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## *Restless Rivals:*

*Trump, China and the implications for Japan and East Asia  
The Berlin Roundtable and Symposium*

*German Institute for International and Security Affairs  
(Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: SWP)*

*Konrad Adenauer Foundation*

*(Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung: KAS)*

*and*

*Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS)*





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The institute publishes an annual report, *Ajia no anzenhosho* (Asian Security), which surveys the changing security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. Well regarded by both the academic and the security communities, the institute also organizes seminars for specialists and the public on national, regional, and international security and sponsors joint research projects with institutes in other countries.

In addition to its research activities, the institute, together with the Japan Foundation's Center for Global Partnership, offers fellowships to young scholars wishing to pursue security studies. Many of these recipients have since become valuable contributors to security studies in Japan.

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Research Institute for Peace and Security  
Meisan Tameike Building 8F  
1-1-12 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0052, Japan  
Tel: 81-3-3560-3288 Fax:81-3-3560-3289  
E-mail: [rips-info@rips.or.jp](mailto:rips-info@rips.or.jp)  
URL: <http://www.rips.or.jp>



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***Restless Rivals:  
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## FOREWORD

On March 6, 2017, the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) held in Berlin both a roundtable with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) and a public symposium with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, KAS). The program planners of the three institutes shared their concerns regarding the security challenges that East Asia poses to both the Asia-Pacific region and Europe, being well aware of the importance of exchanging their views of the region's political and military developments and their implications for global security.

During "The Changing Security Environment in East Asia: Issues, Trends and Implications for Japan and Europe," at the SWP roundtable, and "Restless Rivals: Trump, China, and the Implications for Japan and East Asia," at the KAS public symposium, the major concerns discussed were North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile development programs, China's eastward military expansion, territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, and new tensions between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping and between Trump and North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un.

The following are six papers submitted to the two meetings, written by two European participants (Giovanni Andornino [Italy] and Mathieu Duchâtel [France]), two Americans (Bonnie Glaser and Robert Eldridge), and two Japanese (Hideshi Tokuchi and Masashi Nishihara). They highlight the sources of these tensions and conflicts in East Asia today, suggesting areas of policy coordination among Europe, the United States, and Japan.

It was indeed a pleasure and an honor for RIPS to cosponsor these programs with the two German institutes. Our special thanks go to Professor Hanns Maull and Dr. Hanns Günther-Hilpert of SWP and Mr. Tomislav Delinic of KAS, as well as Dr. Atsushi Yasutomi of RIPS.

Masashi Nishihara  
President  
Research Institute for Peace and Security  
April 2017



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# 1. Trump's China Policy: Implications of an "America First" Policy for East Asia

Bonnie Glaser

Donald Trump's approach to China is still evolving. During the campaign and the presidential transition, Trump demonstrated an impulse to get tough with China, especially in the area of trade, and pledged to take a series of steps to turn the U.S.-China relationship to America's advantage. In his first month in office, however, Trump has adopted a more cautious, pragmatic stance. Although his rhetoric remains critical of Chinese policies, Trump has eschewed taking harsh actions such as imposing tariffs on Chinese goods or labeling China a currency manipulator, for example. Instead, President Trump has expressed a desire to have a "constructive relationship," and taken steps contrary to his campaign statements that have prevented U.S.-China ties from going off the rails, including reaffirming the long-standing U.S. "one China" policy. In the first month of his presidency, Trump has shown a willingness to listen to and accept advice from his cabinet and national security staff. These early signals suggest that an early crisis in U.S.-China relations will be averted. However, a clear Trump administration policy toward China that is grounded in a broader regional and global strategy has not yet been formulated and will likely take many months to emerge. In the meantime, Trump's steps as president to lower the risk of conflict with China are beneficial to East Asian security.

## **Trade/Economics**

Although there is no coherent strategy yet toward China, there is an apparent intention by the Trump administration to rebalance the bilateral relationship so it is more advantageous to the United States, especially economically. Trump and his key associates believe that as part of the "America First" policy, the U.S. must put an end to Chinese practices that benefit China at the expense of American interests. During the campaign, Trump accused China of "raping our country" by keeping its currency undervalued to promote exports. In his campaign manifesto, Trump pledged to "cut a better deal with China that helps American businesses and workers compete." He set out four goals, including putting an end to China's illegal export subsidies, and lax labor and environmental standards," as well as declaring China a currency manipulator.

Trump's trade policy hasn't become clear yet, in part because four weeks into the new administration, the entire economics and trade team is not yet in place. Once the team members are all in their positions, it will probably take additional time to sort out various roles and forge a consensus on China policy. Available information suggests that the five

key officials diverge in fundamental ways in their views. Peter Navarro, a hardline mercantilist China basher who heads the newly-created National Trade Council, favors tariffs and other harsh measures. Gary Cohn, at the helm of the National Economic Council, is on the record as saying China's currency is too strong, not too weak. Like Navarro, Robert Lighthizer, the nominee for U.S. Trade Representative who has yet to be confirmed, has advocated imposing unilateral tariffs on China "to force change in the system." Steven Mnuchin, the new U.S. Treasury Secretary, has no known history of antagonism toward China.

The final member of the team is billionaire Wilbur Ross, who Trump has designated as his bureaucratic point person on trade policy. Ross was confirmed as Commerce Secretary on February 28. In his confirmation hearing, Ross called for leveling the playing field with China, which he said is "the most protectionist country among very large countries." Ross also noted China's practice of dumping excess steel and aluminum and supporting unprofitable state-owned enterprises. Prior to his nomination, however, Ross disagreed with mounting criticism of China, noting in 2008 that China "has become the whipping boy in the U.S. just as Japan was some 15 years ago."

If the hard-line approach prevails, any or all of the following steps could be taken:

- Imposing tariffs on Chinese imports
- Declaring China a currency manipulator, possibly when the next semiannual currency report is delivered in April by the U.S. Treasury Department.
- Launching unfair trade cases based on Chinese barriers to U.S. exports and intellectual property violations
- Tightening the official approval process for Chinese investment in the U.S. and acquisition of U.S. companies
- Implementing changes to make it easier to U.S. companies to obtain relief from Chinese imports

Over the longer term, Trump may alter the US tax structure by giving businesses income tax deductions for producing at home and protecting them from imports by imposing Border Adjustment Tax (BAT), which would damage Chinese exports to the United States. These actions would likely lead to Chinese retaliatory measures, a possible trade war, and perhaps a global depression.

For East Asia, these anti-globalization, protectionist policies would be bad news. U.S.-China trade conflict would likely have spillover effects in other areas, most critically East Asian security. The pursuit of "America first" policies by the U.S. would be

detrimental to Asian economies that rely heavily on exports. Trump's shift from a multilateral to a bilateral approach to trade – which has nothing to do with China – is especially harmful. The U.S. withdrawal from TPP is widely viewed as a strategic blunder that has created a vacuum in the region that China will happily attempt to fill.

Privately, influential Chinese have suggested that Beijing is willing to cut some deals on trade in order to preserve good relations with the United States. For example, China can make its market more open to foreign investment in exchange for assurances that its own direct investments in the United States can continue unimpeded, with limited exceptions that relate to U.S. national security. If such deals can be reached, trade tensions can possibly be tamped down and managed.

### **North Korea**

There is a consensus in the United States that North Korea is the most pressing security problem in Asia. The Trump administration has wisely undertaken a policy review to assess “lessons learned” from past administrations and consider options. With the likelihood that North Korea will soon have the capability to launch a nuclear-tipped ICBM at the continental United States, the matter is urgent. There are essentially three tools to deal with North Korea: diplomacy, sanctions and deterrence. The question is what the mix of these will be employed by the Trump administration.

There are already signs that Trump, like prior presidents, will urge China to use its influence on North Korea to effect change in its nuclear weapons and missile programs. After his election victory and prior to the inauguration, Trump blamed China in a tweet for not helping with North Korea. His tweet came an hour after an earlier tweet in which Trump had said: “North Korea just stated that it is in the final stages of developing a nuclear weapons capable of reaching parts of the U.S. It won't happen!” When Trump and Xi Jinping spoke by phone on February 9, he raised concerns about North Korea.

The increasing nuclear and missile threat from North Korea was at the top of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's agenda when he met with his counterpart Wang Yi on the sidelines of the G-20 In Bonn. Tillerson urged China to use all available tools to moderate North Korea's destabilizing behavior, according to a U.S. Department of State spokesman. Trump told Reuters in a February 23 interview that “China has tremendous control over North Korea. Whether they say so or not is up to them, but they have tremendous control over North Korea. I think they could solve the problem very easily if they want to.” North Korea was one of the main topics of discussion during State Councilor Yang Jiechi's February 27-28 visit to Washington DC.

Xi Jinping may opt to take steps to increase pressure on North Korea to win favor with

the Trump administration. The Chinese realize that they need a positive issue on which the U.S. and China can cooperate that will cushion friction in other areas. Under the Obama administration, that issue was coping with climate change, but the Trump administration is unlikely to attach priority to global warming. Under the precondition that pressure does not create regime threatening instability in North Korea, which would be detrimental to Chinese interests, there is certainly more that China can do. Beijing's announcement that it will suspend coal imports from North Korea through the end of 2017 is evidence that China is willing to do more.

Prospects for enhanced U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea will grow if the Trump administration decides to return to negotiations under the Six Party Talks Framework. Whether Pyongyang would agree to negotiations depends on several factors, including the preconditions for talks and Kim's calculation of what can be gained. The implications for East Asian security are uncertain, depending on what is achieved. A freeze in some elements of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs would be positive for the region, but may not be attainable.

### **South China Sea**

Trump administration officials have sent muddled signals on the South China Sea and as a result, its policy is unclear. At his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Tillerson threatened to deny China access to its newly created islands in the South China Sea, which many observers interpreted as likely to lead to a U.S. naval and air blockade. The Chinese are not likely to be deterred from using these islands, and therefore the potential for conflict would be high. In Questions for the Record (QFR) posed by the Senate after the hearing, however, Tillerson clarified that the U.S. should be prepared to deny access only in a contingency. That position is likely similar to the Obama administration, although such details were never discussed publicly.

In the meantime, White House spokesman Sean Spicer weighed in on the matter, but further muddied the waters. He stated that the U.S. would protect its interests in the South China Sea, adding that "If those islands are, in fact, in international waters and not part of China proper . . . we'll make sure we defend international interests from being taken over by one country." His remarks provided further evidence of the Trump administration's impulse to be tough on China, but showed no understanding of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

In what was likely an attempt to provide reassurance, when visiting Tokyo Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis emphasized the need for the U.S. "military stance" to reinforce diplomacy and stated that "there is no need right now at this time for military maneuvers or something like that." Some observers found this reassuring, but for those who want the

U.S. to push back harder against China's gains in the South China Sea (including many of China's neighbors), Mattis' messages were likely seen as too soft and creating the potential for miscalculation by China. Mattis call for a rules-based international order was widely welcomed, however. He is the first Trump administration official to do so, and also said that "freedom of navigation is absolute."

