the U.S. bases in relation to its future security (for more details, see section I of the full report).
  2. The relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam is part of both the buildup of U.S. bases in Guam and the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan (see section II).
  3. Because Japan will assume the considerable financial cost of the relocation, it should use this as an opportunity to enhance its own security. Moreover, Japan's support for the relocation will have an important role in America's overall plan to strengthen its bases in Guam. Accordingly, Japan should be actively involved in implementing the relocation with regard to its own interests. Whenever necessary, Japan should work with the United States to benefit from the military development of Guam in proportion to its financial support, considering the use of Guam's base facilities for its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) (see section II).
  4. The ongoing buildup of U.S. bases in Guam, including the relocation of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to Guam, could strengthen Japan's security in the following eight ways (see section III):
    1. The U.S. military's capability to intervene in the vast area from the Western Pacific to the Middle East will be enhanced.
    2. The relocated U.S. Marines will be positioned closer to Southeast Asia and the "Arc of Instability" than they currently are.
    3. Guam has the geographic advantage of being located close enough to the "hot spots" (places of potential instability) in Asia to be vital to any conceivable conflict, but far enough from mainland Asia to preclude attacks from other countries in the region.
    4. The bases in Guam will be useful to the United States and its allies in preparing for China's buildup of its navy's blue-water capability.
    5. The probability of a military conflict on the Korean peninsula comparable in magnitude to the Korean War is low. However, if such a conflict were to occur, the remaining U.S. Marine units in Okinawa, which will maintain high combat readiness, would be sufficient to handle the situation.
    6. In case of a military conflict between China and Taiwan, the United States presumably would come to the aid of Taiwan. Likewise, although the marines stationed in Okinawa have not been considered essential to its response, those remaining would be sufficient to take care of any contingency.
    7. The United States also will maintain its capability to support Japan in the event of a military conflict between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands or in the East China Sea, since U.S. Marine units on high combat readiness will remain in Okinawa. The question here is the United States' willingness to actually provide such military support to Japan in such a situation.
    8. To resolve the U.S. base issue in Okinawa and to maintain a stable U.S. presence in the Western Pacific, this mutually agreed-on plan-in which the number of U.S. troops in Okinawa will be reduced to the extent possible without creating any strategic problems and will be moved to the U.S. territory of Guam-is rational.
  5. Even though the bases in Guam belong to the United States, to make sure that they will be operated in a way that reflects Japan's interests, the Japanese and U.S. governments should agree on the following four points (see section III):
    1. That the great distance between Okinawa and Guam will not negatively affect Japan's security;
    2. That the United States' commitment to the security of Japan will not be weakened by the relocation;
    3. That the strategic advantages of the U.S. bases on Guam will actually be used for Japan's security; and
    4. That Japan, in turn, will use the strengthened Guam bases to enhance its security.
  6. Despite the smaller number of U.S. Marines in Okinawa, the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan is expected to better equip the U.S. military to defend Japan, for the following five reasons (see section IV):
    1. After the marines leave, enough U.S. troops to provide the necessary defense support for Japan are scheduled to remain in the country.
    2. The command function of the U.S. forces in Japan will be strengthened.
    3. Along with the realignment of U.S. troops, the military power of the U.S. forces in Japan, such as the U.S. missile defense, will be reinforced.
    4. Since the U.S. forces in Guam will be located where they are invulnerable to attacks by other countries in the region, they can launch a counterattack (e.g., in response to a military attack on Japan) without the fear of preemptive attacks or retaliation.
    5. The mutually agreed-on plan for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan considers various resolutions to problems related to the bases there-which include but are not limited to the relocation of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa-that will enhance the Japanese people's support of the Japan-U.S. alliance.
  7. To make sure that the relocation of U.S. Marines in Okinawa, the strengthening of the U.S. bases in Guam, and the realignment of the U.S. bases in Japan actually work to the advantage of the Japan-U.S. alliance and Japan's security, the following actions must be taken (see section V):
    1. The Japanese government needs to spell out to the U.S. government exactly what Japan expects from the relocation, how it hopes the bases in Guam will be operated in the future, and what it expects from the United States in regard to military support in case of an attack on Japan. The Japanese and U.S. governments then must coordinate their policies on these issues.
    2. Both Japan and the United States need to take appropriate measures to avoid any misinterpretation of the reduction of U.S. Marines in Okinawa that could undermine Japan's security. It is particularly important that the United States reconfirm its willingness to provide military support to Japan in case of military conflict between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands or in the East China Sea, so as to bolster collaboration between Japan and the United States in dealing with such incidents.
    3. The two governments must secure access routes from the bases in Guam to Japan, Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, and the like. In addition to developing and maintaining the necessary means of transport, Japan and the United States should cooperate in defending the open sea bounded by Guam, Tokyo, and Taiwan.
    4. The Japanese government should promote its Self-Defense Forces' active utilization of the bases in Guam. It first should draw up plans to use Guam both as a training base for the Air SDF and other branches of the Japanese forces and as an operational base from which the SDF can defend the sea-lanes and conduct overseas missions. The government should obtain the United States' consent to such plans as soon as possible. And the government should also ensure that the U.S. buildup of the Guam bases includes the construction of facilities for the use of the Self-Defense Forces.
  8. Any further delay in the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility will also delay the relocation of U.S. Marines, make impossible the return to Japan of the Futenma Air Station, and postpone Japan's use of Guam for its security. Indeed, such a delay is likely as well to damage the United States' trust in Japan and even undermine the Japanese people's support for the Japan-U.S. alliance. Therefore, the Japanese government should begin construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility as quickly as possible (see section VI).
  9. Japanese policymakers must draw up plans for how Japan can best use the bases in Guam to promote its national interests, taking into consideration such factors as the international security environment and the defense capabilities of both the United States and Japan. Japanese political leaders also must be able to explain their plans to the Japanese people. The problem here is Japanese policymakers' lack of knowledge and understanding of these security issues. This needs to be remedied, urgently, in order to meet the challenges presented by the relocation of the U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam, the buildup of U.S. bases in Guam, and the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan (see section VI).

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