The deployment of a carrier strike group to the South China Sea on February 18 indicates an early willingness to strengthen deterrence, but it remains to be seen whether and how Trump administration strategy will differ from Obama's. The Obama administration was generally cautious and unwilling to incur risk in the South China Sea as evidenced by the careful exercise of its Freedom of Navigation operations (FONOPs). The timing of those FONOPs also suggested a desire to avoid undermining cooperation with China on other issues. Time will tell whether Trump administration FONOPs will be less cautious, for example by including flight operations when sailing within the 12nm waters around Mischief Reef, which was determined by the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal to be a low-tide elevation within the Philippines' EEZ.

Although the possibility exists that Beijing will seize an opportunity to further consolidate its claims by dredging at Scarborough Shoal, declaring baselines in the Spratlys, or establishing an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea, none of these actions are likely to take place before China's 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress planned for this fall. Even beyond the Party Congress, China may refrain from destabilizing actions in order to preserve positive relations with Philippines' President Duterte and China's other neighbors.

### **Taiwan and the "one China" Policy**

Since Trump hardly mentioned Taiwan during the campaign, his decision to accept a phone call from Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen after the election came as a surprise. Even more astonishing than the phone call, however, was Trump's subsequent statement on Fox News that his administration would not necessarily be bound by the "one China" policy "unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade." This suggested that Trump might be willing to use the "one China" policy as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from China on other issues. Underlying this position was the belief that China would have no choice other than to accept and adjust to U.S. abandonment of the "one China" policy.

In the weeks that followed, however, Beijing made clear that the issue was "non-negotiable." China refused to have any discussions with the Trump administration, including holding a phone call between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, until its position on Taiwan was stated plainly. Recognizing that refusing to endorse the "one China" policy

would have high costs and yield few benefits, senior Trump administration officials, including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, persuaded the president to back down from his earlier stance.

Trump's about face averted an immediate crisis in U.S.-China relations, but left much uncertainty about U.S. policy toward Taiwan and therefore it is premature to conclude that differences over Taiwan will be easily managed. First, although President Trump said he would honor the "one China" policy, he did not define it. There was no mention by Trump of the three U.S.-China communiques, which Beijing will undoubtedly insist that he reaffirm at an early date. By simply stating that he would support the "one China" policy, Trump has left room to interpret it differently than his predecessors. Second, Beijing will remain suspicious of U.S. intentions toward Taiwan and will likely react strongly to any perceived efforts by the Trump administration to strengthen ties with Taiwan. If Trump decides to sell advanced weapons systems to Taiwan, permit flag officers to visit Taipei, negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) or take other steps to upgrade U.S. relations with Taiwan (even though such actions arguably fall within the "one China" framework), U.S.-China tensions will likely increase significantly. Third, Trump might still seek to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in the future—a possibility that has created much anxiety in Tsai Ing-wen's administration.

The role of Taiwan in Trump's Asia strategy has yet to be determined. Those who seek to pressure Beijing to make concessions to the U.S. on trade and economic matters may be tempted to try to use Taiwan as a lever to influence Chinese policy. Other individuals within the administration who support strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relations are likely to oppose such a policy, however. The Trump-Taiwan phone call and the early kerfuffle over whether to reaffirm the U.S. "one China" policy do not provide clear insight into the approach that the new U.S. administration will take toward Taiwan going forward.

### **Questions about Implications for Regional Stability**

A month into the Trump administration, there is considerable uncertainty about the new U.S. president's approach to China, and how his China policy will fit into a broader strategy to toward Asia. There are some reassuring signs to point to, including Secretary Mattis' early trip to Tokyo and Seoul; Japanese Prime Minister Abe's visit to the United States; Trump's phone call with Xi Jinping; and Yang Jiechi's visit to Washington DC. Yet many questions remain.

Some of the most pressing questions that have yet to be answered are:

1. Will the U.S. rely chiefly on military approaches to security? Will the Trump administration have an economic pillar to its Asia strategy? What will be the extent of the administration's diplomatic engagement with the region? Will diplomacy, economics, and military policies be integrated into

a comprehensive regional strategy? I would posit that a strong U.S. military presence alone will not be sufficient to ease Asian allies' and partners' concerns about U.S. staying power and commitment to the region.

2. Will Trump administration foreign policy be centered on rules and norms or will the U.S. jettison this long-standing approach to East Asia? Will the U.S. seek to strengthen the international order and its role as regional and leader or abdicate that role to China? There may be contradictions between Trump's "America first" policies and long-standing U.S. policies to underwrite and provide security in the Asia-Pacific.
3. Will the Trump administration ratchet up tensions with China and force countries to take sides? No country in Asia wants to be compelled to choose between the U.S. and China. There is reasonable fear of being dragged into a more competitive dynamic. The Trump administration must strike the right balance between engaging and deterring China.
4. Will regional countries hedge against or toward China? Some countries have clearly been in China's orbit, including Laos, Cambodia, and to some extent Thailand and Brunei. Other countries, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia were leaning toward the U.S. during the Obama administration, but now they are hedging their bets by leaning toward China in an effort to benefit economically and in part because they view the U.S. as unreliable.

## 2. How do we Assess China's Foreign and Security Policy? – A Japanese View

Hideshi Tokuchi

In May 2015, China released its biennial defense white paper, "China's Military Strategy." It is filled with abstract language about Chinese military concepts but lacks any details about PLA's budget or operations, to the disappointment of many observers.

Furthermore, the real meaning of each of these concepts is difficult to ascertain. For example, in describing "Military Force Building Measures," the document states, "China will innovate and develop theories and practice in relation to running the armed forces in accordance with the law, establish a well-knit military law system with Chinese characteristics, so as to elevate the level of rule by law of national defense and armed forces building." We do not know, however, if China has a correct legal mind. Although President Xi Jinping stated at this year's World Economic Forum that "we should honor promises and abide by rules. One should not select or bend rules as he sees fit," this statement sounds hollow, because China rejected the July 2016 award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) and does not intend to comply with it.

The strategy's key concept, "active defense," is defined as adherence to the unity of strategic defense and operational and tactical offense; adherence to the principles of defense, self-defense and post-emptive strike; and adherence to the stance that "We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked." According to US DOD's annual report to Congress, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," this statement is "a decade-old PLA commitment not to attack until attacked, but to counterattack strongly once struck." If this interpretation is correct, it does not contain any meaningful message at all. The report then elaborates by noting that China would "respond aggressively once an adversary decides to attack," which is even more worrisome because China might act in accordance with its own arbitrary interpretation of an adversary's intentions, not actions, which will cause a tremendous problem for the international order.

China's strategic requirement leads the PLA Navy to the combination of "offshore waters defense" with "open seas protection," based on the strategic tasks such as "to safeguard the security of China's overseas interests" and based on the importance attached to "protecting maritime rights and interests." That is, China is building up its military forces while focusing on both the seas and new domains such as outer space and cyberspace. China's

military budget grew by double digits each year from 1989 to 2015, and became 3.4 times as much in the recent 10 years (from 2006 to 2016), and sustains rapid military expansion.

With all this in mind, I discuss here some of the challenges China poses and some of the measures we should take in response.

### **China's Dream and Its Maritime Expansion**

As described in the white paper, China believes that a world war is unlikely in the foreseeable future. In China's mind, the international situation is expected to remain generally peaceful. China regards this situation provides important opportunities for its development. In order to capture the opportunities, China is trying to remove any obstacle. China believes that multiple and comprehensive security threats and increasing external impediments and challenges exist in front of it. China has indeed given itself "an arduous task to safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity and development interests." As it maintains, "the Taiwan issue bears on China's reunification and long-term development," and "Some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China's reefs and islands." In addition, "with the growth of China's national interests, ... the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue."

In 2049 China will celebrate the centennial of the People's Republic. In order to make the country strong, China is trying to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by then under the banner of the "Chinese Dream," part of which is building a strong military. To do this, the Chinese have been strengthening their military capabilities and have also become more assertive. Feeling that they have been hemmed in by the US and its associate powers, China may be looking for ways to break out, but to the Americans and the Japanese, such attempts only succeed in disturbing the regional order and disrupting the freedom of navigation and may lead to the exclusion of the US from the region. In military terms, China is trying to keep foreign forces away from its territory by denying foreign forces' power projection capabilities and benefits of their forward deployment and also by expanding its own overseas deployment.

China, however, does not want to destroy the stable environment that has helped the country develop, and thus seems to want to avoid full confrontation with the US and other major powers. From this view-point, China will try not to push the US and its allies, like Japan, too far, although China will continue to criticize these alliances and to try to drive a wedge among the members. The Chinese will probably continue to be assertive on the issues of territories and sovereign rights as they define, albeit while carefully avoiding full

confrontation. They will continue, therefore, to resort at sea to coercive tactics short of military conflicts, by expanding their maritime law-enforcement capabilities.

To that end, Chinese law-enforcement vessels continually intrude into the Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, with some Chinese even calling these illegal operations “joint management of the islands.” In the summit meeting between China and Japan in September 2016, when Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe urged China’s president Xi Jinping to seek peaceful settlement of the South China Sea disputes based on international law, President Xi reminded Japan that it was not a party to this issue and thus should exercise caution in its words and deeds in regard to this matter. Possibly in response to Japan’s support of the PCA award, a large number of Chinese fishing boats operated near the Senkaku Islands and China’s law-enforcement vessels illegally entered Japanese territorial waters around the islands in early August.

### **China Poses Four Challenges**

First, this should not be viewed as a matter of security dilemma. China has the world’s second largest economy, and it is the crux of the Asian economy, which gives it even greater responsibility for both the regional and global order. Unfortunately, though, the Chinese lack a fundamental understanding of the rule of law as the basis of the order and are taking advantage of other countries’ efforts to maintain the order.

Second, despite the Chinese perception, the rise of China is not an obstacle to any other countries in the Asia-Pacific. China is not like the Soviet Union in the Cold War era, and neither Japan nor the US has a policy of containment. They do not intend to isolate China so that it will decay. Instead, they helped China develop. China should not misunderstand it.

Third, China’s actions differ from its words. For instance, even though China termed its land reclamation in the South China Sea a “green project,” the PCA found that China caused severe harm to the area’s marine environment. For another example, the Chinese say that “one belt, one road” (OBOR) and AIIB to undergird it enhance the world’s connectivity, but in fact, what China has been doing in the South China Sea is disruption of connectivity.

Fourth, China views the sea with a continental mindset. That is, its concept of “maritime territory” includes not only its territorial waters but also its contiguous zones, EEZ and the continental shelf. China also calls it “state- administered area.” Consequently, it insists that it has the power to restrict other states’ military activities in its EEZ.

## **How We Should Address the Challenges**

There will be no quick fix or silver bullet to address these serious challenges. I propose the following four responses to these challenges.

First, in order to educate China and to help it behave as a responsible member of the international community, we should establish a network of regional security cooperation to include China. Incidentally, the hub-&-spokes regional security system centering on the US has become a kernel of such a network. For example, the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), a biennial naval exercise first conducted by some of the US regional allies during the Cold War, keeps evolving. In 2016, 45 surface ships, 5 submarines, more than 200 aircraft and 25,000 troops from 26 nations participated, including India, Indonesia and even China.

Second, we should preserve the regional balance of power in response to China's maritime expansion. All activities of maritime expansion of China are headed toward the sea in East Asia. Japan in Northeast Asia and the Philippines in Southeast Asia, these two regional allies of the US directly face the impact of this expansion. A regional balance of power, however, can be maintained only by strengthening the US-centered regional security system, of which Japan-US Alliance is the principal component. In the most recent Japan-US summit meeting, the two countries' leaders confirmed that their bilateral alliance was the basis of peace, prosperity and freedom of the Asia-Pacific. They also confirmed that the US and Japan would oppose any attempt by any country to assert maritime claims by means of intimidation, coercion or force. The two nations also called on the countries concerned to refrain from taking any actions that would escalate tensions in the South China Sea, including the militarization of outposts, and to act in accordance with international law. This summit meeting generated a big achievement, but we cannot be complacent. Both Japan and the US must continue to strengthen their alliance's capabilities, and we must communicate the will of the alliance to the Chinese. China advances to the maritime domain in Southeast Asia often by taking advantage of the power vacuum there and establishes irreversible changes in a short period of time. China conducts salami slicing tactics in the South and East China Seas to discourage its adversaries from responding forcefully. Consequently, we must maintain our physical presence at sea, continue building our capabilities to address every stage of the escalation, and clearly articulate our intentions.

Third, we must establish mechanisms for crisis management. The China-ASEAN summit in September 2016 reaffirmed the commitment to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to improve the operational safety of naval ships and naval aircraft in the South China Sea. Although this is a positive development, CUES is not legally binding, and it does not apply to air force aircraft, which patrol airspace in peacetime. Therefore, an

Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (INCSEA) that is legally binding in a multilateral format is worth exploring, in addition to a legally binding and effective Code of Conduct (COC).

Fourth, we must continue to work on China for more transparency in military affairs. China releases its defense white paper only every other year. The 2015 white paper does not include any information about its military expenditure or any details of the PLA's operations. China has become less transparent in military affairs. Although we cannot expect a nondemocratic country like China to be truly open, demanding more transparency might help head off any arbitrary actions. Transparency is one of the useful weapons of open democracies, and therefore the value of this approach should not be underrated. Incidentally, one of the very opaque issues on the part of China is maritime militia. It is not clear if they have sufficient professional expertise and skill to operate as military. If they are not professional enough, it causes much jeopardy to adversaries. China should be transparent on this issue as well.

## **Conclusion**

Our common goal is to achieve rules-based and liberal order in the international community. This goal cannot be attained without power or cooperation. To this end, the hub-and-spokes system in the Asia-Pacific provides an indispensable tool to bring together the powers of like-minded countries in order to maintain the order in the region, particularly in the face of China's maritime expansion. This is why the US policy vacuum in the region will make it unstable and unpredictable. Thus, the US should establish its security policy toward the region as an urgent agenda.

In addition, the continuous engagement of those European nations with an interest and benefit in the stability of the East Asian sea is strongly desired. Indeed, the sea is not a wall to separate nations but a road to connect them.

### 3. How Do We Assess China's Foreign and Security Policy?

Giovani B. Andornino

China's foreign and security policy is primarily a function of its domestic politics, whose polar star is the preservation of the current political-institutional setup of the Chinese Party-State. The Chinese leadership explicitly articulates this posture when referring to China's "core interests", as most recently done by State Councillor Yang Jiechi during his meeting with President Donald Trump on February 27, 2017. Such interests, hierarchically ordered, allow for a progressively less compromising negotiating stance on part of Beijing the further one moves to the top of the three-item list: 3) the continued stable development of China's economy and society; 2) national sovereignty and territorial integrity; and 1) preserving China's basic state system and national security.

While the Chinese Communist Party assumes that the stability of its political regime naturally equates with China's supreme national interest, such premise does put China on a different level vis-à-vis most global players, determining a degree of heterogeneity in the international system that appears to be deepening in conjunction with China's reemergence and the fraying of the established liberal world order. Calls for adjustments to global governance entailing new approaches to sovereignty - embracing obligations and responsibilities, as well as prerogatives and rights - face China's intrinsically idiosyncratic posture in the realm of high politics. It thus seems appropriate to assess China's foreign and security policy looking at two internal dynamics shaping Beijing's behaviour on the global stage: the role of the leader and the evolving national identity underpinning China's worldview.

#### **Xi Jinping as a "primus inter inferiores"**

The salience of a national leader's input in foreign policy definition and implementation is generally hard to assess, except in retrospect, and becomes especially impervious to analysis when decision-making processes are as opaque as they are in China. Also, a leader's impact is most obvious during major crises, which have not really taken place during Xi Jinping's first term in office (2012-2017).

Xi Jinping's leadership, however, does seem to lend itself to some consequential observations. For one thing, it may be argued that, despite the absence of immediate foreign policy emergencies, the current international environment in and of itself is looking increasingly worrisome from Beijing's standpoint. Marked by a disturbing level of power

diffusion (including potentially disruptive individual empowerment) and unprecedented uncertainty over the shifting posture of the US and Europe - the key anchors of the order which has allowed China to develop over the past four decades - global politics is becoming more and more complex precisely at a time when China's leadership needs to soft-land its over-invested economy into a "new normal" equilibrium.

While Beijing's assessment of the state of the world has not yet changed in its fundamental components - "international multipolarisation, the globalisation of the economy and the democratisation of international relations" remain the defining trends - clearly the medium-term tendencies being observed require a break with the prudent conduct of the recent past. In this context, on February 17 Xi Jinping has used his role as chairman of the State Security Commission to indicate for the first time that China should "guide" the shaping a "new world order" and "safeguard international security".

Secondly, the evolution of Xi's own political-institutional physiognomy offers insights as to the transformation of top policy-making in today's China, a dynamic that is likely to become more evident after the XIX Congress of the CCP in autumn, when the ongoing personnel reshuffle will reach its climax with the renewed membership of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, likely affording Xi even greater political leeway. The outcome of this critical transition will set the stage for the next half-decade of government action in China, which many deem to be the timeframe within which China has to either robustly reform its growth model, or face a more radical and potentially disorderly adjustment down the road. Greater cohesiveness in the "collective wisdom" of the incoming leadership and its will (and capacity) to see substantial implementation of the bold decisions outlined in the 3rd Plenary Session in November 2013 will fundamentally influence China's domestic stability and hence its propensity to walk the walk of a more "inclusive globalisation" (as opposed to - say - sliding toward populist revanchism).

Clearly, Xi's hyperbolic enhancement of his own position once appointed at the apex of political power in China confirms the remarkable institutional flexibility of the Party-State, which has been stretched to the point where the role of General Secretary of the Party and President of the People's Republic - formerly a primus inter pares in the Politburo Standing Committee - has morphed into a condition of primus inter inferiores. With the assumption of the Chairmanship of the Central Military Commissions at the very onset of his first term in office, Xi upended the previous practice, setting the stage for his unprecedented and very public proclamation as "Commander-in-chief of the CMC Joint Operations Center" in April 2016. While Xi's determination to concentrate power in his hands has clearly met a degree of resistance - as suggested by the lack of progress in the implementation of economic reforms, but also by the enduring and highly discretionary anti-corruption campaign, ubiquitous calls for unquestioning loyalty to the Party, and increasingly

paranoid measures of social control - his authority was further enhanced by the decision of the CCP Central Committee to elevate him to “core” of the fifth generation of leaders, a title that had eluded his predecessor Hu Jintao. Coupled with his heading several key Leading Small Groups of the CCP Central Committee, such development has led influential scholars to refer to him as the “Imperial President”.

Xi’s authority is anything but titular, especially in the foreign and security policy realms. Not only has he deliberately chosen to cast himself as a transformative leader (with a pervasive media presence echoing what has been described as a supremely selfconfident personality): he has actively sought ownership of all major foreign policy dossiers, including some previously handled by the PRC Premier (notably Europe and the West Asia, Northern Africa region). From a symbolic-normative perspective, Xi has quickly broken with his predecessor’s defining tifa (official discourse) by advancing his own keywords, chiefly the “China dream” of the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. It is noteworthy that the first instance of Party-State tifa gaining enough symbolic-normative traction as to shape the global discourse took place under Xi’s tenure, and precisely in the foreign policy domain: the New Silk Road project - then renamed “One Belt One Road” and finally “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) - is very much Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy proposition, and while not quite a grand strategy in itself, it surely is a test case of China’s success in breaking Western hegemony in the production of globally influential symbolic capital.

### **China’s evolving national identity and worldview**

Besides holding the monopoly over political power, the CCP jealously preserves its role as the sole authority permitted to mould China’s official identity and worldview. Over the past five years the Party’s cultural hegemony has been markedly reinforced: in the bureaucratic sphere, veteran leader Liu Yunshan has commanded over a tightly integrated system combining orthodoxy-defining institutions (Central Party Schools), propaganda channels (traditional media at home and abroad, with a special effort made to target overseas Chinese), and tools to repress views contesting the State-sanctioned narrative.

Operationally, not even the most prestigious universities and research institutions have been spared from the forced narrowing of the spectrum of ideas that may legitimately be debated in public. Some analyses relate this tightening ideological grip to the ambitious rebalancing China needs to implement in the coming years. This line of thought, popularised in the 1980s as neo-authoritarianism, posits that the structural reforms needed to fully modernise China require a robust central authority to reduce the transaction costs of major adjustment.

However, while efficient in suppressing political participation, this approach has so far been less than successful in curbing the most immediate threat to economic reforms,

namely vested interests concentrated in the Party-State apparatus. Barring significant discontinuity after the XIX Congress, it would appear that the official identity being crafted for China as it heads for the two centennials (2021 and 2049) is one combining Leninism in the political sphere, a technological closed society mollified by sanitized confucian attributes, and semi-contendible economic and financial playing fields heavily populated by Party-controlled national corporate champions. This trajectory, advocated by members of Xi Jinping's closest entourage such as Wang Huning, has several implications for the foreign and security policy domains.

Firstly, the increasingly focal role of the Party, as remarked by Xi during the 2014 Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, lies at the heart of China's quest for its own - quintessentially Chinese - version of modernity. Far from being a purely domestic goal, this project reflects an overarching foreign policy objective: China's insistence on inclusiveness and especially "harmony" (*he er butong*) in world affairs effectively implies the end of the Western hegemonic prerogative to define the contours of the "international community", and the recognition that alternative social, economic and political models may coexists with equal legitimacy.

Secondly, the promotion of conformism and active discouragement of systematic engagement with foreign ideas - especially among China's youth, already pervasively socialised to the tenets of patriotic education - may in the long run restrict the spectrum of policy options fed to the leadership. While Xi Jinping has recently expressed his vision for "agglomerating talent into research institutions" and "breaking institutional boundaries" to allow for an exchange of talent between the private sector, the government, and think tanks, the benefit of "revolving doors" is easily offset when scholars are intimidated and research grants foster generalised sycophancy.

Thirdly, as greater emphasis is placed on the "Chinese characteristics" of China's socialist market economy - particularly the role of national corporate champions in spearheading global investment, market penetration, strategic assets acquisition, and productivity acceleration - a number of practical implications are likely to challenge established practices and exacerbate departmental fragmentation across the Party-State:

- a) the growing stock of China's outbound foreign direct investment is outpacing the capacity of the state and PLA to provide necessary protection and supervision to Chinese citizens, personnel and assets overseas;
- b) public opinion in key countries appears to reflect increasing diffidence towards China, especially in Europe, where Beijing's lack of reciprocity in several trade and investment domains is frustrating governments too;

- c) the investments that would give substance to the Belt and Road Initiative require long-term stability and cooperation with myriad interlocutors in very complex regions of Asia to generate returns: unlocking the potential of Eurasian connectivity is as much a political-diplomatic conundrum as it is a financial and infrastructural challenge;
- d) encouraging economic dependency on China in volatile countries where Beijing is reluctant to get too involved politically (i.e. the Middle East and North Africa) may not shield it from the public hostility of nationalist or radical movements, with potential spillover effects inside China (the restive region of Xinjiang being a case in point).

## **4. China's Maritime Security Policy: Trends in Early 2017**

**Mathieu Duchâtel**

China's South China Sea policy in the beginning of 2017 is determined by two immediate factors: uncertainties regarding how the Trump administration will handle the issue of freedom of navigation, and the management of the post-arbitration "new normal". These two factors tend to generate a more cautious and low-key approach than was the case in 2013-2016, but it is likely a phase of tactical pause, and one during which China continues to work at discreetly consolidating its newly established strategic presence. A similar pattern can be observed in the East China Sea, where there are no longer quick gains to secure now that China successfully – seen from Beijing at least – projects an image of "shared administration" through regular presence in the territorial seas and the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands. In the short term, China is expected to gauge the intentions of the Trump administration; is likely to test the US resolve in the South China Sea; but is also very much constrained by the very real possibility that the Taiwan issue may take center stage again during the course of the year as the key national security priority. Overall, China should be expected to continue to seek expansion in the empty spaces where it faces no serious resistance – thus rather in the South China Sea than in the East China Sea, hence the focus of this discussion paper on the former.

### **China has successfully neutralized the effects of the arbitration ruling**

After the highly unfavourable arbitration ruling issued last July, China has manoeuvred rather successfully to neutralize the impact of the verdict on its position in the South China Sea, by exploiting the lack of enforcement in the international system and the lack of action from the Philippines. China has not withdrawn from UNCLOS, as some feared, but it has reinitiated bilateral diplomacy with Manila, with President Duterte making clear that the arbitration award remains in his "pocket". Who can help enforce the arbitration award if the Philippines is not taking decisions to interdict actions deemed illegal according in the ruling?

China has regained the strategic initiative, helped by the weakness and the division of its opponents and the new foreign policy of the Duterte administration. Japan and Australia were rather isolated when issuing the only statements that explicitly called for abiding by the ruling. The EU's statement was weak and the reflection of internal divisions. ASEAN did not even produce a statement. This lack of cohesion among the usual proponents of a

rules-based international order was worsened by the American reaction. In the late days of the Obama administration, the division between the White House and PACOM on the importance of FONOPs was public. The lack of FONOPs to enforce the ruling after July 12 may have been a factor in Duterte's decision to turn his back on the arbitration process.

The restart of talks with the Philippines projects internationally the image of a commonality of views between Beijing and Manila that going to arbitration was a mistake. It signals that the arbitration is now good for the books, as the two sides are back on the correct track of bilateral diplomacy – China's constant position since the beginning of the procedure. China has pursued a mix of two politics. On the one hand, China has provided economic incentives and diplomatic support, with promises to integrate the Philippines in the future maritime Silk Road and political support for the controversial war on drugs of the current government. On the other hand, China has checkmated the arbitration by changing its approach on Scarborough Shoal. According to the ruling, both China and the Philippines enjoy 'traditional fishing rights' in the shoal, and resources should thus be shared. China has made non-committal and reversible concessions without stating them politically: lifting the interdiction of access to the waters around the Shoal to fishing boats from the Philippines, and most probably making an oral promise behind closed doors that no militarized artificial outpost would be built on the Shoal through land reclamation. This fragile outcome enables President Duterte to argue internally that bilateral negotiations deliver more than confrontation in courts of law.

### **China continues to consolidate its gains in the South China Sea but in a more low-key manner**

This successful neutralization of the arbitration process reinforces the assessment in Beijing that the expansionist policy of the Leading Small Group on the protection of maritime rights, since its inception in 2012, has enabled China to make concrete gains in the South China Sea. As often the strategic goal has been expressed very clearly by the Chinese themselves – it is about progressively establishing administrative control (both in the East China Sea and the South China Sea). Chinese military officers are on the record saying to the press that the goal of the PLA in the SCS is to administer the waters within the 9 Dash Line. China already controlled the Paracels and Scarborough Shoal, it now has established a dominant presence in the Spratleys through the construction of artificial islands.

It is likely that China will further consolidate this presence to further alter the balance of power. Recent news include reports that China prepares for deployment of surface-to-air missiles on the artificial islands; the vice-director of SASTIND has confirmed that China is carrying out research on floating maritime nuclear power plants, with the South China Sea in sight, "to provide stable power to offshore projects"; and Xinhua has reported on

possible upcoming revisions to China's 1984 Maritime Traffic Safety Law, in the sense of more restrictions for foreign vessels. These three recent developments are part of the same trend of continuing to progress in empty spaces to reinforce China's power to administer its maritime claims.

At the same time, there are no signs that the PLA is ready to do what it would take to really administer the South China Sea: seize by force the features controlled by rival claimants. Despite the numerous violations it has suffered, the 2002 declaration on the Code of Conduct still works as a tacit confidence measure. And a positive scenario is not to be entirely discarded, as the ruling of The Hague opens a face-saving solution as all features in the Spratly have been defined as not being islands but rocks or low-tide elevations. China could accept a *modus vivendi* by which a new status quo is frozen through a set of bilateral negotiations if the new status quo freezes a position for China as the dominant regional power, because the South China Sea is more about power and hierarchy than actual territorial control and exploitation of resources.

### **China is expected to test the Trump administration on freedom of navigation**

The Obama administration has faced criticism, particularly in Japan, for having given China a free hand in the South China Sea – mediation without enforcement of the outcome on Scarborough Shoal and hesitations and divisions over FONOPs during more than a year. As of today, it is impossible to know with certainty what will be the policy of the Trump administration on the South China Sea. Contradictory statements have been pronounced and so far no clear action has been taken.

The December underwater drone incident was China's way of testing the Trump administration without risking too much – Trump was only the President-elect. There is a genuine anxiety in China that the Trump administration will overreact when challenged and will seek to unilaterally impose American terms on all foreign policy issues, and will use all available leverage to reset the US's foreign trade. It is unclear how much China learned from Trump's tweets and subsequent exchanges with the US strategic community regarding what will be the reaction of the Trump administration to a naval or air incident linked to American surveillance of China's naval activities in the South China Sea. The drone incident was China's way to communicate the importance of the issue and Chinese resolve to continue making these patrols more dangerous. As there is a lack of clarity on FONOPs while surveillance continues to intensify, it is extremely likely that a new test will be mounted.

## **Where Europe stands**

Europe simply is not in a position to provide political leadership on international law solutions if the main stakeholder is not seeking enforcement of the ruling. There is awareness in Europe that the undermining of the rules-based order in the South China Sea could have global repercussions. In military circles, some start to realize that there is also a long-term question of political influence at stake in the South China Sea. Once China becomes the dominant military player, market access for other players will be more difficult. In this period of crisis, Europe has no choice but to continue to speak out in favour of international law. With ASEAN and with China separately, Europe has space to be active in the area of ocean governance and fisheries management. Time has also come to Europeanize the annual French naval presence in the region to send a political signal with regularity and commitment. This should be complemented by more talks with the PLA – this is the missing channel in Europe’s attempt to exert influence on China’s strategic behavior – in support of UNCLOS.

If there are tensions in the South China Sea, a key dimension will be the international perception of who has caused trouble. The issue of moral high ground will be important to determine Europe’s position in a crisis, as Europe still pursues a values-based foreign policy but without hard power. People have always assumed that while Europe has been low-key and disengaged on the South China Sea, it would automatically side with the US in times of conflict. This probably should no longer be taken for granted given the rise of strategic distrust in transatlantic relations.

## 5. East Asia: Territorial Issues And Regional Security Developments: The View From Japan's Alliance Partner, With A Focus On The Senkaku Islands Dispute

Robert D. Eldridge, Ph.D.

One year has elapsed since I last presented at a RIPS conference about the Senkakus. At the time, the regional meeting was held in Manila, and was attended by representatives from about seven countries, all of whom were concerned to varying degrees about China's regional ambitions and efforts at territorial aggrandizement. I spoke at that time primarily about the U.S.' historical involvement with the Senkaku Islands, and my country's need to also "own" the problem, more than simply acknowledging that the islands fall under Article 5<sup>1</sup> of the bilateral security treaty, which it now does every time leaders of the United States and Japan do when they meet.<sup>2</sup>

Unfortunately, during the past year, the situation if anything has worsened, which would not surprise any of the participants then, especially yours truly. Within the Philippines, a new, nationalist president was elected who has sought to distance himself from the United States and buddy up to Russia and China. The latter country, in the meantime, continues with its build-up of the artificial island and its militarization. Furthermore, it continues with its military expansion, recently testing the capabilities of its new aircraft carrier in regional waters and flying a variety of military aircraft through the

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<sup>1</sup> Article 5 reads: "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

<sup>2</sup> Most recently, the U.S. government acknowledged the treaty's coverage in meetings between Defense Secretary James N. Mattis and Prime Minister Abe Shinzō/Defense Minister Inada Tomomi on February 3, 2017, Secretary of State Roy Tillerson and Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio on February 7, and Prime Minister Abe and President Donald J. Trump on February 10. Abe and Trump even included a paragraph on the Senkakus in their joint statement: "The two leaders affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands. They oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these islands. The United States and Japan will deepen cooperation to safeguard the peace and stability of the East China Sea. The two leaders underscored the importance of maintaining a maritime order based on international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. The United States and Japan oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or force. The United States and Japan also call on countries concerned to avoid actions that would escalate tensions in the South China Sea, including the militarization of outposts, and to act in accordance with international law." See "Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe," <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/10/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-and-prime-minister-shinzo-abe>. For a critique of the defense minister's meeting, see Robert D. Eldridge, "Mattis, Inada, and Another Missed Opportunity," *Japan Forward*, February 6, 2017 (<https://japan-forward.com/mattis-inada-and-another-missed-opportunity/>). For a copy of the author's 2016 paper, please contact RIPS at [rips-info@rips.or.jp](mailto:rips-info@rips.or.jp), or the author at [robert@reedintl.com](mailto:robert@reedintl.com).

first island chain, between Okinawa Island and the Miyako group. North Korea, likewise, continues to develop its missile technology, ignoring international criticism and warnings. Tensions between the U.S. and China, including fears of a trade war, and between the U.S. and Russia over the latter's alleged interference in the U.S. presidential elections using hacking and other means has dramatically cooled relations in recent months leading to images of a new, new Cold War. President-elect Donald J. Trump's receipt of a "congratulatory" telephone call by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen shook the international status quo, especially in the U.S. capital, and brought hopes that a sea-change in regional dynamics was afoot, but Trump's admittedly cryptic reaffirmation of the "One China" policy in January has temporarily reduced hopes.

With regard to the Senkakus, the focus of this paper, China, in addition to its unconscionably rapacious behavior in fishing and coral plundering (and other crimes against ecological systems), has sought to heat up things by sending military aircraft and naval ships in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands on a number of occasions, as well as regular Coast Guard incursions and a mass dispatch of 230 fishing vessels to the area in August. With regard to air incursions, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force scrambled 407 times against Chinese aircraft in the first half of 2016 alone, an increase of almost 600 percent in just five years. By the end of the year, the number of scrambles had exceeded more than 1000 times, the highest ever, and more than at the height of the Cold War in 1984 when the ASDF scrambled 944 times primarily against Soviet fighters.

As the increase in scrambles show, Japan has firmly, although in a limited and incremental manner, been responding to the worsening situation. In January last year, it doubled the number of F-15s (to 40) stationed at Naha Air Base to meet the threat, something that was long overdue. Due to the distances involved, limited number of aircraft assigned, and dual use with the Naha International Airport that gives priority to commercial flights, quite often the scrambles were too little, too late.

With the increase in aircraft available, Japan is now sending up four F-15s at a time, two in the rear to be on alert to handle any additional aircraft that join an incursion which there are certain to be, as China historically tends to increase in a highly calculated manner the frequency, number, and scale of its incursions, whether by military aircraft or ships, or civilian agency and vessels.

In light of this, the increase in Japanese aircraft may not be enough to handle future challenges, particularly as the number of incursions grow annually. As such, I have argued that two options need to be pursued with regard to its ability to strengthen its air defenses—joint air patrols with the U.S. military (Air Force, Navy and/or Marines) and/or the stationing of the aircraft (Japanese aircraft alone, or those of both the U.S.-Japan) closer

to the Senkakus at the 3,000-meter runway of Shimoji Island in the Miyako group. A former U.S. naval officer knowledgeable about the region who believes the People's Republic of China has been tightening its military "noose" around the Senkakus since September 2012 and is preparing for a "short, sharp war" to seize the islands, echoes the view of joint patrols by stating it is "time for the [U.S.] to begin to conduct concurrent responses with their counterparts. If we are ever going to deter the PRC, it had better start this year." Restarting use of the U.S.-managed training ranges in the island group at Taishō Jima and Kuba Jima, which have been unutilized since 1978, or sharing them with the SDF (or returning the islands outright to Japan) would be ways to demonstrate to China that Japan and the United States are serious.

Japan has done other things to strengthen its defenses<sup>3</sup>, or more precisely, its policing capabilities, by developing a fleet of 12 Japan Coast Guard ships assigned to Ishigaki City (under whose administrative jurisdiction the Senkaku Islands fall) in April 2016. Ten of the ships are newly built 1,500-ton vessels, and 2 are helicopter-equipped ships. Prior to this, similar to the challenge that the ASDF had with the limited number of aircraft and distances involved, the Japan Coast Guard was overtaxed. Aware that the JCG is overburdened, the Abe Shinzō administration is seeking an increase of nearly 20 billion yen in the Coast Guard budget in order to purchase new, larger ships to patrol the Senkakus, to bring the total to 210 billion yen (1.82 billion dollars).

Despite these efforts, Japan, however, has failed to adopt some of the more fundamental measures administratively with regard to the islands, thus, ironically, making a military clash all the more likely. Although Japan is recognized as having administrative rights over the islands by the United States, which returned the islands to Japan in 1972 as per the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, and has administered the islands since 1895 (minus the period from 1945-1972 of U.S. occupation and administration), it has hesitated over the past 46 years to robustly implement this administrative control in order to avoid tensions with Taiwan, which also claims the islands, China, and even the United States. What Japan should have done, and can still do today, is to: build a lighthouse, a weather station, a communications/radar facility, an emergency port, and a heliport, and man these facilities as appropriate with Japanese government personnel. This would be entirely within the scope of having "effective administrative control" over the islands, and would serve as a deterrent for any authorized landings on the islands.

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<sup>3</sup> A GSDF surveillance unit was deployed in March 2016 to the new installation known as Camp Yonaguni, and a new Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade is scheduled to be stood up in March 2018, along with other units and installations in the island chain on Miyako, Ishigaki, and Amami. For more, see Robert D. Eldridge and Paul Midford, eds., *The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces: The Search for Legitimacy* (New York: Springer, 2017).

In contrast, not having these facilities and personnel on the islands (which supported at one point a community of almost 250 Japanese in the prewar period) only invites regional misunderstanding and international doubt over the true ownership and administration of the islands. In other words, if Japan does not take action on the islands, other than externally patrolling them, it must not believe that it truly owns the islands. That it does not allow its own citizens to visit the islands, or its own officials and elected representatives to go there any longer and conduct the necessary investigations and research, further lends credence to the perception that Japan's case is weak.

Of course, this all does not mean that China's claims are any stronger. In fact, they are weaker, historically and legally. This is equally true of Taiwan's, and indeed Taiwan's own former President Lee Teng-hui has on numerous occasions following his time in office pointed out that the Senkakus are without doubt Japan's, most recently when I met with him at his home in May last year.

So, while China's (and Taiwan's) claims are incorrect, bilateral and international calls for joint development misplaced on the one hand, and Japan's handling of the issue too tepid on the other, the origin of the Senkaku issue actually resides with the United States' problematic stance in this writer's opinion. Namely, the U.S. Government has tended to walk an all-too-fine line, taking a "neutral" stance on the issue of the territorial sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands.<sup>4</sup> This stance has unfortunately been historically inaccurate, diplomatically unnecessary, and strategically harmful. In particular, the ambiguity of its position, which was announced in 1971 at the time of the signing of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement and deliberations in the Senate and done in the hopes that Japan and Taiwan (ROC), and later China (PRC), would work out their differences peacefully, actually laid the seeds for further conflict.

The U.S. position was problematic for several reasons, which I elaborate on in my previous RIPS conference paper, but suffice it to say: (1) U.S. policy from 1952 to 1972 had been to recognize Japan's "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa, including the Senkaku Islands as per the public and international interpretation of Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan (colloquially known as the "San Francisco Peace Treaty")<sup>5</sup>; (2), Second, the United States could have easily argued, if not outright dismissed, the arguments and claims of the ROC (and the PRC) had it chosen to do so, as the claims of both the ROC and PRC were then (and now) violations of the principle of estoppel in international law, by

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<sup>4</sup> For details, see Robert D. Eldridge, *The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute: Okinawa's Reversion and the Senkaku Islands* (London: Routledge, 2014).

<sup>5</sup> For details, see Robert D. Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952* (New York: Routledge, 2001).

which a government is not allowed to deny or assert anything to the contrary of that which has been established as the truth by its own deeds, actions or misrepresentations<sup>6</sup>; and (3) the policy was harmful because it created instability to the acceptance and confusion of multiple claims, which have over the years gotten only more intense and competitive, and emboldened China, which has long sought to overthrow the *status quo*.

My paper further goes on to discuss why the U.S. Government likely took the contradictory and self-weakening position it did at the time, based on my *The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute: Okinawa's Reversion and the Senkaku Islands* (which was translated into Japanese and published in 2015). I invite you to read the book or the paper, and note that we continue to live with the consequences today.

Bold ideas are necessary, both to correct the doubly faulty historical record (on the question of sovereignty over the Senkakus and on Taiwan's international status), as well as in light of the fact that the status quo on the Senkakus is untenable (with a rising China) and the security guarantees as is being superficial.

For this reason, I have argued that the U.S. government should reverse itself and publicly acknowledge Japan's sovereignty over the Senkakus. Obviously, both Taiwan and China will be upset. In China's case, that is to be expected as it has spent the past 40+ years bluffing over its claims and bullying Japan. With Taiwan, however, a *quid pro quo* may be possible.

The formula I have suggested involves in exchange for Taiwan's acceptance of a clear U.S. statement on the Senkakus, the U.S. and Japanese governments would immediately recognize that Taiwan is indeed an independent, sovereign nation, and not a part of China. Furthermore, the U.S. and Japanese representatives would nominate President Tsai for the Nobel Peace Prize for essentially, unilaterally, relinquishing Taiwanese claims over the Senkakus. I call this the "Grand Bargain."<sup>7</sup>

With regard to the superficiality of the security guarantee, the Japanese have regularly sought an oral statement that the islands fall under the bilateral treaty. However, I have long pointed out that an Article 5 scenario—when an attack on territory administered by Japan occurs—is an easy one politically (and legally), although less so militarily, to deal with.<sup>8</sup> It is all the scenarios just below this—an incursion by armed "fishermen," a massive

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<sup>6</sup> Robert D. Eldridge, "Facts Stack Up Against China's Senkaku Claim," *Japan Times*, January 28, 2013 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2013/01/28/voices/facts-stack-up-against-chinas-senkaku-claim/>).

<sup>7</sup> Robert D. Eldridge, "A U.S.-Japan-Taiwan Grand Bargain over the Senkakus," *Japan Times*, June 10, 2016 (<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/06/10/commentary/japan-commentary/u-s-japan-taiwan-grand-bargain-senkaku/#.LYbxW996M8>).

<sup>8</sup> Eldridge, *The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute*, especially Conclusion.

arrival of fishing vessels seeking shelter from a storm, an emergency requiring use of the islands or the area, a maritime clash at sea where Japan is made out to be the aggressor—that are more worrisome, partly because any one of them could possibly place a wedge in between the United States and Japan diplomatically, and cause confusion operationally. Particularly in the latter scenario—a clash at sea and Japan was seen to have drawn first blood—is the most dangerous for the alliance, as Article 5, in which Japan has placed all hopes, would NOT, in fact, apply.

There are many—academics and observers around the world—who ask, “why fight over ‘just a bunch of rocks?’” Others, still, call on the two/three countries simply to put off (or shelve) the question of sovereignty, and focus on joint development of the area and its mineral and other resources.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, those with pro-China sympathies or who have antipathy toward Japan argue the islands are actually Chinese territory. In fact, none of these is true or is a viable option. China has no legitimate claims to the Senkaku Islands whatsoever. Simply repeating that it does, or treating the China as a “disputant” and thus giving it credibility, will not give the statement legitimacy, nor does outside support for those claims by the above academics and observers. In reality, it further clouds the issue and makes a solution all the more difficult and conflict all the more likely.

I think we all would agree a China in control of the Senkakus would be dangerous for Japan, for the United States, and for the region as a whole for many reasons. This cannot be allowed, diplomatically if possible, militarily if necessary. In either case, Japan and the United States must work closely together and with like-minded countries of the region who also have similar pressures and concerns.

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<sup>9</sup> One example of this sort of—misplaced, in my opinion—was found in Akikazu Hashimoto, Michael O’Hanlon, and Wu Xinbo, “A Framework for Resolving Japan-China Dispute Over Islands,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 30, 2014.

## 6. The Korean Peninsula: Focus of Tensions

Masashi Nishihara

### Is Korean Unification Realistic?

Reunification of the Korean peninsula has never seemed so remote as it does today. Political turmoil has reigned in South Korea since President Park Geun-hye was impeached by the National Assembly and since Lee Jae-yong, vice chairman of a conglomerate responsible for 20 percent of the nation's GDP, was arrested on charges of bribery. The government succeeding Park is likely to be leftist and to take a pro-North Korea stance.

In North Korea, the position of Kim Jong-un, chairman of the North Korean Workers' Party and the country's supreme leader, is far from stable. Kim Jong-un's half-brother Kim Jong-nam was assassinated in Kuala Lumpur due to his fear that Kim Jong-nam might eventually threaten his regime. In addition, North Korea's escalating development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, as well as its questionable leadership, has created huge security issues for Northeast Asia and the United States. Consequently, unification is not on the agenda for any of these governments.

The media and many experts tend to regard the young Kim Jong-un as not only inexperienced but also irrational. But despite the execution of both his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, and his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-un should not be considered irrational. Cruel as he may be, he has carefully devised a strategy to speed up the modernization of his nuclear weapons while preventing any pushback by the United States and South Korea.

In her February 2013 inaugural address, President Park stressed a trust-building process with North Korea. But her bold "trustpolitik" initiative, which aimed to "turn mistrust and confrontation in Northeast Asia into trust and cooperation," soon failed, for it presumed the collapse of the North Korean regime and its absorption by South Korea. As a result, tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang grew. Soon after North Korea conducted a test of its nuclear weapons in January 2016, President Park, showing her displeasure, shut down the Kaesong industrial complex, the only joint Korean venture. In September of that year, Kim Jong-un again taunted South Korea and the United States by conducting another nuclear test.

In addition to these two nuclear tests, North Korea launched ballistic missiles 24 times in 2016. Then on January 1, 2017, Kim Jong-un announced in his New Year's Day message

that his military was preparing to conduct its first launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). In order to defuse this threat, the new US secretary of defense, James Mattis, visited Seoul and stated that the United States would retaliate against a nuclear attack by North Korea “with an effective and overwhelming response.” The new US president and Shinzo Abe, who was in Washington, also talked about their strong bilateral alliance in regard to North Korea’s threats. Kim Jong-un then launched an intermediate-range missile into the Sea of Japan on February 13.

Today, South Korea, Japan, and the United States have no interest in negotiating with North Korea on its nuclear weapons. Their position is to denuclearize North Korea. No country wants to see a united nuclear Korea, whether under Kim Jong-un or Park Geun-hye’s successor. China’s basic strategy is to keep North Korea as a buffer against the US forces in South Korea and to prevent North Korea from turning toward Russia. To that end, China only halfheartedly enforces the sanctions on North Korea, thereby continuing to help sustain its economy.

Nonetheless, China is opposed to North Korea’s nuclear development, and Kim Jong-un in turn was angry with President Xi Jinping for visiting Seoul before going to Pyongyang. For a while in 2013-2015 Xi formed a supportive relationship with President Park Geun-hye mainly in order to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States. Park then sought Xi’s help in preventing Kim Jong-un from further developing nuclear weapons. When Xi did not help her, however, Park has moved away from him, and China now criticizes Park for agreeing to deploy the US-made THAAD antimissile system, which will weaken its own defense system, although Seoul needs the system to defend itself from North Korea’s nuclear attack.

The United States, too, has no interest in pursuing a united nuclear Korea. During President Barack Obama’s 8-year tenure, North Korea conducted as many as four nuclear tests. Obama’s “strategic patience” policy has clearly failed. Similarly, Japan opposes a united, anti-Japan, Korea. It would not result in the release of Japanese abductees. (On February 10, 2017, the Japanese cabinet disclosed that as many as 883 Japanese nationals may have been abducted by North Korea.)

Japan’s relationship with South Korea also remains tense. South Korea claims territorial sovereignty over the island of Takeshima (in Korean, Dokto). Japan’s position is that South Korea illegally took possession of the island in January 1952 while Japan was still under US occupation. Another issue is the two countries’ dispute over wartime damages. Protesting the South Korean government’s handling of comfort woman issues, on January 9, 2017, Japan recalled its ambassador in Seoul and its consul general in Busan. Indeed, many Japanese fear that a united Korea would become even more anti-Japan than the two Koreas

currently are, and this fear even might persuade Japan to develop nuclear weapons of its own.

### **Is a Second Korean War Likely?**

Is another Korean War likely under these circumstances? Probably not, since no country wants a large-scale conflict in East Asia. Although Kim Jong-un attacked Yongbyong island off the west coast of South Korea in November 2010, he must be aware that his provocations have limits. A large-scale conflict on the peninsula would result in a huge number of casualties and devastate the North Korean economy.

Yet history shows that in similar situations, the party that feels stronger than its opponent is often tempted to be the first to use force and to try to expand its area of dominance. Or the stronger party tends to treat a political and military vacuum in a region as an opportunity to enlarge its dominance. The 1950–1953 Korean War is a case in point.

Today, then, North Korea may see the turmoil in South Korea as a political vacuum. Perhaps this is the main reason why Secretary of Defense Mattis visited Seoul in February to reaffirm the United States' command of their joint forces, to reaffirm the US commitment to defend South Korea and to take a firm position against North Korea's nuclear threats.

As long as the balance of power on the peninsula is sustained, a precarious stability is likely to continue. Kim Jong-un, however, may consider that time is on his side. He has intensified the allocation of vital resources to speed up the development of the country's nuclear and ballistic missiles. The intermediate-range missile launched on February 11 is considered to have achieved a new level of sophistication. North Korea also has had success in its cyberattacks, as well as in terrorism and espionage. If Kim's confidence grows, he may be tempted to use these weapons to enhance North Korea's external position and to undermine South Korea's government. Indeed, one South Korean government source has suggested that in a few years, North Korean ballistic missiles may enter an epoch-making phase.

### **Is There a Resolution?**

Is there a reasonable way to create a peaceful, denuclearized, united Korea? First, the two Koreas must develop confidence in each other. In the past, a few attempts were made to build mutual confidence, but none—including the six-party talks, the promise of a light-water reactor, and the construction of the Kaeson industrial park—were successful. Diplomatic efforts like the UN Security Council's resolutions and sanctions have proved

ineffective.

Even though these measures have not helped, Japan, South Korea, the United States, and the European Union should maintain close coordination and continue to press China and Russia diplomatically to try to prevent North Korea from developing its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Because China and Russia are in a position to pressure North Korea, the allies need to engage them first.

Coordination between China and its Pacific neighbors has often been hindered by conflict. China and the United States disagree on many regional security issues, including the US deployment of THAAD in South Korea, the disposition of the Senkaku Islands (in Chinese, Diaoyudo), Taiwan, the South China Sea. Similarly Japan and China disagree on the Senkakus and the South China Sea in addition to China's military expansion and coercive actions in the western Pacific.

Economic sanctions against North Korea have so far proved unsuccessful, largely because China has continued to trade with North Korea. But on February 19, 2017, China announced that it would suspend its imports of coal from North Korea until the end of this year, to pressure North Korea to stop developing nuclear weapons and perhaps to retaliate for the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, whom China favored. China's suspension of coal imports, which account for 50 percent of China's total imports from North Korea, may have a significant negative impact on North Korea's economy and foreign currency earnings, although loopholes are still suspected. .

Even though sanctions have been ineffective, we should try even harder to strengthen them. At the same time, we should find ways to engage North Korea. One such approach may be for the United States and its partners to assure North Korea that in exchange for its denuclearization, they will not pursue regime change.

To accept North Korea as a nuclear state would be a dangerous option, for it may encourage other nuclear-aspiring countries to follow suit. Kim Jong-un also might regard this as a diplomatic victory and may even try to take the upper hand in dealing with the big powers.

Another approach may be to instigate regime change in Pyongyang. This would be dangerous. Yet the price of risking an uncertain future may surpass the price of doing nothing and allowing the current regime to threaten the world with its nuclear weapons. In the end, much of what will happen on the Korean peninsula will depend on what policy President Trump may pursue.



# 日本語要旨

## 1. Trump's China Policy: Implications of an "America First" Policy for East Asia

Bonnie Glaser

トランプの中国政策はまだ形成中である。選挙期間中は中国に対して厳しい姿勢をとっていたが、大統領になってからはより慎重になっている。中国と「建設的な関係を築きたい」と述べるようになった。「一つの中国」についても同様である。しかしより大きな地域戦略やグローバル戦略の中で中国をどう位置付けるかについてはこれからの作業で、何か月もかかりそうである。その間、トランプが中国と対立するリスクは低下したわけで東アジアの安全保障にとっては役に立つ。

### 貿易と経済

トランプの中国政策は一貫したものではないが、二国間関係を再均衡させ、とくに経済面で米国により有利なものにしようとする意図が見える。トランプ政権の経済関係の閣僚その他の要人はこれから決まるのであるから、政策はこれからであるが、概して中国に厳しい陣容となりそうである。

もしハードラインの政策が出てくるとすれば、中国からの輸入品への関税をかける、中国を通貨操作国と断定する、米国の輸出品に対する中国の障壁に基づく不公正貿易を指摘する、米国内での中国の投資に対する認可過程を厳しくする、などであろう。長期的にはトランプ政権は、企業家に国内投資を促し、また Border Adjustment Tax (BAT) を敷くことで輸入品から企業家を擁護する政策をとるであろう。そうすれば、中国の対米輸出に打撃を与えることになり、中国の報復措置、貿易戦争、そしてグローバルな恐慌となりそうである。

東アジアにとっては、反グローバリズムは悪い知らせとなる。米国への輸出に依存する東アジアの国々にとっては、「米国第一主義」は有害であり、とくに多国間主義から二国間主義への転換はそうである。米国の TPP からの撤退は戦略的失敗だと見られており、その空白を中国が喜んで埋めるであろう。

### 北朝鮮

北朝鮮は今日の米国では最も差し迫った安全保障の課題である。トランプ政権はこの問題と取り組むための準備をしている。基本的に、外交、制裁、抑止の3つの分野の問題である。トランプは中国に対して北朝鮮に核・ミサイルの開発断念をするよう圧力をかけるべきだと考えている。ティラーソン国務長官の王毅外相との会談でも、楊潔篪国務委員の2月末のワシントン訪問でも、主たるテーマは北朝鮮であった。トランプは中国が北朝鮮に対してとてつもなく大きな圧力をかけることができると言った。

習近平は、米国との関係改善のためにも、北朝鮮へ圧力をかけるかもしれない。米中は協力し合えるテーマが必要である。中国が北朝鮮からの石炭輸入を2017年末まで停止したのもその表れであろう。もしトランプが米国は6か国協議に戻ると言えば、対中関係の改善に資するであろう。

### 南シナ海

トランプ政権は南シナ海に関する発言に混乱があり、その政策は不明瞭である。ティラーソン国務長官は議会での指名公聴会で、南シナ海での中国の動きを拒否すると証言した。そのため、米国の海空軍による封鎖が行われるとの観測が流れた。しかしその後の会合で、同長官は緊急事態においてのみの封鎖であると釈明した。

東京を訪問したマティス国防長官は、外交に効果を与えるため「軍事的スタンス」が必要だと述べた。米国に中国に対してタフになることを期待した向きには、同長官はソフトすぎて、中国

に誤算させる危険があるとした。また同長官はトランプ政権内で、規則を尊重する国際秩序の必要性に触れた。また「航行の自由作戦は絶対である」とも述べた。

2月18日に米国が空母を南シナ海に派遣したことはトランプ政権の抑止の姿勢をよく見せることになった。しかし果たして今後どういう行動をとるかはまだ分からない。これに対して中国もスカボロー礁の領有権をさらに強く主張するのか、または南シナ海に防空識別圏を設定するのか、に関しては今秋の第19回党大会以前にすることはないであろう。その大会が終わった後も、中国はドゥテルテ・フィリピン大統領との良好な関係を維持するためにそうした行動に出ないかもしれない。

### **台湾および「一つの中国」政策**

トランプが選挙戦中に台湾に関して発言することはほとんどなかったのが、台湾の蔡英文総統からの電話を受けたり、また「一つの中国」政策の放棄をにおわしたことは驚きであった。しかしトランプはその後側近の進言により、「一つの中国」政策を維持することを表明した。

とはいっても、米中の台湾問題に関する意見の相違が解消されたと結論付けるのは時期尚早である。第1に、トランプは「一つの中国」尊重とはいったが、それを定義することはしていない。3つの基本的な米中コミュニケについても言及していない。第2に、中国はトランプへの不信感を持っていて、トランプが台湾への接近姿勢を見せれば強く反発するであろう。第3に、トランプは台湾を中国との取引に利用するかもしれない。

トランプのアジア戦略の中で台湾の役割はまだ決まっていない。対中貿易を改善したいと思っている連中は、台湾を使って中国から譲歩を勝ち取るのが良いとの意見であるが、台湾との関係を強化しようと思っている人たちにはそういうやり方に反対であろう。

## 2. How Do We Assess China's Foreign and Security Policy? — Japanese View

Hideshi Tokuchi

2015年5月に発表された中国の2年ごとの国防白書『中国の軍事戦略』は、人民解放軍の予算や作戦に関する詳細もなく、抽象的な表現で軍事概念が書かれていた。戦略の基本概念である「能動的防衛」という概念も、戦略的防衛、作戦的攻勢および戦術的攻勢を統合したものとしているが、同様に分かりにくい。

中国の戦略的必要性から、PLA 海軍は「オフショア防衛」と「公海防護」の組み合わせに注目する。前者は「中国の海外権益の安全を防護する」というような戦略的任務に対して後者は「海洋権益の防護」の重要性という考えに基づいたものである。中国は海域および海洋に焦点を当てて軍事力を増強している。中国の国防費は1989年から2015年の間毎年2ケタ増加しており、過去10年間で3.4倍の増加を見せてきた。

こうした点を踏まえて中国が我々に与える挑戦および我々が採るべき方策について論じたい。

### 中国の夢と海洋進出

中国の国防白書によれば、中国は近い将来大きな戦争はないとみており、国際情勢は平和であると予想している。しかし多種かつ全般的な安全保障の脅威が存在しており、中国は国家統一、領土の保全、開発利害を防護するために苦心しているとする。例えば、台湾問題は国家統一を阻害しているなどである。

2049年には中国は建国100周年を迎える。中国は強大国となることを望み、「中国の夢」を説く。軍事力が増強するにつれ、中国は自己主張をするようになり、また外国勢力を自国領土から遠ざけ、自国部隊を海外において勢力の拡大に努める。中国は米国とその同盟国との対決は避けるが、同盟を分断して弱体化させようとする。

中国の法執行船（公船）は尖閣諸島海域に頻繁に侵入している。2016年8月に大量の中国漁船が尖閣諸島の周辺に集結したのは、ハーグの仲裁裁判による南シナ海問題の裁定で日本が裁定を支持し、中国に裁定に従うように主張したことへの反発であったようだ。

### 中国の挑戦

中国が日本に与える挑戦は主として4つある。第1は、中国の「法による支配」への理解が浅いこと。第2は、中国は日米が中国を封じ込めようとしていると疑っていること。日米はむしろ中国の発展を支援し、中国を孤立させる意図はない。第3に、中国の発言と行動が不一致であること。たとえば、南シナ海のサンゴ礁の埋め立てを「グリーン・プロジェクト」と呼ぶなど。第4に、中国は海洋進出に際して大陸的思考を適用していること。中国の「maritime territory」は領海と同じであるべきであるが、実際は領海、接続水域、EEZ、それに大陸棚までを含んでいる。こうして中国は自国のEEZにおける他国の軍事活動を制限しようとする。

### 挑戦への対応

中国の挑戦への対応として以下の4点を指摘したい。

第1に、地域安全保障協力のネットワークを作り、そこに中国を加え、中国に国際社会の責任あるメンバーとしていかに振る舞うべきかを学ばせることである。例えば、リムパックは冷戦時代は米国とその同盟国で行っていたが、2016年合同演習では中国を含む26カ国が参加した。

第2に、中国の海洋進出に対して地域勢力均衡を維持することである。そのためには日米同盟が中心的役割を果たす、米国を中核とした地域安全保障体制が必要である。そして中国に国際法に準拠した行動を促し、力による現状変更への反対を強く要求する必要がある。また海上でのプレゼンスを維持し、力の空白を埋める努力が必要である。

第3に、危機管理メカニズムを構築することである。2016年9月には中国-ASEAN 首脳会議でCUES (Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea)の再確認があった。CUESは積極的な展開であ

るが、法的拘束力がなく、また空軍には適用されない。したがって法的拘束力のある米ソ間の協定である INCSEA (Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas) の適用を検討することが望ましい。

第4に、中国に軍事活動における透明性を高めさせることである。透明性は開放的な民主主義体制の有益な武器である。

#### **結論**

我々の共通の目標は国際社会において法規則を基にした、自由主義の秩序を作ることである。このためには、軍事力の後ろ盾が必要である。また地域秩序を維持するためには、ハブ・アンド・スポーク (hub-&-sopkes) system が不可欠である。米国の政策の空白が地域の不安定を招くので、米国が地域安全保障政策を確立することが焦眉の課題である。またヨーロッパ諸国の継続的関与も重要である。

### 3. How Do We Assess China's Foreign and Security Policy?

Giovani B. Andornino

中国の外交安全保障政策は主として国内政治の関数であり、それは中国の党国家システムを維持することにある。中国の指導層はそれを中国の「核心的利益」という用語で具体的に表現する。去る2月27日に楊潔篪国務委員がトランプ大統領との会談で述べたように、それはピラミッド式に下位から述べて、①中国の経済社会の安定的発展、②国家主権と領土保全、そして③中国の基本的国家体制と国家安全保障の維持、となる。

中国の外交安全保障政策を評価するには、中国のグローバルな舞台での振る舞いに影響を及ぼしている2つの国内変動要因、つまりリーダーの役割及び中国の世界観の土台となる中国としての自意識の発展を見るべきである。

#### 習近平の指導力

外交政策におけるリーダーの役割は中国のような不透明な決定過程では分かりにくい。リーダーの影響力は危機の時に最も明白になるが、習近平の第1期（2012-2017年）ではそれが起きなかった。しかし今日、権力の分散とこれまでにない米欧の変動に見る不確定さが示すように、グローバルな政治は一層複雑になりつつある。中国としては過剰投資の経済を「新常态」にソフトランドさせる必要から、習近平は去る2月17日に国家安全保障委員会委員長として、中国が新しい世界秩序を形成し、国際安全保障を保護するにあたって主導権をとるべきだと初めて述べた。

さらに習近平は党内の人事を掌握することで、自己の地位の強化に努めてきた。今秋の第19回党大会でその掌握ぶりがよりはっきりと見えるであろうが、これが第2期の統治改革の成功を左右する。権力を自らの手中に集中させようとする彼の意志は抵抗に会ったが、党の中央委員会が彼を第5世代の指導者層の「中核」に据える決定をしたことで、彼の権威は一層強化された。こうしたことで、習近平のことを「帝王的国家主席」と呼ぶ有力学者もいるくらいである。

習の権威は、とくに外交・安全保障の分野で実質的である。彼はすべての主要な外交分野を掌握している。過去の首相が持っていたヨーロッパ、西アジア、北アフリカなどの分野も自分のものにしていく。彼は早期に前任者と決別して、自ら「中国の夢」や「中華民族の復興」という新しいスローガン、それに「新シルクロード」を「一带一路」と改名しさらに「帯路イニシアティブ」(BRI) という語を作りだすなどの意欲を見せてきた。これは大戦略とは言えないまでも、西側の覇権を壊すことに中国が成功するかどうかの試金石になる。

共産党は中国の公式の立場と世界観を一手に引き受ける権威となっており、党の文化的指導権は過去5年間の間に著しく強化された。劉雲山 (Liu Yunshan) は中央党学校、内外情宣活動、政府批判の抑圧などを統括してきた。このため、最も権威ある大学や研究所でも思想の幅を強制的に狭められてきた。このイデオロギーの引き締めは今後の中国の発展に必要なものであるとの考えに寄っており、1980年代にもあったことである。第19回党大会以後円滑な発展はないかもしれないが、指導層は2021年および2049年という2つの百周年行事に合わせて党の立場を維持しているようだ。

この筋道は習近平側近の王滬寧 (Wang Huning) などが進めているものであるが、中国の外交・安全保障政策にもいくつかの含意するところがある。第1に、党の役割を拡大することで、「国際社会」の中に入り、「調和」を求めることで西側の覇権を終わらせ、西側に代わる社会、経済、政治モデルを提示して平等の正当性を期待することを意味する。

第2に、思想統一の促進は長い間には指導層に必要な政策選択の幅を制限することになるかもしれない。習近平は最近優秀な人材を研究所に集め、政府と民間の交流によって機関間の境界を取り払うという構想を打ち出したが、思想統制強化で学者たちが怯えてしまえば、そうした効果は期待できなくなることを意味する。

第3に、中国の社会主義市場経済の「中国的特徴」に重点がおかれ、国営企業の役割が強調されれば、実際には既存の慣行と対立し、党国家全体に組織内部局の断片化が進むことを意味する。

海外中国人や海外資産の保護能力を超える中国の海外投資の増大、中国の投資、貿易における相互主義を軽視する態度に対する諸外国、とくにヨーロッパ諸国の反応などである。

## 4. China's Maritime Security Policy: Trends in Early 2017

Mathieu Duchâtel

2017年初の中国の南シナ海政策を決定するのは、トランプ政権が航行の自由問題をどう取り扱うかという点とハーグ裁定後の「新常态」の管理という点である。この点で見ると、中国は2013-2016年の期間の際よりも慎重で低姿勢で臨むと見られるが、しかしこれは戦術的休止であって、中国は新しく確立した戦略的プレゼンスを引き続き静かに固めるであろう。同様のパターンは東シナ海でも見られる。北京から見れば、中国は尖閣諸島の接続水域に定期的プレゼンスを据えて「共同管理」をしているとのイメージを投射することに成功しているからである。

当面中国はトランプ政権が南シナ海問題に関する決意がどこにあるかを試そうとするであろうし、その間台湾が重要な国家安全保障問題として再び浮上するかもしれない。総じて中国は抵抗の少ない空白の地域へ引き続き進出をするだろうと考えるべきである。よってここでは南シナ海問題に焦点を当てたい。

### 中国はハーグ裁定の効果の中和化に成功した

中国は自国に不利な裁定の効果の中和化することに成功した。国際システムの執行力欠如とフィリピンの行動欠如によるものであった。反対勢力の弱さと分裂さらにドゥテルテ政権の新しい外交政策に助けられて、中国は再び戦略的イニシアティブを確保した。日本やオーストラリアは中国が裁定に従うべきことを要求する声明を出したが、むしろ孤立することになった。EUの声明は、内部の対立を反映して弱いものであった。ASEANにいたっては声明も出せなかった。米国はホワイトハウスと太平洋軍司令部(PACOM)との自由航行作戦の重要性をめぐる対立が表ざたになった。この結果、裁定を執行すべき自由航行作戦の不足がドゥテルテが裁定プロセスに背を向ける決定をした一要因だったかもしれない。

フィリピンと中国は結局仲裁に持ち込んだのは誤りであったという点で合意し、中国は中国はフィリピンに将来の海洋シルクロードに組み込む約束をし、麻薬戦争に政治的支援を与えることとした。他方で、中国はスカボロー礁での埋め立て工事を中止し、その周辺の漁業権を両国が持つことを口頭による了解事項とした。こうして中国側は将来修正可能な譲歩をしたのである。ドゥテルテの方は、国内で二国間交渉の方が得であると説得することができる。

### 中国は南シナ海での利得獲得を低姿勢で続ける

中国は、仲裁経過を中和化することに成功したことで、習政権の海洋進出政策が南シナ海での具体的な利得を可能にしたという評価を強めることになっている。中国の戦略的目的は東シナ海および南シナ海の行政的支配を達成することであり、軍部幹部はPLAの目的は九段線の内側の海をコントロールすることであると明言している。

さらに中国はスプラトリー岩礁の人工島に地对空ミサイルを配備する準備をしているという。また沖合のプロジェクトに安定した電力供給をするための浮上原発の構想もある。

### 中国は航行の自由作戦でトランプ政権を試す

トランプ政権が航行の自由作戦(FONOP)に関してどんな政策をとるかは分からない。2016年12月の海中ドローン事件はトランプ政権を試す中国式のやり方であった。中国側にはやりすぎてトランプが貿易問題まで持ち出すような過剰反応をすることを恐れた。このドローン事件が示したように、中国は南シナ海での米国の作戦を難しくすることを狙ったものであった。今後ますます中国の情報収集活動は活発になり、米国は新しく試されるだろう。

### ヨーロッパの立場

米国が主導権をもって裁定を執行するのでなければ、ヨーロッパは政治的リーダーシップを発揮できる立場にはない。ただヨーロッパでは、南シナ海で法の支配による秩序が崩れるのであれば、世界中に影響を及ぼす可能性がある懸念する声がある。また軍部関係者間では、南シナ海の長期的な政治的影響を認識し始めている。中国が南シナ海で支配的地位を持てば、他の国々が

市場を利用することは困難になる。ヨーロッパ諸国は国際法の順守を指摘し続けざるを得ない。ヨーロッパは ASEAN や中国との間で別個に、海洋統治および漁業管理の点で発言できる。また地域内で毎年見られる仏海軍をヨーロッパ化する時期に来ている。これに PLA との協議が補完されるべきである。中国の戦略的行動にヨーロッパが UNCLOS 支持の点で影響力を及ぼすチャンネルとなる。

これまで、ヨーロッパは価値外交を重んじたが、南シナ海では低姿勢で非関与の姿勢をとるとし、何かがあれば自動的に米国の側に立ったが、米欧関係における戦略的不信が台頭している今日、もはやこれを当然視すべきではない。

## 5. East Asia: Territorial Issues And Regional Security Developments: The View From Japan's Alliance Partner, With A Focus On The Senkaku Islands Dispute

Robert D. Eldridge

中国はこれまで巡視船、漁民、軍用機、艦船、巡視船などを尖閣諸島周辺に送ってきた。軍用機の侵入も頻繁で、航空自衛隊のスクランブル回数は2016年の一年間に1,000回以上に及んだ。那覇基地に配備した空自戦闘機の機数は従来の2倍の40機になった。中国機の侵入回数が高まれば、空自戦闘機の数は十分でなくなる可能性が生じる。筆者はこのため、米軍機と空自機との合同パトロール案、そして尖閣諸島に近い下地基地（3,000メートル滑走路がある）に日米両部隊の駐留案を提案してきた。

日本はさらに、尖閣諸島が属する石垣市に巡視船12隻を配備した。巡視船の過重負担を軽減するため、安倍内閣はより大型の船を配備する方針で、約200億円の予算を付け、海上保安庁の予算を計2,100億円（18.2億ドル相当）とした。

こうした努力にもかかわらず、日本は尖閣諸島の管理にあたってより基本的な方策をとっていないため、日中部隊の衝突の可能性を大きくしている。日本は尖閣諸島に灯台、気象観測所、レーダー設備、緊急避難港やヘリポートを設置し、政府職員を配置すべきである。これらは政府の言う「実効性のある行政管理」の範囲内のことであり、上陸許可を守る抑止になる。これをしないで周囲をパトロールしているだけでは、日本自身が島を本当に所有しているとは思っていないからだということになる。自国の市民の上陸を禁止し、政府職員や議員の現地調査を禁止していたのでは、日本の主張は弱いと思われる。

中国や台湾の主張も弱く、間違っているが、尖閣問題の起源は、尖閣諸島の領土主権に関しては「中立である」とした米国の曖昧な立場にある。

尖閣諸島に関する主権および台湾の国際的地位に関する史実の誤りを糾すために、そして中国の台頭で尖閣諸島の地位を維持するのが難しくなり、安全の保証がうわべだけのものになっているという事実を照らして、大胆な発想が必要である。米国政府がこれまでの立場を変え、尖閣諸島の主権は日本にあることを認めるべきである。当然、中国や台湾は反対するであろう。しかし台湾には交換条件を提示し、台湾がこの米国の立場を認めるならば、日米は直ちに台湾の独立を認めることにすればよい。さらに日米代表は台湾が尖閣への領土主張を放棄することで蔡英文総統をノーベル平和賞受賞者に指名することができる。私はこれを Grand Bargain（大取引）と呼ぶ。

日本政府は、長く尖閣諸島は日米条約下にあるとの立場をとってきた。しかし筆者は、条約第5条（日本の施政権下の地域への武力攻撃があった場合は日米両部隊で対処する）を政治的に扱うことは容易であるが、軍事的に扱うのは容易ではないと指摘してきた。武装漁民の侵入、嵐を逃れて避難してきた大量の漁船の扱い、島の利用が必要になった緊急事態、海上で船舶の衝突があつて日本側が攻撃国にされるなどの場合、扱いが複雑となる。

我々は中国が尖閣諸島を支配下におくことは日本、米国、そして地域全体にとっても危険である点では合意している。可能であれば外交的に、必要であれば軍事的に対処すべきである。日本と米国は緊密に、また地域の友邦国とともに協力していかなければならない。

## 6. The Korean Peninsula: Focus of Tensions

Masashi Nishihara

朝鮮半島の統一は現実的か。朴槿恵大統領に対する国会での弾劾決議、李在鎔サムスン副会長の逮捕、金正男の暗殺に見る金正恩党委員長の不安定な位置など、南北朝鮮とも不安定な状況で、半島の統一への可能性が今ほど遠のいている時はない。

南北朝鮮の間の緊張は増している。金正恩は言われているような不合理なリーダーではなく、核の現代化のために慎重に戦略を練るリーダーである。朴大統領は *trustpolitik* を唱道してきたが、2016年1月北の核実験に不快感を示して開城工業団地を閉鎖してしまった。北は弾道ミサイルの発射実験を繰り返している。

今日、半島の統一を望む国はない。中国は北朝鮮を米国への緩衝国として維持したく、統一に関心はない。米国も核保有の統一韓国を望んでいない。オバマ政権の「戦略的忍耐」戦略は失敗であった。日本も統一反日韓国には反対である。

第二の朝鮮戦争の可能性はどうだろうか。そうした大規模の戦争を望む国は今日存在しないので、その可能性は小さい。半島での戦争は北朝鮮の経済を潰してしまうだろう。とはいえ、北朝鮮は韓国の政治的混乱を政治的空白と捉え、自国の支配地域を拡張する機会と思うかもしれない。半島の勢力均衡が維持されている間は、あやふやながらも安定は続くが、金正恩は「時は自分に有利だ」と考えれば、行動に出るかもしれない。

では平和的で非核の統一韓国という解決策はあるのだろうか。まず韓国と北朝鮮の間の信頼醸成が必要である。これまでの試みはすべて失敗している。米日韓およびEU諸国は相互に協力して、中露が北朝鮮に核・ミサイルの開発を控えるよう促すべきである。そのためにはまず中露と協議することが必要である。地域内には米中間の THAAD、日中間の尖閣諸島、日韓間の竹島および戦時中の問題、それに南シナ海、台湾など多くの問題があるので、信頼醸成は容易ではない。

北朝鮮に対する経済制裁がこれまで成功していないのは、中国の協力が不十分だからであった。制裁の効果をもっと上げる努力が必要であるが、同時に北朝鮮との関与を進める方策を探るべきである。北の非核化と引き換えに体制変化への不干渉を交渉することが必要である。北朝鮮を核保有国として容認することは、他の核保有希望国を励ますことになるばかりか、金正恩もその容認を自分の勝利と考え、さらに大国との関係で有利な立場に立とうとするであろう。

いま一つのアプローチはピョンヤンの体制変化を扇動することである。これは暴力を伴う危険なシナリオであるが、それでも何もしないでいて現政権が核で脅すのを許すよりは、不確かな将来であっても思い切って受け入れ可能な体制を見る方がましである。結局のところ、朝鮮半島の将来はトランプ大統領の政策にかかっている。

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107-0052 東京都港区赤坂1丁目1番12号 明産溜池ビル8階 Tel: 03-3560-3288 Fax: 03-3560-3289

Research Institute for Peace and Security

Meisan Tameike Building 8F 1-1-12 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0052, Japan rips-info@rips.or.jp www.rips.or.jp